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Security Exchange Theory is a novel approach to alliance behaviors in which a great 
power gives scarce security goods to a small state.  This behavior is a puzzle for two 
reasons.  First, it seems unlikely that a rational state would give away valuable resources 
without getting something in return, yet small states seem to have nothing to offer.  
Second, small states sometimes refuse great power offers, which would seem to indicate 
that “free” security goods impose some sort of cost.  This theory addresses both of these 
puzzles.  First, it argues that great powers evaluate small states on their ability to 
contribute to the great power’s security agenda.  The extent to which a small state can do 
so is its Perceived Strategic Value (PSV) in the eyes of the great power.  Ceteris paribus, 
small states with higher PSV receive larger security exchanges.  Second, it argues that 
small states face a wider array of threats than do great powers and array their forces to 
meet the greatest threat facing the regime.  To the extent that the small state’s security 
perspective mirrors the great power’s, the level of security exchanges will be higher.  
However, because security exchanges impose costs on both parties, there are many cases 
in which either low PSV or an incompatible small state strategic agenda makes a security 
exchange unlikely.  I test the theory using great power – small state interactions in the 
Middle East between 1952 and 1961 using qualitative methods and from 1952 to 1979 
using statistical analysis.  I find Security Exchange Theory is a powerful and 
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, 1956, the American National Security Council met for the 283
rd
 time.  
During this particular the discussion of American grand strategy, the topic turned to the 
costs of America’s military posture abroad.  The Secretary of the Treasury was a business 
magnate named George M. Humphreys, and he “expressed the view that all this money 
being spent on bases throughout the world would be better spent on producing B-52 
aircraft in the United States.”
1
  He urged his fellow council members to “[t]hink of all the 
money that the United States had poured into Formosa.  Think of what it would have 
bought us in terms of B-52 aircraft.  In the last analysis,” he said, “the United States will 
stand or fall on how strong we are.”
2
  As a result, he argued that America would need “to 




President Eisenhower had a different view.  He told his advisors that “the matter 
of bases was nowhere near as simple as Secretary Humphrey indicated.”
4
  In fact, in a 
general war with the Soviet Union, it was his opinion that America “could do a lot more 
damage to the enemy with a small or medium bomber from the ring of nearby bases than 
we could inflict with much larger bombers based in the continental United States.”
5
  
Thus, in the view of the President, it “was unthinkable that we should abandon our bases 
around the periphery of the Soviet Union.”
6
  Nonetheless, it was true that the U.S. had 
finite resources at its disposal and it had to be judicious in its pursuit of security.  
                                                        
1
 “Memorandum of discussion,” Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records, as reproduced in 
“Memorandum of Discussion at the 285
th
 Meeting of the National Security Council,” May 17, 1956.  in 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957, Vol XIX: National Security Policy, ed. John P. Glennon, 











 Chapter 1: Introduction 
2 
 
Therefore, “[t]he President said that the heart of the foreign assistance problem was the 
question of eventual cost to the United States of a given ally, and how much that ally was 
worth to us.  This was something which we ought to be able to calculate and thus reach a 
conclusion on how many allies we can afford to have.”
7
 
 Many theories of international relations and alliance behavior share Secretary 
Humphrey’s views of military power and, therefore, his puzzlement at the large sums that 
great powers dedicate to developing and maintaining alliances with small states.  If a 
great power goes to the trouble of building the tools of modern warfare, presumably in 
the belief that those tools contribute to their national power and security, the fact that it 
would subsequently give them away to others seems bizarre.  The great power must 
believe some value is gained in the exchange, but it is difficult to understand what 
precisely that value is using the rough aggregate measures employed by both Sec. 
Humphrey and contemporary political science. 
 The reality of great power behavior over the past 70 years, however, indicates that 
President Eisenhower’s approach dominates modern security policy-making.  While great 
powers sign formal security agreements with a wide variety of states, there is substantial 
variation in the level of assistance offered to allies.  It would seem that there is some 
underlying logic that determines how important a state is, and thus, how large a share of 
the finite pool of available security resources it should receive.  The purpose of this 
project is to create and test a general theory of great power–small state security 
exchanges that explains this consistent, widespread, and currently inexplicable 
phenomenon. 
                                                        
7
 Ibid. 
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 The transfer of security goods from a great power to a small state is best 
understood as a bargain struck between two self-maximizing, security-seeking parties.  
Great powers are the dominant military and economic actors in the global system and can 
only be defeated by a group of states that contains at least one other great power.  Small 
states are unable to meaningfully shift the global balance of power on the basis of their 
resources alone and are therefore only of contingent importance to global politics.  The 
great power believes that the small state offers some value to its security posture in the 
world that outweighs the cost of the goods being transferred – I call this valuation the 
small state’s Perceived Strategic Value.  The small state believes that the value of the 
transferred goods to what I call its Small State Strategy offset the logistical, doctrinal, 
organizational, and strategic costs that accepting great power security transfers imposes.  
I call the encounter between these two distinct strategic logics Security Exchange Theory. 
 Security Exchange Theory is rooted in a more nuanced and subjective 
understanding of military capability than is commonly employed in the political science 
literature.  In this chapter, I discuss the theoretical antecedents to the model of capability 
and strategic value that I employ here, as well as some of the competing views on the 
topic.  With my argument for an expanded notion of capability in place, I then turn to 
competing theories of alliance behavior, with a particular focus on existing models of 
security exchanges.  I show that because they rely on a limited conceptualization of 
capability they are unable to offer a satisfactory explanation for the puzzle of great power 
security transfers to small states.  Next, I briefly discuss two of the significant approaches 
to bargaining and alliance formation.  Finally, I conclude by outlining the remainder of 
the project. 




Capability and Offense-Defense Theory 
 Inherent in any realist approach to international relations is the notion that states’ 
differential capacity for acting in the material world is a central determinant of political 
outcomes.  Even in the very brief introduction above, when I have used the terms “great 
power” and “small state,” I have implicitly been speaking of capabilities (and not, for 
example, geographic size).  Capability and power are notoriously slippery concepts in the 
IR canon; nonetheless, there is a sense that for many applications a rough-and-ready 
estimate of relative power is all that’s needed to understand the structure of a system and 
the relative capabilities of the actors.
8
 
 Yet while such measures can be adequate for assessing the structural 
characteristics of an international system, they do not scale down particularly well.  In 
particular, states are anxious to determine the precise configuration of power and 
capabilities that will create security and positive international outcome and would be 
foolish to rely on an either hefty amount of aggregate power or a local relative advantage 
to ensure victory.  History has consistently demonstrated that simply having a lot of 
power in the sense commonly used by international relations theory does not guarantee 
success in international competition.  For example, sprawling kingdoms with immense 
wealth, large populations, and sizable military establishments were brought low by a 
relatively small number of conquistadors in Central and South America.  A numerically 
                                                        
8
 For examples of the debate about power and capabilities, see Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,”  
Behavioral Science 2 (July 1957): 201-215; Robert J. Art, “American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of 
Force,” Security Studies 5 (Summer 1996): 7-42; Stephen Baldwin, “Force, Fungibility, and Influence,” 
Security Studies 8 (Summer 1999): 173-182; Robert J. Art, “Force and Fungibility Reconsidered,” Security 
Studies 8 (Summer 1999): 183-189.  For examples of rough estimates used for the calculation of power, see 
the argument about the identification of great powers in Kennenth Waltz, Theory of International Politics  
(Menlo Park: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 131; or the discussion of aggregate power in Stephen Walt, The 
Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 275. 
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superior Iraqi force was unable to prevent a US armored brigade from driving through 
Baghdad and parking at the airport, thus triggering a collapse in the Iraqi Army’s 
resistance and the demise of the Ba’athist regime.  A non-motorized Vietnamese Army 
was able to inflict a catastrophic defeat on the French at Dien Bien Phu, which soon 
ended France’s control of the country.  Obviously, a simple comparison of national 
wealth, population, total military personnel, or industrialization can fail to predict 
important international outcomes.  To understand the “capability” of a state, it is 
insufficient to simply know the size of its population, economy, or military.  One must 
have an idea of what technologies its military has at its disposal, their advantages and 
limitations, and how a state intends to leverage its military capacity into strategic 
outcomes.  This relationship between the technologies of warfare, the doctrine guiding 
their use, and the security behavior of states has been a fruitful avenue of scholarly 
inquiry and has created the more precise approach to capability that I leverage in Security 
Exchange Theory. 
Offense-Defense Theory (hereinafter ODT) is a theoretical tradition which ties 
political outcomes to variation in both the amount and the nature of a state’s military 
capability.  The modern taproot of this approach is Jervis’ “Cooperation Under the 
Security Dilemma,” which uses a simple game theoretic model to illuminate conditions 
under which states might feel more or less compelled to initiate hostilities.
9
  One way to 
think about the subsequent development of ODT is to analyze the literature in terms of a 
split between the objective and subjective elements of Jervis’ original formulation.  The 
                                                        
9
 See also George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (Piscataway, NJ: 
Transaction Books, 1977).   Quester discusses a similar logic at book length, albeit with a heavier emphasis 
on technology than perception.  Levy delves into the earlier antecedents of the contemporary debate.  See 
Jack Levy, “The Offensive-Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical 
Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (June 1984): 219-238.   
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former emphasizes the importance of specific physical objects or tactical innovations, the 




 Security Exchange Theory is based, in part, on the Perceived Strategic Value that 
a great power assigns to a small state.  This implies that perception is an important basis 
for strategic calculation – or, put differently, not every actor confronted with a strategic 
problem and a given set of capabilities will understand the problem in the same way and 
apply the capabilities identically.  The complications implied by this approach could be 
avoided, however, by simply adopting a purely objective method for the evaluation of 
security problems as exemplified by objective ODT. 
The allure of a completely objective basis for ODT is immense.  If war becomes 
more likely in offense-dominant systems, and such systems are determined by the 
possession of discrete, corporeal objects by state actors, then an elegant, 
operationalizable, and exogenous variable will have been discovered that explains a 
major question in the field: what makes wars more likely?  It would also, for present 
purposes, provide a neat definition of precisely what is meant by capability and a clear 
direction on how to measure it.  Within the objective ODT tradition, there are two 
approaches to capability – (1) capabilities are strictly technological and (2) capabilities 
are technology mediated by doctrine and other things.  Both of these are easily 
observable -- machines are easy enough to discover when mass-produced and 
conventional doctrine must be widely disseminated to be useful.  The foregoing theories 
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argue that these observable truths translate readily into political behaviors; in essence, the 
material military world causes a political logic to emerge 
The first approach to capability, which asserts that it is purely technological, finds 
its historical roots in interwar efforts to classify “offensive” and “defensive” technologies 
for the purposes of arms control.  The contemporary variant of this idea seeks to apply 
the sophisticated methodologies of combat simulations to determine the ratio of offensive 
forces required to overwhelm the defense, when optimal employment on both sides is 
assumed
10
 or utilizes a reading of the elements of combat power to determine the 
ascendancy of the offense in any given period and then subjects that historical assessment 
to quantitative analysis.
11
  This is an exceedingly narrow basis for the determination of 
the offense/defense balance, but is certainly tractable. 
 Numerous scholars in the objective vein find the narrow approach inadequate, due 
to the difficulty in determining what precisely constitutes an offensive weapon,
12
 what 
characteristics of a system are inherently “offensive”,
13
 and, of course, the nature of the 
war in which these systems are to be utilized.
14
  Thus, these authors employ broader 
definitions of offense-defense that include not only technology, but also geography, 
strategy, tactics, opponent, etc.  Proponents of this broader view assert that offense 
                                                        
10
 Chaim Kaufmann and Charles Glaser, “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?”  
International Security 22 (Spring 1998): 44-82. 
11
 Karen Ruth Adams, “Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence 
Balance,” International Security 28 (Winter 2003/04):  45-83. 
12
 Levy, “The Offensive-Defensive Balance of Military Technology.”   
13
 Keir A. Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International 
Security,” International Security 25 (Summer 2000):  71-104. 
14
 See, for example, Jonathan Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case of 
Military Entrepreneurship,” International Security 15 (Winter 1990/91): 187-215; or John Mearsheimer, 
Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 24-27. 
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 or the use 
blitzkrieg strategies instead of attrition,
17
 any of which can be evaluated objectively by an 
external observer. 
 In many respects, the broader approach is preferable, since the employment of a 
given technology is inextricably linked to its battlefield effectiveness, and the same 
weapons can seem to favor the offense or the defense, depending on who employs them 
and how.
18
  Optimal employment of a given set of weapons is a heroic assumption that 
runs directly counter to the entire concept of military endeavor -- it assumes that there is 
some “optimal” employment, known to both sides, against which there can only be set its 
“optimal” counterpart.  Of course, the goal of military strategy is to employ one’s forces 
in such a way as to avoid the “optimum” strategy of one’s opponent while simultaneously 
optimizing one’s own forces to their anticipated reaction.  There is, in short, no optimum, 
only a continuous competition to out-innovate one’s competitors,
19
 thus making the 
narrow approach to objective ODT untenable. 
 However, the broader approach is not without its own significant issues.  The 
simpler variant, which either favors an extremely broad interpretation of “offense 
dominance” or a combination of offensive technologies and a corresponding doctrinal 
                                                        
15
 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1999), 118, note 2. 
16
 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 17, 21. 
17
 Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 29. 
18
 See, for example, Stacie E. Goddard’s remarks in James W. Davis, Jr., Bernard I. Finel, Stacie E. 
Goddard, Stephen Van Evera, Charles L. Glaser, and Chaim Kaufmann, “Correspondence: Taking Offense 
at Offense-Defense Theory,”  International Security 23 (Winter 1998/99): 179-206; Shimshoni, 
“Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I;” Biddle, Military Power. 
19
 As exemplified in Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I.” 
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innovation has significant problems.
20
  First, as Betts points out, with the addition of only 
a few additional variables, one can simply return to referring to “offense-defense 
balance” as “relative power” and be done with it.
21
  Second, the division of all possible 
strategies into “blitzkrieg, attrition, and deterrence,” which correlate roughly to offensive, 
defensive, and deterrent political dynamics requires a controversial reading of both 
military strategy and history.
22
  Third, the valorization of “blitzkrieg” leads to an 
overweighting of the importance of armored forces and, in some ways, to a reversion to a 
narrower sort of accounting (tanks * blitzkrieg = victory).  This is incorrect.
23
 
 The more sophisticated reading of doctrine, which acknowledges more 
complexity than a simple offense-defense dichotomy, has its own issues.  Specifically, 
implementation of a modern approach to force employment underweights the importance 
of technological factors – Biddle writes explicitly that “[t]echnology does not, however, 
determine who will win and who will lose, which is normally determined by force 
employment.”
24
  This overstates the case – it was clear in the 2003 invasion of Iraqi that 
the Iraqi Army had learned from its previous defeat and established a defense in depth, 
with concentric rings around Baghdad.  However, it still possessed no weapons capable 
                                                        
20
 For in-depth discussions of the impact of this kind of doctrine / technology interaction, see Mearsheimer, 
Conventional Deterrence, or Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and 
Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). 
21
 Richard K. Betts, “Must War Find A Way?” International Security 24 (Fall 1999):  166-198. 
22
 For example, Desert Storm was an example of an attrition-based strategy that was highly favorable to the 
offense and was concluded quite rapidly. 
23
 See p. 31 in Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine for a discussion of the adverse effects of tank 
fetishism on the IDF in 1973.  See p. 387 in Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace” for a discussion of 
the defensive utility of tanks in a retrograde war of attrition.  See Stephen Biddle, “Rebuilding the 
Foundations of Offense Defense Theory,” The Journal of Politics 63 (August 2001): 753 for a discussion of 
Operation GOODWOOD, in which “the British amassed one of the highest tank densities in history ... 
though they outnumbered the Germans more than 5:1 in tanks, a reserve-oriented German defense in depth 
took a tremendous toll on the exposed British attackers, destroying more than one-third of all the British 
armor on the continent in under three days and halting the offensive after an advance of only 10 
kilometers.” 
24
 Biddle, “Rebuilding the Foundations,” 750. 
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of reliably penetrating the armor of American tanks, so a single armored brigade was able 
to simply drive through the defenses, killing everything in its path, and park itself in 
Baghdad International Airport with a minimum of casualties.
25
  What Biddle predicts as a 
“very defense-favorable balance” that should have resulted in a “contained offensive” 
with “very high attacker losses” and a “very large numerical preponderance required to 
prevail” resulted in the exact opposite, due to technological overmatch.
26
 
 In either the narrow or broad approach to objective ODT, the argument that 
capability determines the politics of security in an obvious and mechanical fashion has 
serious problems.  It is clear that states would be ill-advised to pursue security based on 
the narrow view of objective ODT, since doing so would cause them to misperceive the 
likelihood of battlefield victory due to its neglect of doctrine, strategy, and other key 
factors.  However, the broader approach is still insufficient, as it continues to assume that 
capabilities, however defined, have a single optimum employment, obvious to all experts, 
that determines outcomes.  Moreover, in order to make the theories tractable, capabilities 
themselves (and thus expert opinion) are forced into quite limited categories, which then 
fail to make useful predictions in several key cases, as noted above.  If the theories cannot 
reliably predict who will win an armed conflict, it seems impossible that they would 
usefully predict the strategies states would pursue to prepare themselves for that conflict, 




                                                        
25
 For an account of the battle, see David Zucchino, Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad 
(New York: Grove, 2004). 
26
 Biddle, “Rebuilding the Foundations,” 750. 
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Subjective ODT offers an alternative – rather than a purely objective 
consideration of technology as such, the important thing in security behavior is what 
policy-makers believe about the efficacy of their technology and doctrine.  These beliefs 
about warfare structure both international aggressiveness and alliance politics and thus, 
despite whatever the truth may be about who will actually win in a war and how well it is 
captured in theories above, it is what leaders think will happen and how much it will cost 
that is important in determining security exchanges. 
 The most famous work in this subjective branch of the ODT tradition is Snyder’s 
Ideology of the Offensive.
27
  In it he argues that rational calculation of the efficacy of the 
offensive (the “optimum employment” discussed earlier) is mediated by organizational 
and political biases,
28
 causing military leaders to value the offense for its own sake, even 
in the face of abundant contrary evidence, in order to maintain their organizational clout 
within the government, the culture of the professional military, and the illusion that 
victory is possible.  The belief that the offensive was the dominant form of warfare was 
the primary cause of the First World War – each country believed that it had to mobilize 
quickly in order to take the offensive and win what was assumed to be a short, sharp war.  




 The shift here is subtle, but remarkably important.  It is no longer necessary to 
undertake complex modeling of the initial clash of two great armies, calculate force 
                                                        
27
 Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1984). 
28
 Ibid., 33. 
29
 Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International 
Security 9 (Summer 1984): 58-107.  This argument has, naturally, inspired criticism.  The main thrust is 
that the cult of the offensive is overstated and that the doctrinal beliefs of 1914 were reasonable given the 
geopolitical circumstances in which the actors found themselves. 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
12 
 
ratios, evaluate the efficacy of force-employment, make final claims about which factors 
do and do not facilitate the offense, or even derive a meaningful definition of what the 
offense actually is.
30
  It is sufficient merely to know what a state leadership believes to be 
the case.  That these opinions might be ludicrous from our viewpoint is no matter, for 
“we are all capable of believing things which we know to be untrue, and then, when we 
are finally proved wrong, impudently twisting the facts so as to show that we were right. 
Intellectually, it is possible to carry on this process for an indefinite time: the only check 
on it is that sooner or later a false belief bumps up against solid reality, usually on a 
battlefield.”
31
  This theory is, of course, useless for identifying the likely outcome of 
conflicts – it would need the addition of the objective sorts of assessments described 
above about technology, doctrine, geography, and the like – but it is invaluable in 
assessing the link between military capability and political outcomes prior to the 
initiation of hostilities. 
 
Defining Capability 
 Security Exchange Theory understands the transfer of security resources from a 
great power to a small state as a bargain between two security-seeking entities.  The 
agreement to exchange goods is meant to achieve some future security outcome; in the 
world described by objective ODT, the bargain would be rather straightforward.  The 
                                                        
30
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value of any small state to a great power, the value of the goods being transferred, and the 
optimum allocation of security resources for any given state would be public information, 
devoid of political calculation.  In fact, the bargains are much more interesting because 
leaders and national security establishments are able to hold differing opinions about the 
security environment, the value of capabilities, and their optimum employment.  What 
states perceive to be the case regarding their security determines their behavior and the 
type of capabilities they seek.  Thus, in this project, I argue that perception is a key 
determinant of Security Exchanges, both in terms of the great power’s valuation of the 
small state and the small state’s valuation of the resources being offered. 
 That said, military capabilities do not exist solely in the realm of the imaginary.  
In order to create an analytical structure for the things about which states form their 
perceptions, I draw on the categories created by objective ODT.  Specifically, I divide 
capability into four components and define capability as the self-perceived effectiveness 
with which a state can generate military power in order to do violence to others and deny 
them the ability to do the same, as measured by the perceived impact of force size, 
technology, doctrine, and geography.  By force size, I mean the raw number of military 
personnel and weapons available (for example, a million soldiers or a thousand tanks); by 
technology, I mean the type of weapons (for example, T-54s or T-72s); by doctrine, I 
mean the organizational and bureaucratic mechanisms used to combine people and 
systems into military power (this covers everything from blitzkrieg doctrine to officer 
training to logistics procedures); by geography, I mean the physical space in which 
military force is to be created, staged, or employed.  These components are interrelated 
and their policy impact is mediated in a significant way by the subjective beliefs of 
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policymakers.  Put simply, a state will seek develop a force that mixes size, technology, 
and doctrine, and deploy that force in physical space based on its subjective 
understanding of its security environment and available alternatives.  To the extent it can 
develop such a force internally at acceptable cost it will do so.  However, states 
sometimes lack some element of capability that they believe would enhance their security 
and that could be provided by a potential ally.  If the need is reciprocated, there exists the 
potential for a mutually beneficial security exchange. 
 
Theories of Alliance Formation: Capability Aggregation and Its Competitors 
 This project is situated within the contemporary trend in alliance scholarship that 
focuses on particular subsets of alliance behavior in order to illuminate important 
variations in state behavior that are lost in more general theories.
32
  As useful as a more 
precise approach is in its own right, it is nonetheless important to situate it within the 
larger alliance literature, both to contribute to the general accumulation of scholarly 
knowledge and to test whether the alliance behavior being explained is already well-
accounted for within a broader approach. 
Contemporary political science has coalesced around several sets of explanations 
for alliance behavior: security-autonomy trade-offs, ideological affinity, symbolic 
competition / signaling, and the tradition that informs Security Exchange Theory, 
capability aggregation.  I will not review the larger debates that have occurred among the 
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proponents of these various traditions.
33
  Instead, I show that great power alliances with 
small states, and particularly those which require the transfer of goods from the great 
power, present special analytical difficulties to these four larger-scale theoretical 
traditions. 
The security-autonomy literature is built upon Altfeld’s 1984 article in which he 
argues that states either produce military armament internally at their own cost or 
contract with other states to obtain security through alliances, and thereby preserve their 
wealth for other purposes.
34
  The cost extracted by the party that offers to “sell” their 
security guarantee is some limit imposed on the autonomy of policy-makers in the 
“buyer” state.  Morrow extends this approach to a range of cases that includes the bipolar 
era and expands the logic to argue that the most stable form of alliance are those in which 
the gains are asymmetric – that is, one party gains security and the other party gains 
autonomy.
35
  This logic is further refined by Palmer and David, who argue that the nature 
of the security guarantee (nuclear v. non-nuclear) creates different spaces for autonomy 
by weaker members.
36
  Referencing earlier work,
 37
 they make an important observation – 
at some level, a great power might become so “security rich” that it can export security 
through alliances at no additional cost to itself. Thus, great powers might ally with small 
states because doing so ensures the support of the small state for the status quo (the small 
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state gives up any revisionist autonomy) at acceptable cost, or they might do so simply 
because it is costless and so any possible benefit is pure profit (in the sense that it induces 
support for the status quo). 
 At the level of major regional powers or in multipolar systems, perhaps this is true 
– for present purposes I need not take a position on whether or not great powers trade 
foreign policy autonomy for security guarantees in this fashion.  But the answer this 
approach offers regarding great power security exchanges with small states is 
unsatisfying.  Unless a security guarantee is costless, why would a great power extend 
one to states that have no capacity, through their autonomy, to upset the status quo?  And, 
of course, if a security guarantee is costless because the forces have already been created 
and allocated (as, for example, extending naval protection to a country whose coastline 
you already intend to protect from rival great powers), one wonders why a small state 
would trade autonomy rather than simply free-ride (which is what Palmer suggests 
happens in these cases).  Trading a security surplus to enlist the support of minor states 
for the status quo seems to be a poor bargain for great powers and a weak explanation of 
the behavior.  In addition to these theoretical challenges, contemporary attempts to 
operationalize security-autonomy models as they apply to US foreign and military aid 
have yielded generally erratic results.
38
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 In contrast to the security-autonomy argument, theories of ideological solidarity 
assert that states make security decisions as a function of ideological similarity.  Thus, 
while from a material standpoint, great power transfers of security goods to small states 
might seem irrational, they can be comfortably explained by the ideological and 
normative commitments of the state to a particular version of the world.  In some cases, 
this takes the logic of the Democratic Peace Theory (which holds that democracies will 
not go to war with one another) and seeks to extend it to positive commitments (e.g. 
democracies will form alliances with each other).
39
  Others simply make the claim that 
alliances are more likely between ideologically similar states.
40
  Neither approach does 
well empirically.  As it happens, it appears that democratic (and autocratic) states only 
get along in the presence of a threatening “other”
41
 and ideology is a poor predictor of 
alliance behavior in some non-European regions.
42
  If anything, the pattern is that 
autocratic states enhance their security through alliances, then reduce their level of 
militarization, and only then democratize.
43
  As I show in later chapters, ideological 
commitments seem to do poorly in predicting observed variation in security exchange 
behavior as well as larger patterns of alliance behavior– great powers seem willing to 
tolerate deviations from their overall ideology, although they become impatient with 
challenges to their subjective understandings of optimal security behaviors. 
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 The third tradition argues that great power alliances with (and, by extension, 
security transfers to) small states are a function of signaling and symbolic competition.  
While of little objective importance, taking sides in minor security competitions enables 
great powers to demonstrate the strength of their resolve to allies and adversaries.  The 
entire globe can become a stage for great power competition; as Waltz notes, “[i]n a 
bipolar world there are no peripheries.  With only two powers capable of acting on a 
world scale, anything that happens anywhere is potentially a concern to both of them.”
44
  
Yet these concerns are of variable levels of significance and, as Schelling points out, it 
can be of critical importance to contain competition (and even war itself) within limited 
theaters in order to avoid mutual destruction in the nuclear age.
45
  Put simply, by 
maintaining commitments in areas where there is some general sort of interest but not a 
pressing national security imperative, a great power is able to wage a conflict with its 
rival at an intensity that signals even greater commitments elsewhere without the risk of 
accidentally stumbling over anyone’s nuclear tripwire.  This fits well with contemporary 
thinking about the unpredictability of conflict and escalation
46
 in that each great power 
aggressively seeks confrontation as far from either metropole as possible in order to 
prevent accidents while simultaneously signaling strength and resolve in order to 
maintain credibility.  It is, after all, very difficult to have proxy wars without proxies, and 
small states can supply ideal pressure-valves for bipolar conflict. 
 As I argue in the next chapter, one can imagine places in the world where this is 
an entirely reasonable explanation for great power behavior – the stakes are low, the state 
capacities of local actors are consistently weak, and the resources required to demonstrate 
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seriousness of purpose are not particularly significant.  However, in regions of the world 
that the great powers believe are of practical, and not just symbolic, significance, the 
application of this theory to security exchanges becomes difficult.  The same logic that 
underlies the theory of symbolic competition (that great powers wish to survive, that they 
are threatened by other great powers, and that they must demonstrate both capability and 
resolve) would seem to direct resources towards security-maximizing behaviors that 
prioritize the development of a suite of capabilities.  That is to say, the symbolic 
significance of competition gives way to practical considerations when it comes to the 
allocation of scarce resources if there is a trade-off between capability and symbolism. 
 The capability-aggregation tradition asserts that states combine their power 
through alliances when doing so allows them meet a threat more effectively than either 
could independently.  Rooted in basic struggle of states to maintain their survival and 
autonomy in an anarchical international system, capability-aggregation suggests a logic 
by which great powers discriminate between states that are important and states that are 
not.  It also impels them to allocate security goods in such a way that their security (as 
opposed to ideological comfort) is maximized.  So long as a small state can offer a 
marginal increase in capability above the cost of the security goods being provided, 
theories of capability-aggregation predict that the great power will be willing to pay the 
cost. 
 The key question is whether or not a small state could conceivably possess such 
capabilities.  In Theory of International Politics, Waltz argues at one point that they do 
not.  He claims that while the use of alliances to achieve balance is critical in multipolar 
systems, in bipolar systems the bipoles rely on “their own capabilities rather than on the 
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capabilities of allies” which Waltz refers to as “internal” rather than “external” 
balancing.
47
  However, just pages later he writes, “[t]he contributions [of allies to great 
powers] are useful even in a bipolar world, but they are not indispensable” yet somehow 
“[o]nly Japan, Western Europe, and the Middle East are prizes that if won by the Soviet 
Union would alter the balance of GNPs and the distribution of resources enough to be a 
danger.”
48
  Thus, even in its most austere form, structural realism argues that great 
powers will engage in capability aggregation.  While internal balancing is an important 
part of bipolar systems, it is not the only relevant consideration.
49
  The key questions for 
realist capability-aggregation models, therefore, are “what are capabilities and how do 
they aggregate?” 
 Because many realist theories want to make general claims about systemic 
stability or patterns of alliance formation understood quite broadly, they tend to employ 
conceptualizations of capability aggregation that are generally additive – that is, when 
two states create an alliance, they “add” their capabilities together to face a threat.
50
  For 
many purposes, this model is entirely satisfactory, but in the case of security exchanges is 
poses significant problems.  Firstly, it fails to explain how transferring relative power to 
another state will result in an increase of relative power available to the alliance.  Second, 
because it is unable to differentiate between small states on the basis of anything but 
power, it struggles to understand how small increments of power can alter the overall 
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balance between superpowers.  Thus, even if, as Walt claims, “the superpowers tend to 
balance primarily against aggregate power alone (i.e., forming alliances to contain the 
other superpower),” the mechanism by which a small state changes aggregate power is 
left unspecified.
51
  However, I will show in the next chapter that by adopting the 
definition of capability I discuss above, one can gain significant insight into the 
capabilities that are aggregated in security exchanges.  Thus, my theory not only draws 
upon the capability aggregation literature, it extends it in useful new directions. 
 
Bargaining Dynamics in Security Exchange Theory 
 So far I have defined capability as the self-perceived effectiveness with which a 
state can generate military power in order to do violence to others and deny them the 
ability to do the same, as measured by the perceived impact of force size, technology, 
doctrine, and geography.  I have further argued that states have the ability to aggregate 
their capabilities in such a fashion that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and 
that states engage in capability aggregation as part of a larger drive to seek security in an 
anarchical world system.  Great powers understand the value of the capabilities that a 
small state could potentially provide as that small state’s Perceived Strategic Value.  
Small states consider the utility of great power contributions to their security in light of 
their chosen Small State Strategy.  When these mutual needs meet, an opportunity for 
bargaining emerges. 
 The idea of alliances as bargains is not new; however, modern political science 
has leveraged the insights of game theory to create mathematical models that replicate the 
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logical structure of alliance decision-making.
52
  One such model that is especially 
important for thinking about security exchange behaviors is advanced by Snyder.
53
  
Snyder, without adopting a theory of capability, nonetheless argues that payoffs will 
differ to strong and weak powers depending on the nature of the local security threat.
54
  
Snyder’s key insight is that available alternatives and exit options structure the payoff 
structures within alliances.  This is critically important to Security Exchange Theory, 
because it is entirely reasonable that great powers and small states might have very 
different views of their security environment and feel differently about the urgency of 
forming an alliance.  Thus, simply because a great power has more aggregate power or 
more of a particular sort of capability does not necessarily entail that a small state will 
simply have to accept whatever terms the great power offers or exchange its (perhaps 
unique) capabilities on terms approaching parity. 
 Once in an alliance, each state’s underlying payoff structure shifts with the 
changing circumstances in which they find themselves.
55
  As a result, participants 
renegotiate the terms of the alliance (not necessarily through a formal rewriting of the 
agreement) and thereby find “a new Nash solution, where the combined payoffs will 
theoretically settle after a period of jockeying.  It is exactly at the midpoint of the 
adjusted bargaining range, where the product of the payoffs to the parties is 
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  Similarly, as the threat environment changes, Security Exchange Theory 
anticipates changing demands by both parties and, thus, a dynamic system of negotiation 
and settlement to emerge. 
 While Snyder’s model argues that alliance formation happens in two stages – an 
initial bargain, followed by subsequent updates – the two are independent of one another.  
Fearon offers an alternative model in “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International 
Cooperation.”
57
  While the game he creates still has two stages, their strategic logics are 
intimately connected.  In Fearon’s model, states play a War of Attrition bargaining game 
to determine the structure and incentives of an international organization, followed by a 
repeated 2x2 type game that they devise during the initial bargaining, which he models as 
a Prisoners’ Dilemma.
58
  In a War of Attrition, each player has a preferred outcome and 
both prefer some agreement to no agreement.  In each period of time, they are given the 
opportunity to accept their opponent’s offer or not.  The game ends when one player 
accepts an offer. 
 The key in War of Attrition is that each player suffers some cost for continuing to 
hold out and is unsure when her opponent will give in.  Thus, driving a hard bargain must 
be weighed against the likely costs of doing so.
59
  In Fearon’s formulation, this cost is 
partly a function of how long the agreement is expected to be in effect and how credible 
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the mutual commitments to it are; this is referred to as the shadow of the future. Fearon 
finds that agreements both parties take seriously may be the hardest to achieve because 
“as the shadow of the future lengthens, both states choose tougher and tougher bargaining 
strategies on average, implying longer and longer delay until cooperation begins.”
60
 
 Security Exchange Theory treats bargaining like Snyder does – an initial bargain 
based on the relative strength of each actor’s negotiating position, followed by 
continuous updating at the strength of those positions shifts.  That is to say, the shadow of 
the future is very short.  By contrast, if actors expected to be in the alliance for a very 
long time and expected to be constrained significantly by the initial agreement, the initial 
terms would be quite important because the shadow of the future would be quite long.  
Since alliances do appear to be both relatively stable and future-oriented, it might seem 
better to use Fearon’s model.  The choice between the two is not simply a matter of taste; 
however, as an empirical matter, the mechanics of security exchanges favor Snyder’s 
approach.  Modern warfare and modern military technologies consume fuel, ammunition, 
and repair parts at a voracious rate.  Security exchanges generally involve both advisors 
on the ground to assist with fielding new equipment and agreements regarding the 
provision of the requisite supplies to make the systems work.  Parties have the ability to 
observe each other closely and modify the “terms” in a practical sense very quickly.  
While Fearon’s War of Attrition model may be an excellent tool for understanding many 
international agreements, it is unnecessarily complex (and therefore not parsimonious) 
when it comes to Security Exchange Theory. 
 
Plan of the Text 
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 In this chapter I have advanced the proposition that Security Exchange Theory 
offers a novel approach to unexplained variation in state behavior.  I have argued that by 
leveraging the insights of Offense-Defense Theory to create a robust definition of 
capability, extending the capability-aggregation tradition, and following Snyder’s model 
of alliance bargaining, Security Exchange Theory will be able to explain the transfer of 
security goods from great powers to small states.  In the remainder of this text I fully 
explicate Security Exchange Theory and test it against great power behavior in the 
Middle East.  To do so, I adopt the organization described below. 
 In Chapter 2, I present Security Exchange Theory.  I argue that the world contains 
regions in which great powers cannot induce bandwagoning, but that are nonetheless 
critical for great power security ambitions.  Great powers develop a general security plan 
for the region based on their own capabilities and then seek out small state allies to 
facilitate the great power’s security goals.  The more important the small state is in this 
restrictive sense, the greater its Perceived Strategic Value.  For their part, small states 
face a variety of threats, and I develop a typology based on the source and location of the 
greatest threat to the small state regime’s survival.  I argue that the small state regime will 
optimize their forces to face that threat and thus adopt one of four distinct Small State 
Strategies.  The capabilities that a small state seeks to facilitate these strategies may or 
may not be congruent with the capabilities the great power is offering.  The process by 
which these competing demands are resolved is Security Exchange Theory. 
 In Chapter 3, I conduct an initial assessment of Security Exchange Theory using 
an original dataset of great power arms transfers to the Middle East between 1952 and 
1979.  I show that arms transfers are concentrated in certain key states and that 
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membership in an alliance with a great power does not necessarily entail receipt of any 
security goods for a small state.  This finding is critically important, because it 
demonstrates that Security Exchange Theory cannot simply be subsumed in a large 
theory of alliance behavior.  I then perform a large-n test of Security Exchange Theory.  
However, while some measures of Perceived Strategic Value perform well when applied 
to American arms transfers, the findings for the Soviet Union are quite sensitive to the 
exclusion of key cases.  Following the discussion of objective and subjective ODT above, 
I argue that purely objective, durable measures of strategic intent that are suitable for 
large-n analysis are an impossibility.  Thus, understanding the subjective perceptions of 
strategic actors becomes of paramount importance – the critical factor in security 
exchanges is what the actors believe about one another and the state of the world at a 
given moment. 
 In Chapter 4, I test Security Exchange Theory against American arms transfers to 
the Middle East between 1952 and 1961, using contemporaneous American evaluations 
of the Perceived Strategic Value of small states.  I leverage recently declassified archival 
material to explore the impact of changing American nuclear capabilities and war plans 
on the Perceived Strategic Value of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Israel to US 
security.  These countries represent a majority of arms transfers from the US during the 
period and cover the full range of strategic valuation.  I find that PSV is a strong 
explanation for variation in security exchanges. 
 In Chapter 5, I test Security Exchange Theory against Soviet arms transfers and 
diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East between 1952 and 1961.  I examine Soviet 
diplomacy in Iran and Turkey immediately after WWII and argue that they were of very 
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high strategic value to the USSR.  So high, in fact, that Stalin attempted to induce 
bandwagoning by thinly veiled threats and unwanted assistance.  However, these plans 
backfired, and so the Soviet Union was forced to pursue less relevant options – Egypt, 
Syria, and Iraq.  These three countries also account for most of the Soviet arms transfers 
to the region, and I find that PSV performs well. 
 In Chapter 6, I test the impact of Small State Strategy on great power security 
exchange decision-making.  I discuss the security imperatives and negotiating positions 
of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt from 1952 to 1961, which I assess using secondary 
sources and American diplomatic records.  I find that, while PSV is a dominant 
consideration determining great power security exchange decisions, Small State Strategy 
has an important and noticeable marginal effect.  This is demonstrated empirically by the 
direct, contemporaneous statements of senior decision-makers drawn from primary 
sources. 
 In Chapter 7, I conclude the project by assessing the importance of Security 
Exchange Theory to present day security studies.  I argue that Security Exchange Theory 
has three important insights.  First, great power security decision-making tends to 
strategic myopia.  This is an excellent explanation for American military aid policy in the 
post-9/11 era, which prioritized counter-terrorism above virtually any other concerns and 
has resulted in active US involvement in some of the most desolate, marginal regions of 
the world.  Second, by observing great power security transfers, one can not only assess 
what the great power deems important, but how the great power understands the world 
and intends to provide security for itself.  Because the objective components of Security 
Exchange Theory are all based on publicly-available, observable information, to the 
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extent one believes the theory, one can make judgments about the content of private, 
subjective security assessments.  Third, Security Exchange Theory may enable analysts 
to predict great power – small state behavior in regions that take on bipolar attributes, 
such as East Asia. 




Security Exchange Theory 
Security Exchange Theory posits that security-seeking regimes engage in the 
transfer of security goods in order to increase the likelihood of their survival.  Using only 
a single distinguishing characteristic, power, I will show that very powerful regimes 
(which I call great powers) establish hierarchy domestically in order to deal with the 
anarchy of the international system.  By contrast, regimes with very low power (which I 
call small states) operate in semi-anarchy both domestically and internationally as a 
consequence of their relative weakness.  I refer to both strong and weak regimes as 
“states” for clarity’s sake, since it is the state apparatus that is used to generate both 
internal and external security and that creates alliances with other states. 
Both great powers and small states identify threats to their survival and marshal 
resources against those threats.  While by definition a great power can only be defeated 
by a set of states that includes another great power, in a non-autarkic, geographically-
connected world, meaningful security advantages against other great powers can be 
gained through capability aggregation with other states in critical regions.  Thus, it seeks 
great powers engage in security exchanges that integrate and develop the capabilities of 
instrumentally useful small states, which it identifies using a process of Perceived 
Strategic Value (PSV,) which I discuss below in Part I. 
In the PSV causal chain, the great power considers its strategic environment and 
determines how it can best position itself to wage war against its rivals.  Having 
understood the nature of the strategic imperatives facing it, the great power seeks to 
compensate for the resource limitations it faces by recruiting particular small states to 
join its struggle.  This takes the form not only of commitments about future behavior in 




the form of alliances but, for some particularly important small states, the transfer of 
security goods that will augment their ability to play the role the great power intends for 
them.  My theory of Perceived Strategic Value is intended to capture the process by 
which great powers make such a determination in the creation of security exchanges. 
Small states, by contrast, have a much more complex security environment.  
Faced with internal and external threats from both great power and non-great power 
actors, they are forced to allocate limited security resources to mutually exclusive 
security approaches, which I call their Small State Strategy and discuss in detail in Part 
II.  In order to procure additional security goods, a small state may seek a security 
exchange with a great power.  However, such an exchange imposes costs on the small 
state by requiring adjustments to absorb the security inputs and limiting future security 
acquisitions. 
In the first two parts of this chapter, I theorize great power and small state alliance 
strategies independently, seeking to understand both the costs and benefits of security 
exchanges.  The costs to great powers of transferring security assets from their control to 
the control of another state and the benefits to small states of receiving that control are 
obvious.  However, by explicating the security benefits gained by great powers and the 
security costs borne by small states as a result of security exchanges, it becomes possible 
to put these two strategic calculations in dialogue.  This is the project of Part III.  Because 
the two cost-benefit analyses are not simply mirror-images of one another, nor are small 
states rent-takers in security exchanges, I am able to create a new theoretical approach to 
great power – small state security exchanges. 




To preview, I find that small states with a high Perceived Strategic Value are able 
to gain greater access to great power security resources and maintain greater autonomy in 
their security policy than are small states with a low Perceived Strategic Value.  I also 
find that great powers endeavor to align small states with their perception of the global 
threat environment, and will modify the level of support they are willing to offer through 
security exchanges to achieve this end.  Importantly, this theoretical approach employs a 
narrow conception of “power” and “value” that is limited solely to security and survival.  
The value of small state to a great power (in terms of security exchange behavior) inheres 
in its usefulness in possible conflicts with other great power, and the utility of a great 
power ally to a small state is its ability to contribute to regime security (rather than its 
ideological orientation, for example.)  Relative power and the search for security drive 
security exchange behavior.   
 
Part I: Perceived Strategic Value Theory 
Great powers engage in security exchanges with small states in for a variety of 
reasons.  In Part I, I develop my theory of great power security exchange behavior in two 
stages.  First, I describe the scope conditions under which the theory is most useful, 
justify those conditions, and describe excluded cases.  Second, I develop my capability-
based theory.  To preview, I argue, given the enumerated scope conditions, that bipoles 
create security arrangements with small states in order to maximize their capability to 
militarily defeat the other bipole through capability aggregation, access to resources, and 
war plan relevance.  I call the extent to which a small state is believed by a great power to 
contribute to its military competition with other great powers the small state’s Perceived 




Strategic Value (PSV).  Small states with high PSV elicit greater resource allocations 
from great powers. 
  
Scope Conditions 
 The difficulty in creating a theory that establishes a single rationale for great 
power security exchange behavior is that such a rationale does not exist.  Great powers, 
especially in the bipolar era of the mid- to late-20th century, created security 
arrangements with dozens of small states for a wide variety of reasons, some ideological, 
some symbolic, and some for the purpose of capability aggregation.  The key, then, is not 
to argue that any one of these is the dominant rationale at all times; rather, it is to 
understand that different rationales are more likely to become operative given particular 
constraints.  The elucidation of those constraints is the purpose of this section. 
 
Bipolarity and Great Powers 
 The implications of this theory and the differentiation between it and other 
theories of security exchange behavior are clearest in a bipolar system.  Bipolarity, in its 
Waltzian formulation, challenges theories of great power behavior to explain why, if no 
state or group of states other than one of the two bipoles can dramatically alter either the 
balance of power or the status quo, either bipole should bother with transferring resources 
to other states rather than allocating resources to internal balancing.
61
  It merits stating 
explicitly that internal balancing, in this sense, is focused on developing and maintaining 
power that can be deployed against the other great power in a global competition for 
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survival.  Extending this logic, one would also anticipate that external behaviors, and 
especially security arrangements, would be based on their potential usefulness against the 
only real security threat – the other bipole.  
 The assumption of bipolarity also creates an easier analytical task in evaluating 
the relative impact of small state alignment and capability.  Since the global security 
competition operates between two behemoths, one has great powers (the bipoles, which 
internally balance) and small states (which are unable to shift the balance of power using 
any of the metrics traditionally associated with power).  Thus, if small state alignment is 
important, it must be for some reason other than simply altering the balance of power, 
since, by definition, a small state is unable to do so.  In a multipolar system, one must 
imagine worlds in which every possible combination of great power alliance and 
capability is tested against the alignment of a small state to determine if, despite its 
relatively diminutive size, a small state’s indigenous capability nonetheless alters the 
balance of power meaningfully.
62
 
 In this project, I am specifically concerned about the security exchange behavior 
of the two bipoles of a bipolar system, which I refer to as great powers.  I do so 
advisedly.  First, by definition, a bipolar system has two great powers, which are the 
bipoles, so the terms are interchangeable given the scope condition of bipolarity.  Second, 
as I argue later, it may be possible to loosen the assumption of bipolarity without losing 
the analytic power of the theory -- thus, for example, a unipole and a regional great power 
might exhibit the same characteristics in their alliance behaviors with small states as the 
great powers did during the Cold War. 
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 Defining a small state precisely is an elusive goal that depends almost entirely on 
the sort of analysis one is undertaking.  One could use the same sort of criteria Waltz 
employs in identifying great powers, and set some arbitrary cut-off value in absolute or 
relative terms (for example population of x-million or military strength ranked in the 
bottom quartile).  This has the disadvantage of excluding populous states which one 
might want to classify as “small” or militarily powerful states with small populations.  It 
also presumes that power and influence in the international system can be readily inferred 
from these measures in a mathematical fashion; one can, perhaps, make reliable 
determinations about whether a system is bi- or multi-polar using these measures of 
power, but it is less clear that one could say something meaningful about the difference 
between the 50th and the 100th most powerful state. 
 Perhaps one can adopt a policy characteristic instead – Handel suggests that “[t]he 
main characteristic of weak states is, indeed, their lack of power or strength, and hence 
they are continuously preoccupied with the question of survival.”
64
  The issues with this 
approach are numerous.  First, a central tenet of realism holds that in an anarchic system 
all states are, to an extent, concerned about their survival, so the discriminating factor 
here is not just concerns about survival in some general way, but a preoccupation 
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therewith.  But, of course, large, powerful states have significant defense establishments 
that do nothing but worry about military threats and potential doomsday scenarios and 
small states manage to do things other than obsessing about being conquered, so 
“preoccupation” becomes an even more nebulous and unhelpful concept than “small.”  
Second, it assumes that states exist outside of their surroundings and, thus, one can say 
useful things about a state’s survival prospects by simply knowing its absolute strength 
rather than its susceptibility to credible threats from proximate regional actors.  This 
would lead one to such erroneous conclusions as: because West Germany was more 
powerful than Costa Rica throughout the Cold War, it was much less concerned about the 
question of its survival. 
  If neither some concrete numerical index of power ranking nor a policy 
orientation seems satisfactory, perhaps its political place in the international order of 
things is a better criteria – as Vital suggests: 
To sum up, the small (or minor) power is that state which, in the long 
term, can constitute no more than a dispensable and non-decisive 
increment to a primary state’s total array of political and military 
resources regardless of whatever short term, contingent weight as an 





Certain aspects of this definition are extremely desirable, yet its limitations must be 
observed.  First, to say something is or is not relevant in the long term is to recall Keynes 
famous adage regarding time horizons.
66
  Second, the second half of the definition, which 
regards the “short term, contingent weight” that a small state might give to a “primary 
power” in undefined “certain circumstances,” is unnecessarily dismissive.  This is 
                                                        
65
 David Vital, “Small Power Politics,” in Small States in International Relations, eds. August Schou and 
Arne Olav Brundtland, (New York:  Wiley and Sons, 1971), 19. 
66
 In the long term, we’re all dead. 




because it insinuates that the weight to which it refers can never be decisive in any 
circumstance, but will at most be an auxiliary help.  As I will demonstrate, small states 
can form a critical component of great power war plans and their efforts are regarded as 
neither dispensable nor non-decisive in the short-term during which a war would be 
conducted.  
 Nonetheless, those caveats aside, this definition is a powerful one.  The defining 
characteristic of a small state, for my purposes, is that it plays a contingent role in a 
bipolar system.  If it is relevant, it is only relevant insofar as it augments the capacity or 
resources of a great power to a meaningful degree.  Once its capabilities or resources are 
no longer necessary, it fades into relative obscurity. 
 
Geographic Constraints 
 Having determined that this theory is designed to operate in a world with two 
great powers and some contingently important small states, it remains to be shown which 
of these small states might be the object the sort of great power alliance behavior 
imagined here, and which might be governed by some other dynamic. 
 Assume, for simplicity’s sake, that military power declines in a linear fashion 
with distance, that all non-great power states are of a uniform size, and that the two great 
powers are located on precisely opposite sides of a flat world.  In this world, I will define 
a great power as a power which is able to defeat militarily any state or group of states 
which does not include the other great power.  In this world, one can imagine the 
emergence of a perfect balance -- the great powers dominate the states closest to them, 
who would gain minimal assistance from the declining power projection of the opposite 




great power if they were to oppose their giant neighbor and therefore choose to 
bandwagon to ensure their own survival.  As one approaches the mid-point between the 
great powers, the bargaining power of smaller states increases -- they are able to choose 
one great power or the other as the relative (geographically-constrained) power of the two 
behemoths equalizes.  Nonetheless, if too many small states support one great power, the 
overall power of the bloc would increase to the point that a single great power could roll 
up the entire system and dominate the remaining small states.  Thus, small states closer to 
the center have an incentive to balance, thereby ensuring their own autonomy.  So, ceteris 
paribus, we would expect large homogenous blocs near the great powers and a mix of 
alliances in the center, with an overall equilibrium reached where no state has an 
incentive to defect from their alliance and thereby jeopardize their survival.  In terms of 
alliance dynamics, the world can be divided into “bandwagoning” and “balancing” 
areas.67 
 Extending this model, imagine that the great power had essential interests in only 
some states, meaning that a change in alignment of those states would somehow 
significantly impact the capabilities of the great powers vis a vis one another.  One then 
might divide the world into three sorts of regions: bandwagoning regions near great 
powers, a balancing region where the great powers had no essential interest, and a 
balancing region where the great powers had essential interests. 
 In the bandwagoning region, it seems likely that the alliance policy of the local 
bipole is overdetermined.  We might imagine a non-voluntary security/autonomy 
exchange dynamic occurring.  The great power prevents encroachment by its rival by 
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enforcing bandwagoning behavior on the part of nearby states and aggressively 
intervening to thwart potential deviations from the status quo.  While the nearby small 
states lose the autonomy to choose to ally with the other great power, they receive the 
protection of their own great power from its predations.  As mentioned earlier, this may 
be nearly costless to the great power, as it is forced to keep the requisite forces in place to 
thwart the rival bipole in any event (such as the American blue water navy protecting the 
Western hemisphere or the Soviet Army protecting Eastern Europe.)
68
  On the other 
hand, we could equally well believe that the symbolic importance of protecting a sphere 
of influence and asserting power in its “own backyard” might be a strong motivation for 
bipoles to enforce bandwagoning.  Or, in some cases, the capability aggregation 
argument might operate in favor of building and defending a buffer area, lest an 
overwhelming security threat emerge. 
 In the second sort of region, all the states are peripheral, regardless of their 
relative power (i.e., the most powerful state in an unimportant region is still unimportant).  
Thus, great power involvement in these areas makes sense from a symbolic or ideological 
perspective, but not a capability aggregation or security/autonomy one.  From a signaling 
standpoint, it is an excellent venue for playing out symbolic conflicts without 
accidentally stumbling over worrisome tripwires.  Great powers can show resolve to one 
another, can test the relative strength of their military hardware, and can demonstrate the 
robustness of their commitments to other allies without accidentally triggering a general 
war.  This is because even if one’s proxies lose the consequences are not so catastrophic 
as to merit intentionally triggering a global conflict. 
                                                        
68
 For an expansion of this logic, see Glenn Palmer and J. Sky David, “Multiple Goals or Deterrence: A 
Test of Two Models in Nuclear and Nonnuclear Alliances,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 
(December 1999):  748-770. 




 During the Cold War, an ideological logic motivated conflict in non-essential 
central regions on the part of both the US and USSR.  The Soviet Union tended to 
support left-wing insurgencies throughout the world, even in strategically unimportant 
regions; the United States, for its part, was more than willing to expend resources to 
combat Communism in an almost reflexive manner at times.  It is difficult to argue on 
non-ideological grounds how the alignment of poor African states had anything to do 
with the security posture of either superpower; nonetheless, both superpowers had 
factions of varying influence within their national security apparatus arguing a moral and 
historical imperative to ensure that the forces of “good” prevailed. 
 Finally, in the third sort of region, where there is an essential interest and the 
possibility of small states aligning with either great power, one would expect to see 
realist considerations in ascendance in the determination of alliance patterns.
69
  There are 
a number of reasons for this.  First, the cost of ideological purity is much higher -- 
rejecting a distasteful ally could mean accepting a major strategic disadvantage in the 
event of a war with the rival great power.  Second, the stakes, and thus the cost of 
miscalculation, are also higher.  The likelihood of triggering a general war in response to 
aggressive moves is significantly greater, given that either great power could decide that 
their strategic position had become untenable and could only be reversed by decisive 
action.  Third, because the small states have the ability to balance, the cost of their 
“autonomy” is higher than in bandwagoning regions, and thus probably outweighs their 
individual ability to alter the status quo, thereby eliminating the cost-benefit rationale of 
the security/autonomy literature.  Realist considerations ought to be consistently stronger 
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predictors of great power alliance policy in essential balancing regions than in the other 
two types.  Thus, this theory focuses explicitly on this type of region to the exclusion of 
the two others. 
 Before moving on, it is important to note that splitting the world into “essential” 
and “non-essential” areas requires a calculation of power and politics that is not without 
controversy.  While it has a distinguished pedigree, including Morgenthau, Kennan, and 
Waltz, among others, it has also inspired a number of criticisms.  First, it may be a 
distinction that simply does not exist.  In the initial formulation of structural realism, 
although Waltz identified Europe, Japan, and the Middle East as critical regions, the 
control of which could alter the global balance of power,
70
 he nonetheless argues the page 
before that “[i]n a bipolar world there are no peripheries.  With only two powers capable 
of acting on a world scale, anything that happens anywhere is potentially of concern to 
both of them.”
71
  Second, it may be that states that could decisively impact a great power 
war are distributed all around the globe, so that a discussion of an essential region is 
misguided.
72
  Third, it could be that great powers determine which regions are “essential” 
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to their interests based on historical memory,
73
 socially intersubjective meanings,
74
 or a 
variety of domestic institutional or cultural dynamics.
75
  Thus, there would be no 
consistent and universally understood logic of strategic threat and capability that would 
render a longitudinal analysis of a region feasible.  Fourth, the nature of “essential” might 
contain a symbolic component, so that a materially unimportant region might become 
critical because both great powers believed it so.  Fifth, the very notion of “essential” 
may assume what it is supposed to prove – namely, that great power alliance policy is a 
function of a variety of factors, one of which is a subjective understanding of how a small 
state contributes to aggregate capability.  If a region can be objectively understood as 
“essential” by an analyst, then including subjective factors in the analysis would seem 
superfluous.  On the other hand, if the degree to which a region is important is a function 
of how it is understood to be important for great power conflict, then one might be 
accused of selecting on the dependent – i.e. looking for the power of perceived 
importance only in areas that are perceived as important. 
 These critiques hold important insight, but are not fatal to my theoretical 
approach.  First, the belief that Western Europe, Japan, and the Middle East were critical 
areas that held special significance in US/USSR security competition is widely accepted 
by practitioners (e.g. Kennan), academics (e.g. Waltz), and politicians (e.g. Carter) alike.  
Even insofar as other states around the globe might be important in the defense of these 
areas, it is the security of these areas and not those other states that was the sine qua non 
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of American and Soviet Cold War security postures.  Thus, it seems justified to describe 
a region as “essential” while simultaneously acknowledging that bipoles can and do have 
interests elsewhere.  Second, the meaning of “essential” from a security standpoint has a 
distinctly material basis that differentiates it from “generally important,” and it is this 
material basis that informs the present theory.  Third, while constructivist and subjective 





 acknowledge that there is a material basis for power 
differentiation in the world.  The approach to geography used here does not require itself 
to be hegemonic or final; rather, it restricts itself to establishing scope conditions for the 
analysis of security alliances and arrangements.  Because material resources are widely 
acknowledged to be extremely critical to physical security, and these regions contain 
those resources in abundance, then it seem reasonable to say they are essential for 
security purposes in the limited sense, even if they are not especially important in other 
(symbolic, ideational, etc) ways.  Additionally, one cannot help but note a fairly stable 
ideation over time, as I will demonstrate empirically, about what does and does not 
constitute an essential region and which are more essential.  While various thinkers have 
argued the limits of America’s Cold War commitment to Europe, I am unaware of any 
who have argued that that commitment was less significant than US involvement in 
Central Africa.  Third, while the importance of a given region might be more or less 
stable over time, I seek to understand variation in the relative importance of states within 
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that region.  Analyzing a balancing-type region where there are essential interests at stake 
prevents over-determined outcomes, has better portability, and speaks directly to extant 
literatures which have dealt with the politics in question. 
 
Lack of active armed conflict 
 This theory pertains to great power rationales for engaging in security exchanges 
with small states.  Much like Offense-Defense Theory seeks to explain the probability 
and onset of war, not its prosecution or final conclusion, the theories to be tested below 
are not meant to apply to political and alliance dynamics that emerge during armed 
conflict.  In such situations, new signaling logics may operate, local factors germane to 
winning the conflict may overwhelm international considerations, and great powers may 
seize the opportunity to bedevil each other simply to attrit the resources available for 
potential global conflicts (e.g. the US strategy in Afghanistan).  If a great power is 




 Given the diversity of great power motivations for alliance behaviors, clear scope 
conditions are necessary to create and test Perceived Strategic Value theory.  In this 
section, I have defined “great power” in the conventional realist fashion and argued that a 
“small state” is one which is only contingently important to great power security 
competition.  I restrict the theory to bipolarity for the time being, although I will relax 
this assumption later.  I also argue that the world can be divided into three ideal-type 




regions and restrict this theory to regions in which the great powers have essential 
interests and the small states have the ability to balance. 
 
Perceived Strategic Value (PSV) Theory 
 
Premises 
 Perceived Strategic Value (PSV) Theory is an addition to contemporary structural 
realism that is a key component of Security Exchange Theory, and is key to 
understanding why great powers transfer security goods to small states in a bipolar 
system.  As such, it adopts the standard premises of structural realism.  The international 
system is anarchic and states are its constitutive unit.  States wish to survive, and preserve 
their security by, among other things, amassing means by which they can defend 
themselves and do harm to others.  In a bipolar system, this means that the two great 
powers are concerned primarily with one another, as each represents the only real 
security threat to the other.  They both seek to allocate their resources in such a way as to 
maximize security for themselves. 
 For simplicity’s sake, I treat the relationships in Security Exchange Theory as 
bilateral.  The theoretical reasons for doing so are simple.  If the PSV for one small state 
is causally related to the PSV’s for every other small state, the determination of the casual 
antecedents of security exchanges would be impossible to calculate.  Even if one could 
simultaneously determine the PSV for every small state in the world, the recursive 
dynamics of security exchanges would be such that as soon the system became dynamic 
(i.e., had more than a single time period) would become analytically intractable. 




This is not to suggest that, empirically, there are not significant military gains to 
be had by an interwoven alliance structure.  In fact, in the American cases discussed in 
Chapter 4, aid allocated to security exchanges in the Middle East was allocated by 
Congress as a single pool for the region.  It was subsequently divided by the relevant 
executive agencies, who were constrained to a zero-sum calculation when considering 
their security exchange strategies.  Nonetheless, despite the fact that the available aid was 
limited, that the regional defense strategy stretched across multiple small states, and that 
improvements in the capabilities of one regional actor would have implications for 
potential threats faced by the others, the disbursement of aid and the evaluations of the 
small states proceeded on a bilateral basis.  Apparently, the analytical complexities 
imposed by treating security exchanges multilaterally are daunting empirically as well as 
theoretically. 
 
Perceived Strategic Value Theory 
PSV = Perception of (Capability + Resources + Relevance)  
 
 In its most basic form, PSV asserts that the value a great power places on a small 
state, given the stated premises and conditions, is a function of the capability the small 
state possesses, the resources it can provide in wartime, and the utility it presents in terms 
of the great power’s war plans. The strategic value of a small state then causes a great 
power transfer security goods in order to develop an ally that provides a security gain vis 
a vis its great power rival. 
 




H1:  Ceteris paribus, the size of a security exchange between a small state and a great 
power will increase when the small state’s capabilities, resources, or wartime relevance 
increases. 
  
Dependent Variable:  Security Exchanges 
 Security exchanges, in this theory, are the transfer of security resources from one 
state to another.  This includes the transfer of personnel and equipment, the assignment of 
trainers, financing for military procurement, or the attachment of units.  The key is that 
the transfer is meant to somehow contribute to the security of the great power even 
though it diminishes the pool of security resources controlled by the great power directly.  
As discussed previously, such transfers and their associated arrangements are quite 
puzzling theoretically, despite being quite common empirically. 
 
Intermediate Variable: PSV 
 As discussed earlier, Waltz’ structural realism predicts that great powers in a 
bipolar system will internally balance, given their overwhelming superiority in the 
production of military goods, industrial outputs, population, etc.  Were these bipoles 
autarkies and neighbors, it is likely that this would be the case; since such a situation 
would seem to be unlikely in the contemporary world, we must consider the impact of 
external resource requirements and geographical separation. 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, geographical constraints can impose radical 
limits on a great power’s ability to defend or alter the status quo.  Thus, it is not sufficient 
to have a powerful military in absolute numerical terms -- that military must be able to 




project its power to defend its core interests against threats.  This may require positioning 
of forces abroad in accordance with the dictates of military necessity.  For example, while 
the US may have contributed the lion’s share of NATOs overall power, had it not been 
able to plan on fighting Warsaw Pact forces on the European continent, it would have 
been hard-pressed to mount an invasion across the Atlantic.
78
  Thus, NATO, among its 
other purposes, was designed to facilitate the rapid introduction of American 
conventional power into Europe
79
 without the necessity of forced entry operations.
80
 
 Modern militaries have enormous and diverse resource requirements, including 
strategic minerals, metals, and, of course, oil.  While in previous eras it may have been 
highly likely that a great power could source its own defense needs from indigenous 
supply, this is rarely, if ever, still the case.  Resource shortages stalled the German 
offensive in the Ardennes known as the Battle of the Bulge, resource concerns were a 
motivating factor in Japanese expansionism in the 1930s and 40s, and, of course, oil 




 Thus, a great power pursuing security in a bipolar system requires a foreign policy 
that creates favorable military conditions for a potential conflict with its rival.  Given 
finite resources, it must build security arrangements such that it maximizes its aggregate 
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capabilities, its resources, and the efficiency with which they both are employed.  This 
triumvirate – capability, resources, and relevance – is the basis upon which a great power 
determines the extent to which a security exchange with a small state is warranted.  It is 
the source of the small state’s Perceived Strategic Value to the great power.   
 This is closely related to, but is not the same as, the subjective component of 
capability aggregation discussed in the previous chapter.  The differences are subtle, but 
extremely important, for without them the argument is entirely circular (i.e. great powers 
think particular small states are important because they think they are important for a 
number of reasons).  The PSV is the value of a small state to a great power as a 
participant in security relationship or alliance, which causes the great power to offer 
security exchanges as inducements to secure such an agreement and investments in the 
development of future capability.  PSV is an intermediate variable that introduces a 
unifying subjectivity into great power security calculations – it is not simply the 
subjective evaluation of capability, resources, and relevance taken separately.  Rather it is 
the internal strategic logic employed by the great power to combine these individual 
components into a coherent whole around which policy can form. 
Nonetheless, there are a wide variety of reasons a great power might perceive a 
small state as important under bipolarity in keeping with the theories discussed in the 
previous chapter.  Therefore, the key question is not simply “does a great power find a 
particular small state important?” but “why?” and, most importantly for this project, 
“which is the more powerful explanation among these hypotheses?” 
 
 





 As discussed in the previous chapter, capability aggregation is a rationale for 
alliance behavior based on the subjective belief about the utility of combining force size, 
technology, doctrine, and geography.  When applied to the present scope conditions and 
theoretical question, it becomes possible to derive observable implications about great 
power security exchange behavior under bipolarity in balancing-type regions.  These 
follow the pattern: because an increase in X results in an improvement of perceived 
relative capability, there is an increase in perceived strategic value, which causes an 
increase in the magnitude of security exchanges.  Great powers believe that the 
aggregated capabilities thus created increase their relative power against their rivals. 
 This is most obvious in terms of force size – a large military could have a useful 
marginal impact on a great power’s war plans, if nothing else because it would allow it to 
allocate its own forces generated through internal balancing elsewhere.  Thus, one would 
expect to see more security assistance and arms transfers allocated to small states with 
large armies in order to induce them to cooperate with great power strategies and to 
enhance the per soldier lethality of their forces. 
 Technology is a more difficult subcomponent of capability to discuss than force 
size, because, in non-obvious ways, more is not always better.  That is to say, if a high-
technology great power is partnering with a lower technology small state, it will get more 
utility out of the man-power the small state has dedicated to high-payoff, low-technology 
tasks (e.g. anti-tank teams) than it will from a small state’s ill-equipped and poorly 
trained higher-technology arms that essentially duplicate functions better performed by 
the great power (e.g. its air force).  However, this is a U-shaped relationship -- at some 




point, the small state’s military may become proficient enough to field the full range of 
great power technologies, at which point it will aggregate force size in a linear fashion.  
Moreover, a great power has the ability to invest in a small state’s ability to absorb its 
technology (through military trainers, technical experts, etc).  Thus, one would expect to 
see higher levels of security assistance and arms transfers to very low technology or very 
high technology small states OR to small states with medium technology that rank highly 
on other subcomponents of capability (force size, geography, or doctrine). 
 That geography is in some way relevant to international security is a nearly 
ubiquitous claim.  It is among the “two main factors that determine whether the offense 
or the defense has the advantage” (the other being technology).82  It “insulates states from 
invasion or strangulation.”83  It means that “any weapon that relates to peculiarities of 
terrain will be supportive of the defense.”84  It is a “critical factor” the “implications” of 
which “are perhaps the least controversial of all the factors that affect the offense-defense 
balance.”85  It determines “the relative weight” of the benefits of offense versus defense.86  
“Geography and technology can affect the intensity and character of balancing 
behavior.”87  It can limit doctrinal options because “a blitzkrieg can only operate in 
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terrain that is conducive to mobile armored warfare.”88  It transmits power by land but not 
by sea89 or threat by sheer physical proximity.90  It shelters insurgents and alters rates of 
mechanization.91  It undeniably matters, the question is: how? 
 Terrain has differential impacts on different sorts of militaries, and may give one 
force a decisive maneuver advantage over another in places where “maneuver” is not the 
first word that springs to mind.  This differential impact is what Glaser and Kaufman 
mean by, “the impact of geography is often asymmetric,” meaning “the effect of 
geography is to shift one directional balance of the dyad toward defense, while the other 
is unaffected or even shifted toward offense.”  No geography is essentially defensive or 
offensive by its very nature.  The key element in the relationship between geography and 
political outcomes is its perceived importance to the great power and not something 
inherent to a particular fact about the earth’s surface.  Thus, to the extent that a great 
power believes a particular geographic trait of a small state would be useful or necessary 
to winning a war against its counterpart, it will increase the level of security assistance 
and arms transfers in order to maintain access to that geographical feature. 
 Doctrine, as a component of capability, should not be confused with war plan 
relevance, which will be discussed later.  As a matter of course, military establishments 
(great power or otherwise) have beliefs about the efficacy of various methods of force 
employment given a certain terrain and opposing force.  A small state that insisted on 
employing its forces in an ill-advised fashion (in the eyes of a great power) would be 
worth less than an identical small state that employed their forces to maximum effect.  
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One could object that this is a fairly obvious thing to say, given that militaries do not 
intentionally employ their forces ineffectively.  However, the key element here is that the 
small state might have numerous security concerns, such as other small states92 or internal 
threats,93 while a great power in a bipolar system is focused on the other bipole.  Thus, the 
great power would prefer that a small state configure its armed forces to assist in the 
military defeat of the other great power.  To the extent that there is a perceived doctrinal 
congruence between the great power and the small state, one should see an increase in 
great power willingness to engage in security exchanges. 
  
Resources 
 The claim that a great power might value a small state to the extent that it can 
extract resources from that state is deeply unspectacular.  I make a much narrower claim: 
under the scope conditions described above, a great power’s valuation of small states in 
terms of security exchanges is based in part on the extent to which those states are 
believed to be able to supply the necessary resources for a war with the other great 
power.  There’s quite a bit going on in this claim, so I will discuss its critical elements 
separately. 
 First, this is a theory about security exchanges, and the relationship of those 
political acts to great power beliefs.  It adopts a security-focused paradigm that 
understands “security” in the limited sense of physical security and not broader 
conceptions of economic or human security.  This means that while a small state might 
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have resources that are quite useful to economic growth or valuable culturally or 
instrumental in addressing a collective issue like global warming, I am interested in those 
resources if and only if they are believed to contribute materially to the ability of one 
great power to make war on the other.  If they do so, this will impact the incentives made 
available for such small states to join security arrangements. 
 Second, because this is an argument not just about the presence of resources but 
the purposes to which they are to be put (war), it is able to be specific about the sort of 
resources which will be the object of strategic value.  A great power needs sufficient 
resources to put a military in the field and desires to deny its opponent the ability to do 
the same.  If both the great powers have a surplus of a given resource, in terms of their 
planned wartime consumption, then even though it may be nice to have for other reasons 
that resource will not be an object of strategic imperatives.  This also generates variation 
in resources over time, as war plans change and demands shift, which can cause some 
resource pools to become more valuable and others to become less so (for example, prior 
to the creation of petroleum-based synthetic rubber, rubber trees were an important 
strategic resource; afterwards, they were not.) 
 Third, it places resource requirements within a broader strategic concept and 
dictates the logic under which a resource-rich state might become more or less valuable.  
There are states with large oil reserves that neither the US nor the USSR took great pains 
to bring into security arrangements (as will be discussed in the following chapters), which 
would be quite odd if resources, as a variable, were a reliable predictor of great power 
behavior.  It is not sufficient that a small state merely have the resources, it must supply 
them in wartime, which means that the great power must be able to transport them from 




their point of origin, through whatever processing and logistics channels are required, to 
the place on the battlefield where they are needed.  Resources nominally under one’s 
control that cannot be extracted or processed when needed are not worth much.  Because 
the war in which they are envisioned as necessary must include at least the possibility of 
being a global conflict, and one that is necessarily with a high-technology great power, 
the possibility of efforts to interdict these resources by the other great power is extremely 
high. 
 The operationalization of this variable is straightforward.  To the extent that a 
great power articulates a belief that a given resource in a given small state is important 
for security reasons, that state should receive higher levels of security exchanges. 
 
Relevance 
 Two aspects of strategic value of been discussed thus far: capability aggregation 
and resources.  The former addresses how a small state might be of aid to a great power’s 
overall combat effectiveness, the latter how a small state’s resources might contribute to a 
great power’s wartime logistic requirements.  Neither addresses directly how one great 
power intends to fight the other.  This is the purpose of relevance – it exists in 
conversation with the other two elements by determining how military resources will be 
allocated, how small states can contribute, what the essential areas in a particular region 
are, and what can feasibly be conquered or defended.94 
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 As discussed in the previous chapter, creating broad categories of force 
employment such as “offensive” and “defense” or “blitzkrieg” and “attrition” leaves 
much to be desired.  On the other hand, delving into the nitty-gritty of military planning 
quickly ventures onto the terrain of historians rather than political scientists.  The key is 
to relate the technical aspects of war plans to the political behavior under scrutiny.  I do 
so by analyzing the following questions: what is the nature of the force presently 
available to the great power?  What are the tasks it must accomplish?  How does the great 
power plan to accomplish those tasks given those forces?  How can a small state assist in 
near-term?  How can a small state assist in the long-term?  I shall discuss each in turn. 
 The nature of the force available to the great power speaks to both its size and 
composition.  For example, a large combined arms force under control of the great power 
in the most critical region of a global conflict would presumably be allocated to the 
central front, where its high technology, cohesive training, and organizational efficiency 
would allow it to generate maximum combat power on land and air.  By contrast, a large 
air force with only a small supporting ground element would have, by necessity, a much 
different scope of responsibility and area of operation. 
 The tasks that a force is meant to accomplish are based on the global war plan and 
where the essential terrain and resources lie.  A force could be required to hold a piece of 
terrain for its value to other fronts, or be required to prevent the interdiction of an 
essential resource, thus forcing it to defend a front as far forward as possible in order to 
prevent air attack.  It could also be tasked to seize a key logistics hub, fix a large enemy 
force in place, ensure the interdiction of a vital conduit, or simply act as a feint for the 
main effort. 




 The combination of available forces and essential tasks then determines a baseline 
great power war plan.  War plans establish what forces are to be allocated to which tasks, 
where they are to be located at the commencement of hostilities, and where they are to be 
moved subsequently.  This, in turn, will determine which geographic features facilitate 
those tasks and where shortfalls exist that must be made up elsewhere. 
 The logistic requirements to move great power forces into place in terms of both 
geography and resources, along with the capability aggregation possibilities presented by 
a small state’s capabilities and a great power’s plans then determine the assistance a small 
state can offer to the great power.  Returning to the examples listed previously, if the 
great power had a large combined arms force that was to reinforced via transatlantic 
flights linking up with pre-positioned equipment in order to fight on a central front, then a 
high technology small state could contribute positioning for weapons stockpiles, logistic 
assistance, and a supporting effort elsewhere in theater to allow the concentration of the 
great power’s forces.  Alternatively, if a great power intended to interdict a choke point 
along a key line of communication with a large air wing and a small ground contingent, 
then a low technology small state could offer air basing and some minimal local security.  
We would expect the former small state to be more important that the latter, and thus the 
recipient of a larger security assistance and military aid package. 
 However, great powers are also able to anticipate future defense needs by 
examining current trends.  Thus, in addition to aligning with small states that fill a useful 
security function in the near term, great powers are also able to invest in developing small 
state capabilities such that they can contribute to future war plans.  There are two reasons 
for this.  First, the war plan that exists today might be optimal given present resource 




constraints, but could be improved upon substantially if new resources were developed.  
For example, a training program invested in a small state could increase its capacity to 
integrate high-technology arms transfers and contribute forces to support an improved 
strategic concept.  Alternatively, a great power could invest heavily in infrastructural 
improvements to facilitate force throughput of its own.  Second, while some military 
changes are unexpected and revolutionary, others can be foreseen well in advance.  As a 
great power’s rival changes its force structure, the great power must perforce alter its 
plans and structures to meet the new challenges.  This constant updating of force size, 
doctrine, and technology changes the perceived relevance of various geographies and the 
usefulness of some small states.  To the extent these changes can be anticipated, great 
powers prefer to be proactive rather than reactive. 
 
Falsifiability and Causality 
 The integration of perception into security behavior runs a significant risk of 
veering into the tautological – because states believe their security is important, a 
particular security policy must be a function of a belief in its importance; were it not 
important, it would not have happened.  This makes falsification difficult, since objective 
factors “count” only in so far as they are subjectively perceived and the internal cognitive 
processes of the actor can be discerned only vis a vis their actions given a set of objective 
factors.  Anything can be predicted and explained, nothing can be conclusively 
dismissed. 
 Happily, while this may be a significant issue for the assessing the cognition of 
individual human beings, crawling into the thought process of a state is within the realm 




of the possible.  In order to direct the state apparatus, it is necessary to communicate 
assessments, purposes, and desired outcomes.  Thus, one ought to be able to observe PSV 
at work in archival data.  This theory can be falsified in number of ways.  PSV would fail 
as a theory under the following conditions: if security assistance is distributed on an 
ideological or symbolic basis in essential regions; if evaluations of capability, resources, 
and relevance are not tied to security exchanges; if the basis of security exchanges is 
mostly a mechanical assessment designed to optimize total capability; if great powers 
judge capability on some other set of metrics (fighting spirit, racial stereotypes) than 
those enumerated here; if resource procurement is considered outside the purview of the 
security establishment; or if war plans are built to be reactive rather than proactive (or 
don’t involve allies at all). 
 In addition to concerns about falsifiability, one might also wonder about the 
extent to which the allocation of aid informs the emergence of war plans and capabilities, 
rather than vice versa.  I argue that the causal arrow is clear – capabilities, resources, and 
relevance interact with perception and small state procurement strategies to form PSV, 
which induces security exchanges to gain cooperation and develop in future capabilities.  
However, this causal chain is susceptible to disproof – if great powers are highly 
susceptible to sunk cost arguments, if the budget process drives strategy, or if military 
sales have their own independent logic, then planners may be responding to aid, rather 
than vice versa. 
Finally, it is important to note two things about military planning.  First, states 
have “a right to be wrong.”  That is to say, their beliefs about warfare and the optimal 
path to security might, in retrospect, turn out to be deeply flawed.  These flaws, however, 




are only a problem for PSV if they are wildly erratic and lead to unstable plans and 
behaviors; if a great power produces doctrine, which it publishes internally and informs 
its beliefs about the world, we should be able to observe and test the extent to which 
beliefs about security, great power competition, and the military utility of small states 
drive security exchanges.  Second, there is more than one way to be right.  PSV is an 
important corrective to mechanistic and strictly objective approaches to security because 
it accounts for the reality that there may be multiple paths to security that seem 
reasonable to the great powers.  This theory doesn’t preselect an approach (e.g. blitzkrieg 
is always better than attrition); rather, it creates space for the great power defense 
establishment to debate the utility of various warfighting doctrines, make a choice, and 
then try to optimize its capabilities based on the strategy it has chosen. 
 
Section Summary 
 In this section, I create a theory that explains why a great power would offer a 
security exchange to a small state.  To do so, I first establish the necessary scope 
conditions under which my theory most clearly operates: bipolarity, a world composed of 
great powers and small states, a balancing-type region with essential resources, and a lack 
of great power armed conflict.  I then create the dependent variable, security exchanges.  
Security exchanges, in which a great power transfers resources to a small state, are 
caused by the small state’s Perceived Strategic Value (PSV).  PSV is an intermediate 
variable that is a function of a strategic logic that combines capability aggregation (the 
perceived impact of combining force size, technology, geography, and doctrine), 




resources, and relevance (available forces, necessary tasks or objectives, near-term plans, 
and long-term plans.)  
 
Part II: Omnibalancing 
Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes. 
I fear the Greeks, even when they bring gifts. 
-Aenied, Book 295 
 
This project seeks to understand security exchanges in two ways.  First, it asks 
why great powers choose to transfer security resources from their own control to a small 
state.  It then develops and tests the proposition that they do so on the basis of those 
states’ anticipated utility in a future conflict with another great power, or, in terms of the 
theory, their Perceived Strategic Value.  However, small states are not simply the stage 
upon which great power security competition is played out.  Nor, importantly, do they 
have the same sets of concerns and constraints as great powers.  Thus, small state security 
behaviors are not simply a mirror-image of great power strategies.  There is an 
independent logic at work for small states, and it is that logic that I address here. 
Before discussing how small states approach security exchanges, I will establish 
why they do so at all.  The argument will proceed in the following fashion: first, I will 
explain why security exchanges impose costs on the small states that receive them and 
not just the great powers that give them. Second, I will argue deductively that small states 
face internal challenges that differ in both degree and kind from those faced by great 
powers.  These internal challenges place demands and constraints on small state alliance 
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behaviors.  Third, I will theorize how external threats differ for great powers and small 
states, and why this difference complicates security exchanges.  Fourth, I will argue that 
addressing internal and external threats draws on the same limited pool of security 
resources but deploys them according to different logics.  Determining the optimum mix 
of internal/external and regional/global strategies develops the small state’s ideal 
omnibalancing strategy.  It is this ideal strategy that forms the initial bargaining position 
of the small state. 
 
Why security exchanges are costly 
 It is not a puzzle to explain why rational actors would engage in rent-taking 
behaviors.  If the costs of security exchanges are all borne by the great power patron, then 
every small state ought to pursue the identical strategy – maximize aid in the present and 
determine whether to defect if and when the opportunity to do so arises in the future.  If 
PSV is solely a function of great power strategies for war with the other great power and 
all small states are equally likely to defect, then there is no reason at all to develop a 
theory of small state decision-making.  However, the empirical variation in small state 
strategies, in combination with the strength of PSV as theory of great power behavior, 
indicates that either small states are only intermittently rational (an unsatisfying 
conclusion) or that there are multiple strategies employed by rational actors, some of 
which include the rejection of security exchanges.  Since it is logically incoherent to 
assert that a rational actor would decline costless goods, there must be some cost borne 
by the small states.  Empirically, these costs take three broad forms: costs from aid 
conditionality, costs from operational expenses, and costs from exposure to risk. 




 Aid conditionality is the most obvious type of cost, and is most prevalent in the 
literature.  With this type of cost, a great power transfers some security good destined to 
be used in support of the great power’s objectives, often in the future.  However, in order 
to obtain the aid the small state must send some costly signal of its commitment in the 
present.  Alternatively, the great power objective might exist in the present and the aid 
could be contingent upon the small state’s facilitation of that objective.  For example, the 
United States exacted a cost in terms of access to geography and sold the Saudi 
government military equipment conditional on that access, which I discuss in detail in 
Chapter 4.  Conditionality can also operate more broadly, from protection of civil 
liberties96 to UN votes to support of the great power’s vision regarding the international 
status quo (the “autonomy” in the security-autonomy literature).  In any event, the 
unifying characteristic of costs imposed by conditionality is that they do not inhere in the 
nature of security goods themselves, but rather in the stipulations of the transfer.  Thus, 
security goods could be costly to great powers and costless to small states in and of 
themselves and carry conditionality costs.  Of course, if the aid is costless to the small 
states, then a strategy of aid maximization would continue to dominate, subject to the 
additional consideration that a small state would consider overall cost (aid minus 
conditions) and not just the value of the aid.  This is the strategy often employed by the 
literature, and, as discussed in Chapter 1, is fairly unsatisfactory. 
 Security exchanges also impose operational costs.  In order to utilize the security 
aid at all, it must be stored, maintained, repaired, and manned.  The creation of the 
requisite logistical apparatus and the necessary human capital may not be funded as part 
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of the initial aid package and is almost never funded in perpetuity.  Moreover, optimizing 
the logistical support chain, both doctrinally and technologically, for a particular type of 
platform limits the aid recipient’s ability to procure arms of a different type. 
For example: suppose a state is offered a large quantity of AK-47s (an assault 
rifle) and an initial allotment of ammunition (7.62 mm).  The AK-47 has a maximum 
effective range of 500 meters and a fully-automatic setting that can fire an entire 30-
round magazine in a single burst.  It is incredibly durable, has relatively few parts, and 
requires only intermittent cleaning.  Now suppose this state wishes to shift from the AK-
47 to the M-16 (another kind of assault rifle.)  The M-16 fires a smaller bullet (5.56 mm) 
so the ammunition is not interchangeable.  This requires tracking and supplying two 
different calibers of small arms ammunition.  The M-16 has a maximum effective range 
of 400 meters and no fully automatic setting, and so will require retraining for soldiers 
who carry it (and will require two different training plans if a unit has a mixture of the 
two.)  The M-16 has a more complicated mechanism and requires frequent cleaning, 
which will require more replacement parts, the distribution of cleaning kits, and further 
retraining.  During the entire period of transition, units will be at lower readiness, training 
time will be spent on basic tasks rather than higher-order exercises, and the logistics 
system will have an outsize burden in updating the requirements for ammunition and 
spare parts.  Each additional weapon type poses a cost on a state, and the transition costs 
from one to the other are high.  Thus, even if this state would prefer to use the M-16 
ceteris paribus, after it fields the AK-47 it will stick with it as long as the margin of 
difference between the two rifles does not exceed the transition costs.  The costs 




identified in this example only become more acute as the technologies become more 
complex. 
Finally, the incorporation of security exchanges of all but the most basic varieties 
creates vulnerabilities of its own.  Modern warfare consumes ammunition, fuel, and spare 
parts at a tremendous rate.  Absent an indigenous capability to produce and stockpile 
those items, the recipient of the transfer is at the mercy of the giver for its future 
utilization.  However, it is important to understand that this cost goes beyond simply the 
set of technologies transferred and extends to the recipient’s armed forces as a whole.  
This is because modern warfare achieves maximum effect through the synchronous 
action of multiple technologies or, put more simply, through “combined arms.”  
Militaries plan for, and spend a great deal of time training for, operations in which the 
branches work together because when capabilities are employed one at a time they are 
much less effective.  Thus, if all the tanks start running out of spare parts or the artillery 
runs out of ammunition or the air force runs out of jet fuel the entire force is put in 
jeopardy and there is not likely to be an immediate substitute for the missing capability 
that is readily available, since maintaining multiple suppliers of major end items is costly 
for the reasons enumerated above.  While these examples have concentrated on physical 
resources, the same can also be said for headquartering arrangements, command and 
control systems, or whole units.  Ultimately, security exchanges often come with strings 
attached, require both initial and on-going expenditure to maintain, and create a unique 
set of risks in future combat.  These are the costs of a security exchange to a small state. 
 
 





 This project differentiates great powers and small states on the basis of power, 
and specifically the ability to generate physical security.  Great powers cannot be 
defeated militarily by any coalition that does not include at least one other great power; 
however, small states possess rather minimal military capabilities and thus have a much 
more fraught security environment.  Until this point, threats have been discussed from the 
perspective of the great power and in the language of a unitary state; thus, threats are 
necessarily all external to the state in question, as it has no interiority.  This mode of 
analysis is less useful in understanding the security environment of small states, and in 
this section I will open the black box of the small state and address the internal threats 
that inform small state alliance behavior. 
 While perhaps empirically useful, it would be theoretically unsatisfying to simply 
assert an ad hoc distinction between great powers and small states that posits that great 
powers have only external threats while small states must address both external and 
internal threats.  Instead, I will show that all states face both types of threat.  I will then 
demonstrate that by using only the distinguishing characteristic already employed thus far 
in the project (“power,” as defined above,) I am able to justify excluding great power 
internal threats from my theory of security exchanges while including those of small 
states.  I will then go on to argue that, unlike great powers, small state security exchange 
strategies consider internal as well as external threats. 
 There are two categories of internal threats faced by a state: threats from within 
the state apparatus (such as military coups) and threats from society as a whole (such as 
revolutions.)  Both are a constant reality for all states, big and small.  The reasons for this 




are straightforward and fairly unavoidable.  It is not controversial to claim that the 
creation of a Weberian state is a resource-intensive affair and that the establishment of a 
monopoly on legitimate violence requires considerable overmatch in security capabilities.  
States have invested in these capabilities because if they did not violent entrepreneurs 
from within their own societies would seize resources for their own benefit.  These 
resources can range from valuable commodities to be traded abroad, the control of people 
to provide exploitable labor, or social and political authority to be leveraged into desired 
outcomes -- the goal of the dissident entrepreneur is not particularly relevant to the 
discussion at hand.  What is important is that non-state actors have a constant incentive to 
seize some or all of the resources controlled by the state to be put towards their own ends 
– these are the threats from society.  However, in dealing with this threat power is 
concentrated in the security apparatus, and a new pool of dissident entrepreneurs may be 
created with the ability to maximize their perceived utility through seizure of the state 
apparatus.  This is the threat from within the state. 
 Neither of those threats is unique to small states.  Even in America’s unipolar era, 
it is faced with armed separatist movements that attack state officials, refuse to pay taxes, 
and assert their sovereignty over (admittedly quite small) tracts of land.  The U.S. 
maintains an internal security apparatus designed to address these threats in the form of 
myriad overlapping local, state, and federal agencies with a vast array of surveillance and 
paramilitary capabilities.  The U.S. also retains the ability to deploy military formations 
from its National Guard to quell widespread civil disturbances and has done so in the 
past.  Other great powers have additional capabilities such as domestic spy agencies, 
large-scale political prison complexes, and vast informant networks.  The threat from 




within the state is also a concern for great powers, regardless of regime type, and active 
steps are taken to circulate officers, build organizational redundancy, and avoid the 
concentration of coercive power in the office a single individual or a small clique. 
 Given that all states face these threats, the first important distinction to be made 
between great powers and small states is their capacity to address internal threats and 
impose order.  Many (though certainly not all) small states face challenges of low per 
capita GDP, expansive and rugged territory, and rapid population growth.  These factors 
stress the ability of the state to obtain the Weberian ideal of monopolization of legitimate 
violence, as state presence may be quite transient for many members of society.  Further, 
there is a trade-off between expanding efficient state capacities to address the challenges 
and creating redundant organizations to address within-state threats.  Great powers have 
enormous resources at the disposal of the state and are able to pay the costs necessary to 
both impose hierarchy on society and police the state security apparatus.  By contrast, 
small states often have fewer resources and exist in an internal state of semi-anarchy. 
 Thus far I have discussed security capacity in terms of a state/society ratio – great 
powers have more state capacity relative to their societies than small states do.  However, 
this is, in many ways, an empirical rather than a theoretical claim.  There certainly exist 
small states in Europe that have high GDPs, a relatively strong state, and no imminent 
threat from within the state.  Nonetheless, there is an additional vulnerability faced by 
small states; namely, great powers have the ability to generate significant internal threats 
in small states by introducing resources that overwhelm that state’s ability to effectively 
control either society or threats from within.  Therefore, it is necessary to consider not 




only the ratio of state/society security capabilities, but also differential between great 
power and small state security capabilities. 
 Great powers are able to “internally balance” against domestic threats not simply 
because of their advantages over their societies, but because of their overwhelming 
capabilities relative to other states.  While it is true that great powers have made a habit 
of attempting to interfere in one another’s domestic politics in order to foment coups and 
rebellions, those efforts have seldom, if ever, yielded results.  This is certainly not the 
case in small states.  From Hungary to Guatemala to Belgium, great powers have 
demonstrated an ability to crush civil disturbances, change regimes, and even create 
states in order to suit their purposes.  Thus, the internal semi-anarchy that distinguishes 
small states from great powers is a function of both internal and external realities.  The 
internal stability of a small state is contingent, to a degree, on the policies of great 
powers. 
 It is here that the connection between small state internal threats and security 
exchanges becomes clear.  While great powers “internally balance” in order to create 
domestic hierarchy, the ineluctable semi-anarchy faced by small states drives them to 
seek resources to support their internal security.  An agreement with a great power that 
generates a security exchange can both enhance the ability of the state to control society 
and placate threats from within the state through pay-offs.  While great powers make 
offers based on Perceived Strategic Value, small states may elect to bear the costs 
associated with security exchanges in part due to internal threats. 
 
 





 Small states face a litany of external threats to their security.  Great powers can, 
and do, use violence directly to obtain political outcomes in small states.  Small states can 
find themselves drawn into conflicts between great powers, voluntarily or involuntarily.  
Small states also face threats from states that are of no significant threat to a great power.  
Obviously, small states face external threats to a greater degree than great powers do.  
However, small states also face threats that differ in kind.  Specifically, unlike great 
powers, small states exist in semi-anarchy externally as well as internally (assuming a 
world of great power security competition.)  Thus, small states differentiate between 
regime and state preservation, small states act as though military results are temporary 
and reversible, and small states are willing to tolerate risk in the global great power 
security competition in order to address more immediate regional threats.97  In this 
section, I will address each of these points in turn. 
 The conflation of state and regime in many third-image theories is a reasonable 
and useful analytical tool for understanding great power politics.  In security terms, the 
destruction of the regime by an external power historically required the destruction of the 
state apparatus that generated the military resources that regime controlled.98  Even a 
successful “decapitation strike” that killed the titular head of the regime would preserve a 
state apparatus that would spontaneously generate a replacement.  By contrast, there are 
numerous examples of a small state regime being violently replaced through external 
intervention during which the bureaucratic and economic apparatus of the state continued 
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to function smoothly.  Therefore, small state security policy, which is controlled by a 
regime atop a state, must focus itself on the preservation of the regime and not simply the 
state because the regime may face dire threats that have only a tangential involvement 
with the state as such.  This point is important, because is the analytical fulcrum that 
connects the internal and external threats discussed in this chapter.  Following 
omnibalancing approaches, it is the regime, not the state, whose logic is the object of 
analysis in Security Exchange Theory. 
 Earlier, I argued that small states face a unique internal threat environment in part 
because great powers have the ability to create serious internal threats at relatively low 
cost to themselves.  Thus, small states are caught in what I call semi-anarchy.99  This 
analysis extends to their external affairs as well.  Brown refers to a semi-anarchical 
system as a “penetrated political system,” that is, “a system that is neither effectively 
absorbed by the outside challenger nor later released from the outsider’s smothering 
embrace;” thus, “the politics of a thoroughly penetrated society is not adequately 
explained – even at the local level – without reference to the influence of the outside 
system.”100  Systems of small states are inherently penetrated, such that neither their 
domestic politics nor their intra-regional security competition can be understood outside 
of great power rivalry.  Great powers maintain an ability to reverse the gains of small 
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state regimes both internally and externally.  Thus, victories are forever temporary and 
major intraregional conflicts are subject to “management” by the great powers.101 
 Because some greater power has the ability to avert a small state regime’s 
destruction even in the aftermath of military defeat, it is imprecise to assert that these 
regimes operate in anarchy in the same fashion as great powers.  Great powers are 
internally hierarchical and face the real prospect of complete destruction if they are 
decisively defeated militarily by their great power rival(s).  Small states are unable to 
create an internal hierarchy, but are also able to rely on other self-interested patrons to 
intervene to prevent a total defeat.  Thus, following Brown, the external security behavior 
of small states should be more risk-tolerant than great powers, be relatively focused on 
short-term, limited victories, and be solicitous of great power participation in order to 
check the ambitions of rivals.  Thus, while a great power might prefer that all states focus 
their energies on the maintenance of a global alliance strategy to aid in its pursuit of 
survival in an anarchic world, its clients will be willing to upset that strategy in order to 
deal with more immediate (in both the geographic and temporal sense of the word) 
threats and opportunities in the semi-anarchy that great power competition creates for 
small states. 
 
The limited fungibility of security resources 
 Thus far I have argued that small state regimes face a litany of threats: internal 
threats from both state and society, internal threats generated by great powers, external 
threats from regional competitors, and external threats from great powers.  Like any 
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scheme of classification, the merits of this approach are to be judged by whether or not it 
provides useful analytical leverage on a question of interest.  Therefore, in this section I 
demonstrate that there are natural incompatibilities between the ideal-type security 
arrangements that meet each of these four types of threats. 
 
Threats and Security Postures of Small States 
 Regional Global 
Internal Distributed Client 
External Independent Integrated 
 
 The external-global threat, or threats generated against small states by great 
powers, are best met through an integrated security plan that aggregates the capabilities 
of the small state with some great power that will come to its aid in the event of conflict.  
The small state, by definition, has no hope of mounting an independent defense of its 
territory against the predations of a great power.  Since a great power can only be 
defeated by some coalition that includes another great power, the small state must not 
only enter such a coalition, it must actively seek to ensure its success by maximizing the 
effectiveness of coalition forces and by inducing great power participation in the event of 
conflict.  Both these goals can be met through the introduction of great power forces, 
headquarters, or trainers onto the national territory of the small state, developing forces 
within the small state that complement the forces provided by the great power, and by 
ceding wartime control of small state forces to a great power commander.  For all these 
reasons, I will refer to this as an “Integrated” security posture. 




 External-regional threats, by contrast, require space for autonomous action on the 
part of a small state to rapidly seize and exploit opportunities or to mount a successful 
independent defense until great powers step in to mediate the conflict.  This force is built 
for rapid, conventional, combined-arms conflicts – therefore, it must maintain operational 
independence, be logistically self-sufficient, and have the full suite of military 
capabilities at its disposal.  It must also maintain control of its rear areas, which means 
keeping the units of other regional actors out of its territory.  In stark contrast to the 
Integrated force, it cannot afford to invest in niche capabilities, nor to cede key command 
and control nodes to outside organizations, nor to allow basing rights to possible 
competitors.  Thus, I will refer to this as an Independent security arrangement, which 
exists in clear tension with the integrative logic demanded by global-external threats. 
 Both the Integrative and Independent security arrangements are driven by a 
military logic that optimally positions forces to meet external threats.  However, internal 
threats are governed by a domestic political logic.  First, I will discuss internal-regional 
threats, which are those that are neither generated by great power resources nor governed 
by great power ideological conflict.  These threats refer to the constellation of challenges 
generated by dissident entrepreneurs in both state and society.102  Because they do not 
involve a great power, it is possible that the small state has the capability to deal with 
these threats using indigenous resources.  The allocation of these resources must 
simultaneously police society and prevent regime change from within the state.  
                                                        
102 Mark Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 25.  This 
model of threats from both state and society is expressed quite well by Lichbach, who writes “… the 
government recognizes the potential threat represented by its own military establishment.  To prevent 
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efficiency, in which successful collective action against a regime opponent is the purpose of the military 
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Generally speaking, this takes the form of lightly armed units near population and 
resource concentrations, more heavily-armed formations held in reserve in remote 
locations, and ammunition stockpiles maintained separately from both of them.  This 
allows the allocation of coercive capacity against rebellious areas or populations, but 
limits the autonomous capabilities of any individual commander to just a few days of 
operations.  I call this the Distributed approach, and it has obvious disadvantages against 
external threats: first, establishing a defensive front will be made difficult by the need to 
concentrate and supply forces at the onset of hostilities; second, offensive external 
operations will have a longer lead-time; third, ammunition stockpiles are vulnerable to 
interdiction or destruction.  Therefore, a Distributed approach is incompatible with either 
an Integrated or Independent security arrangement. 
 When a small state faces an internal threat that is generated by a great power, 
which I place in the internal-global quadrant, it posed unique challenges.  Like external-
global threats, they require the assistance of a great power to effectively thwart; like 
internal-regional threats, they demand a political, rather than a purely military, approach 
to security.  Thus, this threat requires that a small state regime find a great power patron 
that will support its internal stability measures.  Therefore, I call this the Client approach 
to security.  In this approach, the regime maintains a positive relationship with its patron 
such that it is able to receive security exchanges that placate patronage networks within 
the state and simultaneously facilitate control of society.  Unlike the Distributed 
approach, though, the small state is subject to the demands of its patrons concerning its 
security policies and its ideological alignment.  This could mean restrictions on human 




rights violations, special protection for certain elements within state and society, special 
access or basing rights, or a modification of international political behaviors. 
 
Summary 
In this section, I have demonstrated that small states operate in a unique security 
environment.  Unlike great powers, they are unable to neatly bifurcate the world into 
hierarchy at home and anarchy abroad.  In fact I show that due to their limited power they 
face internal and external threats that can be created and mediated by great powers.  
Thus, they live in a state of semi-anarchy, unable to reliably establish enduring hierarchy 
domestically and able to appeal to higher powers internationally.  This, in turn, results in 
an ontological shift – the regime becomes the object of analysis, since survival of the 
state and survival of the regime are delinked.  Broadly speaking, these regimes 
omnibalance.  That is, as survival-seeking entities, they prioritize the most significant 
threats to their longevity. 
 Due to semi-anarchy, these omnibalancing strategies differ from the security 
strategies pursued by great powers.  While great powers ensure their survival in anarchy 
by focusing on potential conflicts with other great powers that may result in a decisive 
victory or defeat, small state regimes employ a variety of security approaches based on 
the predominant threat they face.  If they face a significant external threat from a great 
power, they pursue Integrative strategies to facilitate assistance from a great power ally.  
If they face an internal threat from a great power, they pursue a Client strategy, and adjust 
their internal security policy in accordance with the wishes of their great power patron.  
However, if they face an internal threat from a non-great power source, the small state 




regime will adopt a Distributed defensive posture, which addresses threats from the state 
and society but is poorly suited for external threats.  And if a small state faces an external 
threat than it adopts an Independent posture, which positions its forces for warfare in 
semi-anarchy, characterized as it is by short, sharp, conventional fighting that is 
eventually mediated by a great power. 
 
Part III:  Bargaining 
 Security exchanges impose costs on both parties to the exchange.  The sender 
gives up direct control of security resources, and the receiver accepts the risks and 
burdens discussed above.  That such transfers occur at all indicates that both parties 
believe that the costs of the security exchange are outweighed by an anticipated benefit, 
which implies both an underlying rationality and a bargaining process.  In the previous 
two parts of this chapter, I have conducted a detailed analysis of the strategic logic of 
great powers (PSV) and small states (Small State Strategies) when it comes to their 
preferred allocation of security resources.  In this section, I place these logics in dialogue 
and derive predictions about the bargaining behaviors of great powers and small states in 
the creation of security exchanges.  To preview, given the conditions enumerated at the 
outset of the chapter, great powers prefer that small states adopt Integrative or Client 
approaches, but their leverage over a small state is constrained by the nature of that small 
state’s Perceived Strategic Value. 
 Great power survival is contingent upon their success in security competitions 
with other great powers.  At the outset of the chapter, I limited the scope of the theory to 
essential regions (the domination of which would decisively alter the survival prospects 




of great powers), to regions in which balancing is a viable strategy for small states, and to 
bipolarity.  For the reasons enumerated in Part 1, great powers identify small states that 
contribute to their security requirements vis-à-vis their great power rival and then 
endeavor to aggregate capabilities to maximum effect.  This goal is best served by either 
an Integrative or Client approach, and I will examine each in turn. 
 The great power preference for the Integrative over the Independent approach to 
security on the part of the small state clients is easy to explain.  An integrated force 
structure has desirable military effects, in that it reduces planning requirements and 
execution times, which enables the allocation of forces with maximum efficiency.  It also 
changes the process of force generation – the small state military is designed to 
maximally contribute to the strategic vision of the great power.  By contrast, the 
Independent approach requires the wartime establishment of headquarters and command 
relationships, which is inherently time-consuming and has historically been rather 
fraught.  In addition, it is not improbable that Independent forces would not be arrayed 
optimally to support integration into the great power strategy, nor is it necessary that the 
combined arms force generated in support of regional ambitions will be as effective in 
supporting one great power in a war with the other as it is in supporting the security goals 
of the small state. 
 In a Client approach, the small state articulates its internal challenges in the 
language of great power conflict and develops security forces in accordance with great 
power templates and constraints.  In a Distributed approach, the language of conflict is 
regional, not global, and security forces are created and deployed at the discretion of the 
small state.  The great power preference for Client vice Distributed approaches to 




internal-regional security challenges is a function of the heuristics great powers employ 
to evaluate threats in the world and the beliefs great powers tend to hold about the 
efficacy of their policy recommendations.  I will address each in turn. 
 In third-image theories (such as this one,) ideological conflict is caused by 
security conflict, not vice versa.  The very fact of a threat to survival causes a bipole to 
impute all manner of malevolence, impurity, and ideological “otherness” to its rival.103  
However, simply because ideological conflict has a non-ideological underlying cause 
does not then mean that it has no significance to the great power rivals.  In fact, this 
conflict comes to structure the worldview of its participants such that a small state’s 
refusal to articulate internal security challenges in global terms is more than simply a 
difference in context – it becomes an inability to comprehend the threat represented or to 
participate adequately in the defense of “right” (which is coextensive with the great 
power’s security interests.)  Thus, the ideological congruence represented by the global 
orientation of Client strategies represents to the great power that the small state shares an 
understanding of the world’s security challenges.  This could be a precursor to an 
Integrated approach in the future, but at the very least, it supports the internal elements 
most closely aligned with the great power at the expense of those that are most hostile. 
 In addition to a strong belief in the universalizability of their worldview, great 
powers also have a deep commitment to the efficacy of their security strategies.  This 
commitment sustains itself even in the face of countervailing information,104 and the 
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belief in the efficacy of great power security approaches informs the advice passed from 
great powers to small state clients.105  Thus, great powers prefer not simply that small 
states mirror their description of a conflict (presenting in global, vice regional, terms) but 
they prefer that the small state adapt the security approach the great power has 
determined is optimally suited for the situation. 
Small State Threats and Security Postures, Great Power Preferences 
 Regional Global 
Internal Distributed 
 




  Great Power Preferences 
Integrated 
  
The table above illustrates the possible tensions between small state and great 
power preferences.  Assuming that the threats are exogenously given, some small state 
preferences will naturally align with the great power with which they seek to engage in a 
security exchange.  However, small states which understand their threat environment in 
regional and not global terms and wish to enter into a security exchange with a great 
power will, ceteris paribus, pressure small states to move from Distributed or 
Independent security postures to Client or Integrated ones.  This pressure from a great 
power to move from left to right is attenuated by the small state’s Perceived Strategic 
Value (PSV).  Small states with higher PSV have more autonomy in the design of their 
security strategies than states with lower PSV.  I will explicate each of these claims 
further. 
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 At its most basic, PSV is form of benefit (in terms of additional security) for 
which Great Powers will tolerate costs (in the form of security exchanges.)  By definition, 
a rational actor will tolerate higher costs to receive a greater benefit.  As discussed above, 
small states that focus on regional threats rather than global ones are of less use to great 
power war plans than they would be otherwise, since their security posture is less 
effective for wartime integration, does not comport to great power understandings of the 
world, and/or does not adhere to great power best practices.  A regional focus therefore 
reduces the available benefit to the great power because the small state develops 
suboptimal capabilities or is less able to aggregate efficiently; it does not, however, 
eliminate capability entirely, nor does it make aggregation impossible.  Thus, as long as 
the residual security benefit to the great power exceeds the cost of the security transfer, 
the great power should be willing to enter a security exchange. 
This creates an opportunity for the small state that intends to pursue a Distributed or 
Independent approach to security and wishes to enter into obtain a security exchange 
from a great power.  Such a small state can continue to pursue its chosen security posture 
in the face of great power pressure to the extent that it is so valuable that it retains a 
benefit outweighing the costs to the great power that its proposed security exchange 
entail.  Alternatively, it can adjust its security posture away from its ideal and towards a 
more Integrated or Client-based approach until it calculates that the marginal security 
benefit of an additional dollar of great power security goods does not outweigh the 
marginal security cost of reorienting another dollar of security from regional to global 
concerns.  Obviously, the more attractive the small state is to the great power, the less it 




will find itself compelled to move.  However, the more desperately the small state wants 
the security exchange, the more it will be willing to concede. 
 
The chart above illustrates the essential dynamics of the bargaining process that 
occurs in Security Exchange Theory.  Security goods are transferred from great powers to 
selected small states, for which the great powers seek some strategic value in their 
security competition with their great power rivals.  They may also seek to focus small 
states on global, rather than regional threats.  Small states, for their part, benefit from the 
transfer of security goods, but give up institutional costs for the integration of these 
security goods, lose flexibility should they wish to transfer their loyalties to another great 
power in the future, and may be forced to shift their security strategies. 





H2:  Ceteris paribus, small states with Integrated or Client security approaches receive 
more aid relative to their Perceived Strategic Value than equivalent states with 
Independent or Distributed approaches. 
 
H3:  Assuming a regionally-focused small state and ceteris paribus, the more external 
security goods a small state requires, the more it will shift from a regionally-focused to a 
globally-focused strategy. 
 
Endogeneity and the Causal Process 
 A possible objection to my approach is that the theory has problems with 
unaddressed endogeneity – that is, security exchanges generate security threats which 
require further security exchanges.  These threats also inform strategy, which adjusts 
costs and strategic valuation, and thus a bargain can never be reached because there is 
never a rational endpoint to the spiral induced by bi-directional causality.  While there 
may be some merit to this critique, I believe the theoretical claim that great power and 
small state preferences are at to a large degree exogenously given is sustainable. 
 First, the scope conditions for this theory deliberately restrict the geographic area 
under discussion to those which contain some feature essential to victory in the event of 
great power conflict.  It is entirely conceivable that a great power might make a practice 
of disbursing nominal sums of aid simply to bedevil their rival and raise the cost of 
aligning against them (this was the story of American policy in Africa during much of the 
late Cold War) or, alternatively, might simply intervene directly in the affairs of any 




nearby small state that chose the wrong ally (e.g., the Monroe Doctrine.)  However, doing 
reflexive things in important regions where states have the ability to balance creates 
weakness and gives over the initiative in ways that a rational policy apparatus cannot 
afford.  Thus, while peripheral regions tend to be playgrounds for ideologues of all 
stripes, the more cautious and deliberate state security apparatus of the great powers tends 
to be disciplined and focused in their allocation of resources designed to preserve 
survival.  This would seem to make the security exchange behaviors the servant of great 
power security concepts and not their masters. 
 Second, while it is possible that a small state security exchange decision could 
change the threats they face, it is by no means necessarily the case.  Setting aside regional 
politics, if great powers value small states for their strategic utility they will seek to gain 
their cooperation through alliance, to control or replace the regime internally, or to 
occupy the strategically important regions of the country.  The threat of domination exists 
separately, and is likely prior to, the decision to ally.  In terms of regional threats, while 
there is no a priori reason to assume great power alignment is germane to bilateral 
relationships that are not already articulated in those terms, the reality can obviously be 
somewhat more complicated.  However, empirical work by Walt, Barnett, and others 
suggests that regional political considerations do function outside the boundaries of great 
power rivalry even when they are expressed in a “global” language.106 
 There are strong reasons to believe that great power and small state threat 
perceptions and the strategies they believe will best address those threats are both 
exogenous and prior to the commencement of security exchanges. But even if there is a 
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bi-directional causality, the consequences of making no decision at all (vulnerability for 
the great power, growing threats for the small state) militate against an infinite sort of 
spiral.  Thus, the basic theoretical structure stands, although it only captures the causal 
arrow in a single direction – states pursue security exchanges to preserve themselves 
against threats, even if it is true that the threats may be a function of the security 
exchange to some extent.  However, even if there is partial endogeneity, modeling 
security exchanges as though they are completely exogenous facilitates a clearer analysis 
of heretofore unexplored causal mechanisms. 
 Finally, the causal processes implied by the theory and the criticism presented 
here ought to be empirically observable.  If states conclude security exchanges first, and 
then develop new perceptions of threat as a result, this would provide support for the 
assertion that the theory is endogenous.  On the other hand, if threat perceptions precede 
security exchanges and appear to be stable afterwards, this would indicate that the theory 
has the causal arrow pointing the right way.  As will be shown in the chapters to follow, 
the dominant trend is for threat perceptions to remain stable.  However, there are notable 
examples to the contrary – when Egypt bought Czech arms in 1955, it immediately tried 
to reassure the United States that had no intention of aligning itself with the Soviet 
Union.  Nonetheless, the United States reacted with surprise and hostility, and it looked 
for ways to check Egyptian regional ambitions.  However, even in the midst of this 
diplomatic tumult, American security exchange policies remained steady and were 
focused almost entirely on the Soviet Union.  In my estimation, the weight of the 
empirical evidence supports my decision to model threats as exogenously given and the 
causal process as unidirectional, despite the presence of partial endogeneity. 
 









Statistical Analysis of Middle East Security Exchanges, 1952-1979 
In the preceding chapters, I presented Security Exchange Theory and argued that the 
Perceived Strategic Value a great power assigns to a small state is an important determinant of 
the scale of security exchanges between the two.  In this chapter, I test the plausibility of my 
claims on a dataset I have assembled for Middle Eastern countries between 1952 and 1979.  
Perceived Strategic Value theory asserts that great powers engage in security exchanges with 
small states because of the strategic value those states represent in a potential conflict with other 
great powers.  Strategic value is itself a function of objective factors, which are generally 
appreciated by contemporary theories of alliance behavior, and subjective assessments and 
beliefs about the future, which are not.  In this chapter, I test a modified version of strategic 
value that is based entirely on the observable, objective facts that are presumed to drive great 
power strategic valuation.  Because I argue that strategic value is contingent and perceptual, I 
predict that a model using solely objective factors will not be exceptionally powerful.  
Nonetheless, in accordance with the predictions of PSV, there should be a positive relationship 
between the objective bases of strategic assessment and the willingness of great powers to 
transfer security resources to small states.  Specifically, the model of strategic valuation I create 
tests the proposition that capability, resources, and war plan relevance are sources of strategic 
value.  While the results are mixed, they do demonstrate the plausibility of Perceived Strategic 
Value theory and support the qualitative approach I take in the following chapters. 
 This chapter is organized in the following fashion: first, it ensures that the data employed 
in the analysis meet the scope conditions defined for the theory; second, it discusses the 
dependent variable and justifies the distinction between security exchanges and the more 
commonly used indices of formal alliance behavior; third, it derives proxies for the independent 




variables contained in the theory; fourth, it discusses statistical procedure and results; finally, it 
concludes with a discussion of the findings and implications for the remainder of the project. 
 
Scope Conditions 
 The Middle East meets the criteria for an essential region in which balancing strategies 
are viable alternatives for small states.  Throughout the period in question, its oil exports fueled 
Europe and the United States and it offered the possibility of a warm water port for the Soviet 
fleet.  States within the region changed their great power alignments with greater frequency than 
in other essential regions (such as Europe), thus creating helpful variation in the data.  
Temporally, my sample is bounded by two historical watersheds that fundamentally reconfigured 
the strategic landscape of the Middle East – the Egyptian revolution of 1952 that ended British 
rule over the country and the Iranian revolution of 1979 that heralded the replacement of Arab 
Nationalism with a politicized Islam. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 The puzzle that motivates this project is the recurring decision by great powers in 
bipolarity to give security goods to small states.  In this chapter, I operationalize the dependent 
variable, “security exchange,” using the value of arms transfers from either NATO or the 
Warsaw Pact to the Middle East. 
 Arms transfers are an excellent proxy for security exchanges (although are not precisely 
co-extensive with the variable, which can include other forms of military support), in that they 
involved the allocation of a scarce asset on the part of a great power.  While there were 
extraordinary numbers of weapons produced in the Cold War, the archival data that follows 




indicates that demand consistently outstripped supply.  Moreover, American arms exports were 
seen primarily as a “tool of foreign policy” and not as a profit center throughout the era in 
question.
107
  That is to say, they were controlled by the State Department and Department of 
Defense, rather than led by the Commerce Department (as would be the case after the end of the 
Cold War).  Finally, using the total value of arms transfers effectively captures the wide variety 
of bureaucratic methods used to transfer military resources to small states, including reduced-
cost sales, loan forgiveness, direct transfers, and brokered foreign military sales.  It also captures 
more of the complexity of great power strategy, in that the great powers would occasionally 
support the arms sales of allies or client states worldwide.  For example, if a small state had 
British equipment remaining from the colonial era, the United States might support that state’s 
purchase of further British equipment in order to bolster their defense capabilities.  This would 
not be captured by simple bilateral great power – small state transfers, but is captured by the 
broader measure that I use here. 
The data for global arms transfers is collected and made publicly available by the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
108
  SIPRI was established, and is still 
largely funded by, the Swedish government.  The measure SIPRI uses to evaluate arms transfers 
is its Trend Indicator Value (TIV), which creates a common metric for the valuation of hardware 
transfers in a given year that is designed to be employed in longitudinal analyses.  It “is based on 
the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and is intended to represent the transfer 
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  Where production costs are not available, SIPRI estimates the value of 
the weapon based on its set of capabilities.  Since this theory is specifically meant to address the 
puzzle of great powers transfers of security goods to small powers, TIV is ideally suited to the 
purposes at hand. 
 Before moving to the model itself, it is important to observe that arms transfer data also 
highlight the importance of the differentiating security exchanges from broader theories of 
alliance behavior.  If formal alliances were reliable predictors of strategic alignment and the 
willingness of great powers to pay costs to small states, then existing measures of alliances 
would be sufficient for present purposes.
110
  However, as the tables below demonstrate, many 
states receive arms transfers that have not joined a formal alliance with the great power who is 
transferring the arms. 
 Alliance with any NATO Power 
Arms Transfers from 
any US or Western 
European State 
By Country-Year Yes No 
Yes 71 188 
No 3 46 
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 Alliance with any Warsaw Pact Power 
Arms Transfers from 
any Warsaw Pact State 
By Country-Year Yes No 
Yes 14 64 
No 1 229 
Table 3-2. Arms transfers to Middle East states 1952-79, sorted by alliances with Warsaw Pact states 
 
As the data indicate, if one is in a formal alliance with a great power or its close allies, one is 
likely to obtain arms transfers from that bloc – of the 89 country-years in which such an alliance 
existed, there were arms transfers in 85.  However, the converse is not true.  Simply because a 
small state obtains arms transfers from a given bloc is not a reliable indicator that it also 
participates in a formal treaty structure that codifies its security alignment.  In the 337 country-
years in which arms were transferred, there was no existing formal alliance in 252 of them.  
Moreover, a comparison of Tables 1 and 2 reveals that the USSR was quite willing to engage in 
security exchanges outside the auspices of a formal alliance commitment, largely to do with their 
limited options (which I discuss in Chapter 5) and the small state strategy of their largest client 
(which I discuss in Chapter 6).  Even in the American case, security exchange partners often 
pursued strategies that did not require the institutionalization facilitated by a codified alliance 
structure, and thus bilateral security exchanges were conducted without one.  Finally, when 
formal alliance status was included in the model below, formal alliances between a great power 
and a small state were found to have no statistical significance in determining arms transfer 
levels between those states.
111
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Further, there is substantial variation in the arms transfer data.  Even if one believes that 
formal alliances capture important aspects of a great power / small state relationship, the 
presence of such an agreement does not indicate any difference in their value to a great power.  
As the graphs below demonstrate, the great powers both dedicated increasingly large amounts of 
arms to the Middle East over time, and shifted the proportion of those arms between small states 
in a non-random fashion.  Again, assuming that there is a control premium placed on weapons 
(i.e., weapons are more likely to be effective when kept under one’s own direction) and that great 
powers would not allocate these scarce resources thoughtlessly, it seems that there is an 
additional strategic logic beyond that which can be captured by binary coding of alliance 
provisions.  The following graphs show variation over the time period in question in the value of 
arms transferred by both the West and the Warsaw Pact. 
 










As the graphs illustrate, there is considerable between case and within case variation in 
American security exchanges.  One pattern that is immediately apparent in the distribution of 
Western security exchanges is that Egypt, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan have stable security 
exchanges over time, while Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel have significant spikes in the 1970s.
112
  
In Iran’s case, the increase is so massive that it requires its own scale (with a maximum of $6 
billion rather than $3 billion).  As I discuss in Chapter 6, this represents the emergence of 
Nixon’s Twin Pillars policy.
113
  This policy explicitly relied on American partnerships with 
Saudi Arabia and Iran to ensure the security of the Persian Gulf, and was itself embedded in a 
larger pattern of Vietnamization, wherein the US sought out regional clients to serve as proxies 
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in its global security competition with the USSR.
114
  This policy also accounts for the rising 
security exchanges with Israel, which was to act as an autonomous regional proxy.  By contrast, 
Turkey remained enmeshed in NATO, pursuing an integrated strategy and developing 
capabilities that complemented US forces but was not intended by the US to operate 
autonomously in the region. 
 
 In contrast to the wide variety of strategies and clients available to the US, the data on the 
USSR reveals a story of limited options.  The four states above represent 96.5% of Warsaw Pact 
arms exports to the region between 1952 and 1979.  As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, 
inept postwar diplomacy left the Soviets with few avenues available to disrupt American 
operations in the Mediterranean or the Middle East.  Although relations became tense in the late 
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1950s between Egypt and the USSR, Iraq and Syria only replace Egypt in the aftermath of the 
1973 Arab-Israeli war and the early movements towards the realignment of Egypt into the 
American camp.  While this shift might account for between case variation, in Chapter 5 I show 
that emerging Soviet naval doctrine can account for within case variation.  The need for the 
Soviet Union to challenge the American fleet in the waters around the Middle East, combined 
with their dependence on land-based aircraft for a significant portion of this period, made states 
with airfields and ports near major sea lines of communication critically important. 
 
Independent Variables 
 Security Exchange Theory asserts that a great power engages in security exchanges on 
the basis of its Perceived Strategic Valuation of a small state.  This value is a function of the 
small state’s capabilities, resources, and relevance.  In this section, I develop proxy measures for 




 I measure capability with two broad proxies.  The first is intended to capture capability in 
its most basic sense – the size of force that an ally could potentially contribute to an alliance.  I 
measure this using the Correlate of War’s count of military personnel, and hypothesize that the 
larger a small state’s military is, the more valuable a great power will perceive it to be and, thus, 
the more of the limited pool of arms transfers that state will receive.
115
  The second is intended to 
capture the small state’s capacity to absorb high-technology systems.  I measure this using a 
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count of students in post-secondary education per 1,000 in the population.
116
  This measure 
captures the other meanings of capability that I describe in earlier chapters.  The implementation 
of what Biddle calls “the modern system of war,” the employment of high-technology systems 
on the battlefield, and the maintenance of those systems during peacetime all require a 
population sufficiently literate and educated to make use of the arms they receive.
117
  Thus, I 
predict that a state with a more educated population will be perceived as more important and will 
thus receive more arms transfers. 
 
Resources 
 While there are many resources that are essential for the creation of a modern 
mechanized Army, in the Middle East the most relevant such resource is oil.  Thus, I employ oil 
production statistics for each Middle Eastern state as a proxy for resources.
118
  I hypothesize that 
states with greater oil production are more likely to receive greater quantities of arms transfers.  I 
do not include known reserves in this measure, because the variable it is intended to capture 
argues that resources are important insofar as they will be available for wartime use.  Given the 
time horizons inherent in oil exploration, the more relevant consideration seems to be the extant 
production capacity and not the potential for further resource extraction in the future. 
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 Trying to capture the evolution of American and Soviet war plans across the 27 years in 
question quantitatively is a daunting task.  The defense of the Middle East, while critical to 
American interests, was critical for different reasons at different times.  Moreover, the plan for 
this defense underwent frequent updating and revision.  However, rather than attempt to apply a 
coding rule to the content of American warplans, some of which are classified, some of which 
are discussed only in secondary sources, and some of which are open to the public, I will take a 
consistent measure that is a much broader cut at the strategic reality of the defense of the region. 
 As I show in the following chapters, early US war plans relied heavily on the use of 
nuclear weapons against Soviet conventional forces in the Middle East.  Yet planners were aware 
that the emerging Soviet arsenal would soon render their strategy problematic, in that it would 
require risking the destruction of cities on the continental United States in order to turn back a 
conventional attack on allies in the Middle East.  The evolution of American nuclear doctrine 
more broadly is a fascinating and well-researched topic that I will revisit in subsequent chapters.  
For present purposes, it is enough to say that in the Middle East the solution that emerged relied 
on the conventional capacities of regional allies, thus necessitating the transfer of arms and 
expertise to small states.  Thus, I hypothesize that as the Soviet missile arsenal grew larger, there 




 Since the Soviet Union had rather different strategic concerns, I create an alternate 
measure of relevance using specifically geographic and political considerations.  The Soviet 
Union faced challenges to its maritime security; despite being a land-power, its strategy in the 
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event of war with the West would be served by the interdiction of American reinforcements to 
Europe and the elimination of American nuclear submarines in the Mediterranean.  Because the 
Soviet fleet could be interdicted as it travelled through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, it was 
essential to develop some facility for the repair and resupply of vessels operating in the 
Mediterranean that did not require the navigation of restricted waters controlled by hostile states.  
Therefore, because the Soviet Union needed a warm water port in the Mediterranean, I create a 
dummy variable for all countries that border the Mediterranean and have not signed a formal 
treaty with the West.  I predict that the strategic imperative faced by the Soviet Union to meet the 
American security threat in the Mediterranean makes it more likely that these states would 
receive large transfers of arms from the Warsaw Pact. 
 
Additional Variables 
 Although formal alliances do not capture everything about the security relationship 
between a great power and a small state, I nonetheless hypothesize that great powers are unlikely 
to transfer arms to small states that have ratified formal security agreements with the opposing 
great power.  Employing the alliance data used above, I create dummy variables for an alliance 
with a NATO country or an alliance with a Warsaw Pact country.  These account for the 
variation in arms transfers that is predicted by an alliance with the opposite power, as opposed to 
the independent variables discussed above. 
 In the Middle East, the colonial era was of a significantly shorter duration than in many 
other parts of the world.  Nonetheless, there is good reason to believe that colonial history might 
influence security value, especially in terms of equipment and tactics.  Thus, I include two 
dummy variables that are coded “1” for a country if it was ever a British or French protectorate, 




respectively.  Thus, if there is some special causal weight associated with being a former colony, 
it can be accounted for in the model. 
 
Estimation Procedure 
 I created a unique panel dataset for 14 Middle Eastern countries over 28 years.  For 
countries that did not obtain independence until later in the time period, I drop the observations 
until the Correlates of War project begins recording them in order to maintain the comparability 
of this project with others in the field.  The resulting dataset has 305 country-years and the panel 
has good balance and variation both within and between countries. 
 The data is left-censored, in that the dependent variable cannot take on a negative value.  
That is to say, countries of varying degrees of unimportance all receive no military transfers, but 
neither great power is capable of imposing a negative arms transfer on a country it is displeased 
with or that it believes has grown unimportant.  Thus, the dependent variable will always be 
either zero or positive, even if a country is deeply strategically irrelevant.  Because the data is 
left-censored, but the process that determines the level of arms transfers is the same for all 
country-years, I use a Tobit regression.
120
  Because the model tests characteristics of each 
country that are invariant in the dataset (such as whether or not it is a former colony), the Tobit I 
use is a type of Random Effects model, which in turn makes an assumption that the errors for 
each observation are individually and independently distributed.  This would be an unwarranted 
assumption for the data employed here, so I use robust standard errors estimated by STATA’s 
Observed Information Matrix procedure. 
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 I then conducted a series of robustness checks, dropping countries and years.  The results 
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The results presented in this table demonstrate the plausibility of Perceived Strategic Value 
theory, but do not decisively confirm the causal impact of strategic military considerations on 
great power willingness to form costly alliances in bipolarity.  These coefficients provided 
should not be interpreted in the same fashion as those produced by Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions, because of the particularities of the Tobit method used here.
121
  Happily, these 
results do not require further mathematical manipulation to reveal their import.  For present 
                                                        
121 The Tobit method estimates an underlying, unobservable function that includes both the probability that a case 
will have a non-censored value on the dependent variable and the correlation between the independent variables and 
the dependent variable. 




purposes, it is sufficient to note the sign and significance of the coefficients and the overall 
variation explained by the independent variables (Rho).  As predicted, for both total arms 
transfers and Western arms transfers, Capability and Resources are significant predictors of the 
willingness of great powers to engage in security exchanges with small states.  The greater a 
small state’s capability, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the more resources it has, the 
more arms it receives from the great power blocs.  However, for both the total and Western arms 
transfer results, the overall variation explained is fairly limited (ranging from 14 to 25 percent.)  
This indicates that either there is a great deal of randomness in great power decision-making 
about security exchanges or that some very important elements of strategic valuation are 
unaccounted for by relying solely on these objective measures.  By contrast, the model seems to 
explain much (84%) of Soviet alliance behavior in the Middle East.  However, further robustness 
checks show that the results are unreliable, for reasons I discuss below. 
Taken as a whole, these results provide support for the following three points.  First, 
bipoles do not utilize precisely symmetrical, objective criteria for the allocation of military 
transfers or the determination of perceived strategic value.  Second, the creation of proxy 
variables for strategic logics is a deeply fraught enterprise that necessarily requires a multi-
method approach such as the one utilized in this project.  Third, for bipoles that require local 
allies to facilitate their war plans vis a vis the other great power, both capability and resources 










Asymmetric, subjective logics 
 If it were the case that the model employed in this chapter absolutely captured the 
distribution of scarce security resources in the Middle East from 1952-1979, Perceived Strategic 
Value theory would be unnecessary.  If a large army, an educated population, and natural 
resources are what make a small state valuable, then understanding great power behavior can be 
reduced to simply measuring these objective values and observing the subsequent bidding 
between bipoles as they each seek  to achieve the optimal distribution of payments for a given set 
of resources.  However, the results above indicate that while objective criteria are certainly 
important considerations in the determination of strategic value, the inclusion of subjective 
assessments and beliefs is nonetheless extremely relevant. 
 The importance of subjective factors is only multiplied by the reality that strategic 
imperatives differ between bipoles.  The world would be a much simpler place if territorial 
acquisition during wartime readily translated into increased combat power, as in the old board 
game “Risk.”  As it happens, however, a given portion of the earth can have quite distinct value 
depending on the larger strategic purpose to which it is to be put. 
As I will demonstrate in the case studies that follow, the United States’ overwhelming 
concern in the Middle East during this period was the defense of the Suez canal, of Europe’s 
flank, and, later, of Persian Gulf oil supplies.  Moreover, this defense would have had to be 
performed by a combination of Western nuclear strikes and indigenous forces, as global wartime 
requirements would not permit the positioning of sufficient Western forces to mount an effective 
conventional defense on their own.  Thus, American strategic judgments in the region were 
driven by the need to obtain the land and develop the capacities that would address those 




strategic imperatives.  By contrast, the Soviet Union did not need to obtain Gulf oil to meet its 
wartime needs, nor did it require overseas staging areas or partners to mount a conventional 
attack.  It did, however, need the ability to challenge American naval forces in the Mediterranean 
Sea and to interdict the movement of Western forces across the globe.  Thus, it had a naval 
strategy in the Middle East that gave pride of place to those states that served a purpose quite 
distinct from those considered by American planners.  And, naturally, while it may have 
preferred to deny American planners their chosen objectives, we are unable to observe the value 
of Soviet security exchanges with American allies (hence the inclusion of a control variable for 
precisely that effect.)  However, it is not the case that American and Soviet planners had 
identical beliefs about the optimum methods of war fighting; thus, it is quite reasonable to 
conclude that they would have valued different strategic opportunities differently. 
 The implication of the reality that bipoles make strategic determinations based on 
asymmetric and subjective logics is that there is simply no such thing as an objectively and 
ahistorically “important” small state.  Importance is inevitably a function of context and 
evaluation, and factors that are important to one bipole may be irrelevant to another.  Thus, 
where the US might prioritize the development of indigenous conventional capability, and 
therefore prefer alliance partners with a capacity to maintain and employ the full suite of modern 
weaponry, the USSR might be much less concerned with such criteria.  This is predicted by 
Perceived Strategic Value theory and supported by the empirical data.  It also explains the 
seemingly odd results of the robust checks I conducted on each of the models presented in the 
table. 
 The strategic valuation model that I use here is robust and parsimonious, and explains 
about 25% of the overall variation in Western arms transfers to states in the Middle East.  




Dropping either countries or years does not change the significance or sign of any variable.  By 
contrast, the model is extremely sensitive when applied to Warsaw Pact transfers.  I have 
illustrated this sensitivity in the table presented earlier.  When Iraq is dropped from the sample, 
the value of the “Relevance” proxy increases by an order of magnitude and becomes statistically 
significant.  When all arms transfers are analyzed, the model is robust against dropping any 
country, but the Capability(Skill) proxy is not significant if period 28 is dropped.  Additionally, 
while the colonial heritage variables are significant when all transfers are analyzed, they are not 
significant indicators of the levels of Western transfers.   
 Both the sensitivity of the Warsaw Pact model and the odd results from the colonial 
variable are a function of the Soviet Union’s strategic imperative to seek warm water ports in the 
Mediterranean for their maritime needs and its inability to recruit Turkey or Iran for their land 
strategy.  Thus, the Soviet Union seems to highly value only three states: Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.  
These three states account for 93.6% of the Warsaw Pact transfers during the period in question, 
and in 229 (out of 305) country years, the value of the dependent variable was 0.  Thus, any 
attribute that at least two of the three share (bordering the Mediterranean and not being Western 
allies, or being former British colonies, or having growing oil production, for example) will have 
a lot of statistical power; this is why the strategic valuation model above “explains” 84% of the 
variation in Warsaw Pact arms transfers.  Thus, the model above, which seems to work well for 
capturing capability and resources but does a poor job of capturing relevance, does not 
effectively illustrate the Soviet strategic moves in the area during the time in question. 
Problems with proxies 
 An objective indicator that acts as a reliable proxy for strategic intentions is the 
Philosopher’s Stone of both political scientists and intelligence analysts everywhere.  And, just 




like that mythical transmogrifying rock, it doesn’t exist.  Because states gain strategic advantage 
from maintaining private information about their capabilities and intentions, and especially about 
the precise means by which they intend to prevail in a conflict with a rival, any objective, 
observable measure by which a state revealed that information would be subject either to 
camouflage or manipulation. 
 Given this reality, there are several options open to researchers.  One, which is employed 
in the quantitative model here, is to trade precision for availability.  By using a very rough proxy, 
one can explore the implications of a broader strategic trend that is widely known and is more or 
less public information.  Unfortunately, this can paint with so broad a brush that all meaningful 
differentiation is obscured, as is the case with the “relevance” proxy I employ.  As I will show in 
the follow chapters, while the Soviet nuclear arsenal had an impact on American alliance 
strategy in the Middle East, this impact had wildly differential impacts across the small states. 
 Alternatively, one could restrict the scope of one’s research to matters about which 
private information has been made publically available.  This is not a bad idea from a research 
design perspective, but is unhelpful in the creation of scholarship about matters that states prefer 
to keep secret.  For example, while many of the US conventional war plans have been made 
publicly available, many nuclear plans and discussions remain classified.  Further, the US 
declassification scheme, while glacial at times, is quite rapid compared to those of other global 
powers.  Thus, the restriction of data sets to only that information which is available in archives 
is a prescription for an impoverished and overly limited academic discipline. 
 Finally, one could hand-code a combined pool of archival and secondary-source data to 
form a new proxy that captures a scholarly best-guess a great power’s strategic intentions.  While 
a laudable approach for qualitative research (and one that I will pursue in the chapters that 




follow), the translation of these assessments into a numerical index is quite dangerous.  This is 
because the reliability of the assessment might vary substantially and systematically without the 
researcher’s knowledge.  When this new index is introduced into a statistical model, it will 
produce biased and unreliable estimates that are transparent to the researcher who creates them 
and other scholars who review them.  It seems preferable to simply stick to the scholarly 
judgment of qualitative sources rather than try and shoe-horn limited data into a quantitative 
approach.  Thus, while this chapter explores the plausibility of the Perceived Strategic Value 
model, it will be the following chapters that seek to demonstrate its full analytic power. 
 
When are Capabilities relevant? 
 Despite the limitations on data and the reality that strategic logics are incredibly difficult 
to measure directly, this model does demonstrate that capability is relevant in the allocation of 
scarce resources to small state allies.  Specifically, it indicates that great powers that intend the 
arms they transfer to contribute to their success in a war with their rival are much more 
concerned with the small state’s ability to absorb technology than are great powers that are 
simply purchasing geography to be utilized by their own forces. 
 The differences between the US and the USSR have already been considered, but it is 
also important to note the temporal distinctions in aid allocation.  As will be shown in detail in 
Chapter 4, initial US war plans for the Middle East relied heavily on Western nuclear weapons to 
attrit invading Soviet forces and consigned indigenous forces to guerrilla attacks and holding 
operations.  US planners believed that the small states in the region had neither the personnel nor 
the technical capacity to effectively engage invading Soviet forces.  Thus, Perceived Strategic 
Value was low and arms transfers proceeded at a fairly modest level.  By contrast, as local allies 




developed both their military establishments in numerical terms and their ability to field modern 
weapons in technical terms, the US transferred arms in great quantities.  This coincided with a 
shift toward reliance on proxy forces as a centerpiece of US strategy, and thus the greatest US 
arms transfers go to an Iranian army that was one of the two pillars of US security in the Gulf.
122
  
In terms of the theory, both capability and relevance were increasing.  The data indicates that 
when Perceived Strategic Value is high, there are substantial arms transfers, despite the absence 
of a formal alliance. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter demonstrates the plausibility of Perceived Strategic Value theory by 
showing the empirical connection between capability, resources, and arms transfers.  It further 
highlights the importance of integrating subjective assessment and idiosyncratic strategic 
calculations into theoretical approaches to great power behavior.  Finally, it calls for a qualitative 
approach that employs archival data to test the usefulness of Perceived Strategic Value theory in 
understanding great power strategic decision-making and small state logics.
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American Security Exchanges in the Middle East, 1952-1961 
 
 In this chapter, I analyze the development of American strategy in the Middle East during 
the early Cold War period.  As discussed previously, the story of Soviet and American 
competition through the use of military aid, arms transfers, and advisors in the Middle East is 
really a competition over a handful of strategically vital states.  Yet quantitative analysis is 
insufficient to demonstrate the power of Perceived Strategic Value theory and its contributions to 
Security Exchange Theory, which is based on both on objective factors (like force size and 
resource pools) and on subjective assessments made by policy-makers.  Thus, it is necessary to 
engage in process-tracing to determine if perception relates to fact and determines policy in the 
manner described by my theory.  I do so in two stages.  First I analyze US plans for the defense 
of the region as a whole (which informs the relevance of individual states) and internal American 
debates over the usefulness of Gulf oil in wartime (resources).  With this context in place, I then 
engage in a country-specific analysis of US security assistance, based on contemporaneous US 
perceptions of those countries’ capabilities, resources, and wartime utility. 
 As discussed in Chapter Two, Perceived Strategic Value theory suggests not only a 
relationship between the strategic utility of a small state in a potential war with a rival great 
power and the security goods that a great power is willing to relinquish to that small state, it also 
posits a causal pathway wherein the great power perceives this value in subjective terms and acts 
on those perceptions (and not some other logic.)  Thus, the theory can be falsified in at least two 
ways.  First, it could be shown that having a higher Perceived Strategic Value (in the specific 
sense that I use the term) does not translate into a greater absolute or relative allocation of 
security assistance to a small state.  Second, even if such a relationship did exist, it could be 
shown that the assistance was allocated on the basis of some other non-PSV rationale.  That is to 




say, Security Exchange Theory, which relies on PSV, does not work if perception and strategic 
calculation focused on the other bipole are not the causal pathway informing great power 
security exchange behavior.  Therefore, the test in this chapter is to demonstrate both that the 
variables relate in the way I say they do and for the reasons I say that they do. 
  
US War Plans 
 The demise of the Egyptian monarchy at the hands of the Free Officers movement was a 
watershed event in both the politics of the Arab world, and, more importantly for present 
purposes, in the Western defensive concept for the region.  In this section, I discuss the response 
of the West to the shock of losing their Suez bases, the alternative defensive strategies they 
devised, and the evolution of those strategies over time.  I divide the early Nasser era into three 
phases: 1952-56, 1956-58, and 1958-61, which correspond to major shifts in US force 
availability, tasks, logistics, and near- and long-term planning. 
 
1952-1956 
 In the early stages of the Cold War, the US was keenly aware of the numerical challenges 
it would face in a conventional war with the Soviet Army.  In the Middle East, it had two 
imperatives: limit the Soviet advance as much as possible in order to facilitate a counter-attack 
and launch a nuclear attack against targets in the southern USSR that were only accessible to 
bombers launched from bases in Middle East.  The growing, but still limited, US nuclear arsenal 
meant that some weapons could be spared for attacks against Soviet ground forces but that 
conventional forces would also need prepare for significant combat.  This period, from 1952-
1956, is characterized by initial US and allied skepticism about the defense of the region.  Given 




their limited forces, the Americans and NATO were prepared to cede almost the entire Middle 
East to the Soviets and trade geographical “space” for additional time to attrit Soviet forces 
through nuclear attack.  Thus, the American defensive concept centered on Egypt and Turkey 
(which would retain control of the Suez and the Turkish Straits) and did not include Iran, Iraq, 
the Gulf States, Jordan, or Israel in any meaningful way. 
 Declassified archival materials support this narrative.  While the US and its allies had 
been successful in inducing a Soviet withdrawal from northern Iran after the end of World War 
Two, Western planners were nonetheless extremely skeptical of their ability to thwart a Soviet 
offensive towards the Persian Gulf.  In fact, in 1949 the National Security Council received an 
alarming report to the effect that there was “no airfield in Egypt suitable for bomber operations” 
and which requested US funds to expand existing facilities.
123
  It was assessed that “the USSR 
possesse[d] the capability of virtually completing the conquest of Turkey, and unless substantial 
Allied forces [were] deployed to the Middle East, of occupying the Suez Canal Area” in roughly 
4 months; concurrently, it would take the Soviets a mere 30 to 60 days to capture “the Middle 
East oil lands.”
124
  Thus, the war plan HALFMOON was created, which envisioned three 
immediate objectives for Western forces: “secure the Cairo-Suez base area, deploy and operate 
units of the Strategic Air Command from the Cairo-Suez-Khartoum area and deploy a Marine 
reinforced battalion from the Mediterranean to the Bahrain area to assist in evacuation of United 
States nationals and for possible neutralization of oil installations.”
125
  Only as the war developed 
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would it become possible to “envisage the recapture of the Middle East oil resources by major 
operation following their probable seizure by the USSR.”
126
  In this plan, “no major U.S. ground 
forces or any U.S. air [sic] Force units, excepting those involved in strategic air offensive 
operations, will be deployed to the Middle East.”
127
 
 HALFMOON was regarded by US planners as a purely interim solution, since it 
“provide[d] only for the defense of Cairo-Suez-Levant area” but “neither retain[ed] the oil areas 
nor assist[ed] Turkey.”
128
  In its place, the US preferred “a final defensive position along the line 
South-eastern Turkey Iranian Mountain passes - Persian Gulf” to be “the basis of Anglo-
American medium term strategy in the Middle East.”
129
  This new plan, named REAPER, was 
envisioned for a war beginning no earlier than July, 1954.
130
  However, debate continued about 
the REAPER concept, as the US was unable to furnish additional forces and the Commonwealth 
countries had not yet agreed to augment British ground forces in the region.
131
  Faced with these 
limitations, and a growing recognition of the need to secure access to Persian Gulf oil, the British 
accepted “Plan ‘CINDERELLA’ ... for the period 1 July 1951 to 1 July 1952 [which] include[d] 
as a task the holding of the Southwest Persian Gulf oil resources in isolation and provide[d] 
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limited forces for this task.”
132
 
1:  CINDERELLA.  This map illustrates an early concept for the defense of the Middle East, as envisioned in a 
review of strategic alternatives undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The black arrows represent Soviet forces.  




 Thus, at the beginning of the period examined in this study, the US had identified a 
strategy that made it “operationally and logistically feasible to defend [the Middle East] for a 
limited period of time to permit continued supply of some portion of the oil until such time as 
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[the USSR] employ[ed] major forces against the area.”
134
  However, supplying adequate forces 
for that mission “would require reductions in other areas which could not be made without 
creating unacceptable risks” and, therefore, American planners settled for a more limited concept 
that provided for “defense of the Southwest Persian Gulf in isolation.”
135
  Given this state of 
vulnerability, the US policy apparatus began searching for means to strengthen the defense of the 
area without the allocation of American ground forces.  This included  diplomatic initiatives to 
convince Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa to contribute ground forces, diplomatic 
initiatives with Turkey “coupled with supply assistance as practicable to increase Turkey’s 
capability of contributing to the defense of the area outside of Turkey,” similar initiatives with 
Pakistan, efforts to “increase the effectiveness of Egyptian forces for the maintenance and 
defense of the Suez bases, in the event of an Anglo-Egyptian settlement,” improvements in “the 
effectiveness of the Israeli forces,” an effort to duplicate the Jordanian Arab Legion elsewhere, 
and a commitment to “continue military assistance to Iran.”
136
  As illustrated in the foregoing 
map, the US did not anticipate being able to hold much of the Middle East without additional 
forces, yet the deployment of these forces was to be made on the basis of a military and not a 
political logic.  Thus, some mechanism needed to be created that could unify the defense of the 
region against the Soviet threat. 
 These disparate initiatives were to be tied together under the aegis of a Middle East 
Defense Organization (MEDO), which would have facilitated combined planning and a coherent 
                                                        
134
 Joint Staff. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Adm. W. M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations, 
on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Feasibility of Holding the Bahrein-Qatar-Saudi Arabia Area” Feb 8, 1952.  
para 2a in RG 218 Geographic File 1951-53,  388.1 Austria (6-8-46) Sec. 9 to 381 Emmea (11-19-47) Sec. 6, Box 
11  Folder Sec 8. 
135
 Ibid. Para 4. 
136
 Nitze, Paul  Memorandum entitled “Defense Security in the Middle East.”  Department of State, Policy Planning 
Staff.  May 26, 1952.  RG 218, Geographic File 1951-53,  388.1 Austria (6-8-46) Sec. 9 to 381 Emmea (11-19-47) 
Sec. 6, Box 11,  Folder Sec 10.  This view was endorsed by the Joint Chiefs in Bradley, Omar Memorandum entitled 
“Increased Aid for the Middle East Area.” November 5, 1952.  RG 218 Geographic File 1951-53,  388.1 Austria (6-
8-46) Sec. 9 to 381 Emmea (11-19-47) Sec. 6, Box 11, Folder Sec 12. 




defense of the Middle East as a region.  Egypt was to act as the lynchpin of MEDO, and was an 
obvious choice, given its geographic relevance to the European theater and its centrality to extant 
Western war plans that envisioned the Suez as the taproot of the region’s defense.  However, this 
quickly became unworkable due to the “stalemate in the U.K.-Egypt negotiations concerning the 
Suez base issue.”
137
  As the details of the various alliance structures are of central importance to 
my theory, I shall discuss the diplomatic history in more detail below. 
 Even as the US struggled to convince Egypt and the other Arab states of the necessity of 
MEDO, it further expanded its national security objectives in the region from a defense of the 
Suez and eventual counter-offensive to a broader defense of “a. The NATO right flank; b. Air 
base sites; c. The Turkish Straits; d. The Eastern Mediterranean; e. The Cairo-Suez-Aden area; 
and f. A source of oil.”
138
  The precise plans designed to achieve these objectives remain 
classified.  Nonetheless, it is possible to infer their contents from the earlier discussions 
illustrated above and from unclassified documents that refer to the nature of the classified war 
plans.  From these sources one is able to determine that “[t]he concept of operations is based on 
an allied strategic air offensive and the effect of tactical atomic attacks on the fighting value and 
speed of advance of the Russian forces.”
139
  This atomic attack was to support “allied forces 
deployed along the line of the Zagros Mountains.”
140
  The study also indicates that Iranian forces 
would not be included in defensive plans prior to late 1955.
141
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 It is in this context that the Baghdad Pact emerged.  Frustrated with the lack of progress 
with Egypt and eager to defend the Persian Gulf along with the Suez, the American security plan 
for the Middle East moved north.  Supported by an expanding atomic arsenal, the US believed 
that it could attrit invading Soviet forces sufficiently to facilitate a defense of the Zagros 
mountains near the Iran/Iraq border by indigenous and commonwealth forces.  Such a defense, 
however, would be substantially improved if these forces could coordinate their efforts in 
advance under the auspices of a regional defense organization.  It is the emergence and impact of 
this organization that I discuss next. 





2: Defense of the Zagros.  This map illustrates the American plan for the defense of the Middle East along the 
Zagros mountains, which are just east of the Iran/Iraq border.  Soviet forces are to be degraded by between 20 and 
50% by American air attacks by the time they reach the mountains.  Not illustrated, but of relevance to the 
discussion at hand, is the fact that this line must be supplied through Iraq, making Iraq’s capabilities and 
commitment a key element of this strategic concept.  Note as well that virtually all of Iran will be occupied by the 




The Baghdad Pact 1956-58 
 The Baghdad Pact was a Middle East defense organization established by the UK, 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan in 1955.  As a political project intended to unite the Arab world 
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against the spread of Communism, it was a debacle.  However, insofar as it created a planning 
body joined by the countries most strategically relevant to the US defensive concept for the 
region, it was quite successful.  In terms of which of the small states in the region were relevant 
to the US plan for the defense of the Middle East, this period is also a time of transition.  The US 
felt confident that Turkey and the Persian Gulf could be defended, but nonetheless required 
space to be made for successive air and atomic attacks against the Soviet armies to take effect.  
Thus, the strategy in this period called for the defense of the Zagros mountains, which meant that 
Iraq assumed a prominence in the American strategic vision that it had not had thus far in the 
Cold War and would not have again until the 1980s.  Additionally, the further development of 
Iranian capacity was now a worthwhile endeavor, since the country wasn’t to be wholly 
abandoned. 
 Politically, the US was aware of the controversy surrounding the Pact and the assertion 
that it was merely the new face of Western colonial ambition, and they decided not to join.  But 
this is not to say that the institution did not perform an important coordinating function for US 
military and strategic planning purposes.  In fact, instructions were sent to the military attaché in 
Baghdad that he should engage in “a more active but informal type of liaison” that included the 
right to “express informal views on Middle East defense” and to “point out that the atomic 
capability and massive retaliatory striking power of the United States are major contributors to 
the over-all security of our Allies and the free world.”
143
  However, lest the Pact participants get 
the wrong idea, the attaché was also to observe that “our Allies and friends themselves must 
                                                        
143
 Joint Staff. JCS 1887/148 “Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the JCS on Baghdad Pact.”  Feb. 16, 
1956: 1141. RG 218, Geographic File, 1954-56, 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) Sec. 25-33, Box No 13, Folder Sec 26. 




provide the major share of ground forces for their own defense, recognizing the reduction in the 
magnitude of the Soviet threat which our strategic atomic offensive will achieve.”
144
 
 At the time of the signing, the “currently approved [American] Joint Strategic 
Capabilities Plan” stated that “[r]etention under allied control of Turkey, the Zagros Mountain 
line, and the Middle East areas to the west and south thereof would provide for the attainment of 
the U.S. military objectives in the Middle East.”
145
  This became the basis of Baghdad Pact 
military planning, which raised Iranian concerns, given that the majority of their country is east 
and north of Zagros and would be left largely undefended.  Thus, the American observer to the 
Baghdad Pact cabled that “Iranians raised objections use Zagros mtns in concept ... In order help 
Iranian concept revised to read:  The def of the Middle East, comprising the pact countries, 
should be based on holding the line of mtns in Eastern Turkey, Azerbaijan, Elburz and 
Hindukush.”
146
  In this approach, the line in the Zagros would be relegating to “supporting 
positions” behind the main line of defense further north.
147
 
 This development, along with the reluctance among countries in the Pact to allow their 
allies’ armies to be stationed on their own soil, caused a degree of consternation on the American 
side.  The American planners remained wholly focused on the Soviet Union, against which 
strategic logic dictated “that the defense of the area must be as far forward as it is militarily 
practicable.  Thus, every effort should be made to permit the stationing of forces of one Pact 
country in any other country, so as to be in position on D-Day.”
148
  Absent this level of 
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coordination, “a defense on the Elburz would not be effective for any operation in the near 
future.”  Nonetheless, defending farther north would obviously be more desirable, provided it 
was feasible to do so and thus, while the near-term American plans remained centered on the 
Zagros, the Joint Chiefs expressed the desire that “planning be based ultimately on a defense of 
the Elburz as forces and resources bec[a]me available.”
149
 
 By late 1956, the US and UK developed the view that even absent an overwhelming 
ground capability within the Baghdad Pact, “the planned weight of nuclear effort in the USSR 
area contiguous to the Middle East” was such that “the size of enemy forces ultimately available 
to assault our defensive positions are unlikely to exceed more than 50% of those forces originally 
advancing.”
150
  However, in a challenge to my theory, this nuclear effort was a function of UK 
“plans to allot several squadrons of Canberras with nuclear capability to the theater” and, while 
these nuclear plans were presumably conceived of in conjunction with the US, they are not US 
strategic forces per se.
151
  In any event, “[o]n 11 July 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded 
[in Decision On JCS 1887/220] considering the effects of allied atomic operations, the concept 
for defense along the Elburz Line is the most desirable for the Baghdad Pact area.”
152
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 This shift is remarkably important for this study because it establishes an exogenous 
source of variation in the Perceived Strategic Value of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.  The US, based on 
purely geographical considerations, would have preferred to defend the region as far north as 
possible, along the Elburz line.  However, this concept only became feasible after the growth of 
the western nuclear arsenal, due to the requirement to significantly reduce the strength of Soviet 
forces through nuclear attack.  When the arsenal was small and delivery was quite difficult, only 
Turkey had any real importance among these three countries.  When the arsenal grew, but was 
insufficient to inflict enough casualties on the Soviets to blunt their attack at the Soviet border, 
the line of defense moved north and both Iraq and Iran became important.  Finally, by 1957 Iraq 
was no longer particularly necessary, because the combination of American nuclear weapons and 
indigenous capabilities was sufficient to defend the Elburz line, which could be resupplied from 
Turkish or Iranian ports. 
 
The Iraqi Exit 1958-1961 
 In July 1958, a unit of the Iraqi Army commanded by members of a dissident 
organization called the Free Officers entered Baghdad, gained control of the government, killed 
the entire royal family, and installed General Karim Qasim as the new head of the Iraqi state.  An 
ardent nationalist, Qasim ended Iraq’s participation in the Baghdad Pact, thus inducing a new 
name for the organization (CENTO) and a relocation of the organization’s headquarters (to 
Ankara).  However, by this point the US strategy for the defense of the region had already 
shifted so far north that the loss of Iraq did not seriously impinge upon American war plans. 
 Even before the Iraqi withdrawal from the Pact, the other countries in the organization 
determined that “the capability of the remaining nations to provide an effective defense of the 




Pact Area would not be seriously diminished by the withdrawal of Iraq.”
154
  Sadly, there is not a 
similarly candid discussion in the declassified American archives, as explicit descriptions of 
Western defensive plans in the Middle East recede into official secrecy by the 1960s.  This study 
infers the war plans from three complementary sources.  First, as has been shown, the Elburz line 
was preferred by planners for the defense of the region throughout the 1950s, but was believed to 
be within the range of practicability only in 1957.  Subsequently, the capacity of the Turkish, 
Iranian, and Pakistani militaries only continued to grow.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume, absent 
contrary evidence, as long as it was feasible to defend along the Elburz, the American defensive 
concept did not return to either the Zagros or the Cairo-Suez lines, which were less suitable for 
the preservation of American interests.  Second, after the July revolution in Iraq, President 
Eisenhower requested an urgent study on “what the United States could do to strengthen the 
military position of Turkey and Iran.”
155
  In reply, the Joint Chiefs discussed a variety of options 
to introduce forces into the region, including logistical equipment, atomic demolitions teams, 
and, in the event of “a general war situation” even U.S. forces.
156
  Further, while the specific 
plans remain classified, the JCS reported to the President that there were specific plans and 
earmarked forces “for defense of the Turkish Straits, Erzurum and Lake Van area.”
157
  The 
defensive line from the Lake Van area extends naturally along the Elburz and would be 
dangerously exposed by a defense further south, at the Zagros.  Third, as will be discussed 
below, the country-specific discussions of Turkey and Iran, especially as compared to other 
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states in the region, seem to indicate a special military importance without explicitly laying out 
the specifics of the war plan.  In combination with the foregoing discussion of the evolution of 
American plans, it is possible to surmise that the larger strategic context of this special 
importance is the Elburz line. 
 
Summary 
 In the foregoing discussion, I presented evidence concerning the US strategic conception 
of the Middle East.  PSV is rooted in a great power’s beliefs about not only small state 
capabilities and resources, but also its own capabilities and the limits to what it could feasibly 
attain in a war.  This creates variation in whether or not a geographic feature is “important,” as I 
show in the discussion of the Zagros and Elburz mountain chains.  Similarly, the nature and 
quantity of the forces the great power can allocate to a given theater, given its global 
commitments, also informs PSV as sub-components of “wartime relevance.”  In this case, I show 
that the US nuclear arsenal and the allocation of weapons to the Middle East changed the scope 
of the feasible for American war planners.  Thus, the terrain upon which the battle for the Middle 
East was going to be fought shifted for reasons dictated by a military-strategic logic, which 
alliance and security exchange behaviors then followed.  Thus, in this period it seems that the US 
doesn’t intend to reflexively fight to defend its all of its allies; instead, forms alliances and 
allocates security goods based on where it intends to fight. 





3 Defense of the Elburz.  This map illustrates the final strategic concept the US developed for the defense of the 
Middle East.  It requires a significant conventional capability (illustrated by the 10 divisions in contact and 3 in 
reserve) or a massive nuclear capability to reduce the anticipated 15-20 divisions that would participate in the Soviet 





Oil and Middle East Security 1952-61 
 From the perspective of the 21st century, it can be difficult to remember a time when 
Persian Gulf oil was not considered essential to Western security interests.  Yet throughout the 
period discussed in this chapter, the importance and accessibility of Gulf oil was a subject of 
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open debate in the US political and security apparatus.  I divide this section into three 
subsections based on the importance and accessibility of Gulf oil: the emergence of Gulf oil as a 
critical resource; the debate over accessibility; and the additional military measures taken to 
defend the resource. 
 
The emergence of Gulf oil 
 At the end of the Second World War, the United States produced a larger percentage of 
the world’s oil than Saudi Arabia.  While oil from the Middle East was of significant importance 
to the industrialized world, planners in 1950 assumed that “[i]n the event of a major war in the 
future, there would be imminent danger that the Middle East sources of petroleum would be lost 
to the United States and its Allies.”
159
  Nonetheless, by 1953 it was apparent that “[t]he 
emergence of the Middle East as a major petroleum producing area [was] the outstanding 
development in the pattern of world oil supply since the end of World War II.”
160
  This oil fueled 
Western Europe’s postwar recovery such that the NSC noted: 
Rapidly increasing amounts of Middle East oil in recent years have been moved 
to Europe’s expanding refineries to meet growing requirements and as 
replacement for Western Hemisphere supplies.  Europe’s reliance upon Middle 
East crude has correspondingly increased.  In 1946, the Middle East supplied 44 
per cent of the 130,000 barrels daily of crude oil runs to the refineries of free 
Europe.  In 1952 crude runs had increased to 1,400,000 B/D, of which the Middle 




Moreover, Western planners were also able to forecast the future centrality of Middle East oil to 
the American economy.  A 1952 report estimated that “in 1975 the U.S. may require 2.5 B/D of 
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crude while Western Hemisphere production may be available only to the extent of 1.3 million 
B/D for import into the United States, thus requiring imports of 1.2 million B/D of Middle East 
crude to make up that deficit.”
162
 
 To address the military implications of this pattern of oil consumption, the US adopted a 
plan for wartime rationing, tanker construction, and the expansion of capacity in the Western 
Hemisphere.
163
  However, within that policy, the US explicitly notes that: 
To the extent that the assumed D-Day is postponed beyond July 1, 1953, the 
difficulty of achieving a wartime balance in crude petroleum, under that 
assumption of loss of the Middle East, will steadily increase.  Retention of Middle 
East sources of supply will accordingly grow in importance, as will the need for 
developing and expanding all other possible sources.  Therefore, in the 
formulation of policy with respect to the Middle East countries and the 
determination of proper future level and disposition of our military strength, the 
increasing importance of the Middle East as the greatest known source of 




By 1958, the importance of Middle East oil had increased to such an extent that US policy made 
explicit its willingness to “use force, but only as a last resort ... to insure that the quantity of oil 
available from the Near East on reasonable terms is sufficient ... to meet Western Europe’s 
requirements.”
165
  Thus, over the period from 1952-61, Middle Eastern sources of oil in general 
(the specific policy impact on each country will be discussed below) went from a potentially 
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useful resource to a cornerstone of the European economy, and, eventually, to a national security 
requirement so essential as to provide a causus belli in and of itself. 
 
Accessibility 
 As important as Middle Eastern sources of oil became to the West after the Second 
World War, it was not at all clear that the resource could be put to any use in the context of a 
general war with the Soviet Union.  In the words of the NSC:  “Any consideration of Middle 
East oil, however, must not confuse the importance of that oil with its availability.”
166
  In fact, 
just as oil from the Persian Gulf became progressively more important over time, so too did 
plans for its preservation become progressively more ambitious. 
 The military records I recount above demonstrate that in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
there were no Western plans for a defense of the Persian Gulf.  However, as the oil therein 
became more important, concepts such as the UK’s CINDERELLA plan were developed for the 
retention of some Gulf oil fields.  Nonetheless, problems remained:  “For as long as the three 
Middle East countries, Bahrein, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, are retained, there would be available 
from them about 1 million B/D of crude oil.  However, present military estimates of tanker losses 
in this area from enemy action range from 17-20 per cent per month, making it extremely 
doubtful whether this oil could be utilized.”
167
  It is in the context that a schism emerged within 
the American military.  The Chief of Staff of the Army, in September 1952, expressed the 
opinion that a combination of Soviet airpower and naval interdiction would be sufficient to close 
the Straits of Hormuz, destroy refineries in the Gulf, and prevent the export of Middle Eastern oil 
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in the first 18 months to two years of war.
168
  The study in which he voiced this opinion was 
written in response to both NSC 97, cited above, and an internal discussion of the Joint Chiefs in 
which the Chief of Naval Operations expressed the opinion that it was “feasible to defend [the 
Bahrain-Qatar-Saudi Arabia] area sufficiently to permit continued supply of a major portion of 
the oil.”
169
  In the view of the CNO, this could be accomplished by a local infantry security 
force, a significant anti-aircraft capability, and a naval presence in the Gulf.  The Army and Air 




 This internal debate highlights the bi-directional relationship between resource 
accessibility and war plans.  In the beginning of the period this chapter discusses, Middle East oil 
was presumed to be indefensible and was not accounted for in Western war plans.  By the mid-
1950s, the oil was possibly defensible, although debate existed about the subject.  However, even 
skeptics of the defensibility of the oil under the limited CINDERELLA concept asserted that a 
successful defense of the Zagros could facilitate access to the oil.  Once such a concept became 
the basis for Western planning in late-1955, it is reasonable to assume that Western access to 
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PSV by Country   
U.S. military equipment available to strengthen the area should be channeled primarily to the 
“northern tier” states, and when appropriate to Egypt, which offer the best prospect of creating 
real strength.  A large flaccid grouping, each member of which receives a nominal amount of 
military aid, will provide neither military strength nor political attraction. 




 Thus far, this chapter has taken a regional perspective on American perceptions of the 
strategic value of Middle Eastern states.  It has shown that the region was considered critical to 
Western interests, illustrated the evolution of the Western concept for the defense of the Middle 
East against Soviet invasion, and discussed the value of Middle East oil as a strategic resource.  
However, US security assistance to the Middle East was disbursed bilaterally and this project 
seeks to understand the variation in security exchanges between small states and great powers as 
such, albeit in a regional context.   
 As discussed at the outset of this chapter, I intend to test PSV using both observed co-
variation between the identified independent and dependent variables as well as causal process 
observations which confirm or deny the strategic logic suggested by the theory.  In the following 
sections, I use archival data to demonstrate the countries with a higher PSV do, in fact, receive a 
larger proportion of American security assistance and that the strategic logic behind this pattern 
of behavior is the small state’s PSV and not some other method of allocating aid.  Each section 
begins with a chronological narrative, then addresses both the tests mentioned above, and finally 
concludes with a summary table. 
 Two important caveats are in order.  First, as discussed in the theory chapter, PSV is an 
intermediate variable that is more than the simple arithmetic sum of capability, resources, and 
relevance.  Therefore, the values captured on the summary tables represent my reading of the 
                                                        
171
 National Security Council. NSC 5428 “National Security Council: United States Objectives and Policies with 
Respect to the Near East.” July 6, 1954: 4. RG 273 , Policy Papers 5423-5428 Entry 1, Box 32. 




archival records and are meant to approximate the bureaucratic judgments rendered by the US 
about the small state.  This is obviously somewhat imprecise; however, as discussed last chapter, 
there is a trade-off between objective, easily quantifiable measures and analytical power.  The 
field of international relations would be ill-served by the elimination of fuzzy variables and 
scholarly judgment, not least because doing so would exclude many of the issues that are most 
central to war and peace.  Moreover, the archival records do not support the notion that policy-
makers think or act in as precise a way as one might hope, making the endless pursuit of 
precision not only quixotic but also, ironically, inaccurate. 
Second, this section does not address every state in the region.  This is because doing so 
would be an endless litany of well-documented weak tests that take the form “State X is small, 
has a negligible PSV, and receives no aid.”  While useful from one perspective, these 
observations would not differentiate PSV from any of the other theories discussed earlier that 
suggest that marginal states don’t elicit much aid from great powers.  Instead, this section 
discusses Western aid relationships with leading aid recipients, major oil exporting states, and 
high capability states, some of whom received security assistance and others of whom did not.  
There is both within case and across case variation on the variables of interest, and the sources 
and patterns of that variation helpfully demonstrate the comparative power of PSV over other 
approaches to great power alliance behavior. 
 
Turkey 
 By the beginning of 1952, the US had already identified Turkey as an important ally in its 
security competition with the Soviet Union.  Public Law 80-75, passed May 22, 1947, provided 
financial aid to Greece and Turkey in light of the belief that “the national integrity and survival 




of these nations [was] of importance to the security of the United States.”
172
  Of the two states, it 
was believed that “Turkey is strategically more important than Greece” and that “the United 
States has greater long-range strategic interests in the military establishments of Turkey.”
173
  By 
1948, there were 349 U.S. armed service personnel in Turkey, assisting with “training, highway 
construction, and the supplying of equipment, including naval vessels and aircraft.”
174
  Given the 
institutional strength of the Turkish state, these policies had two purposes.  First, they were 
“based on the necessity of supporting and strengthening Turkish efforts to oppose communist 
pressure;” second, they were designed to develop a Turkish capability that would be available for 
the “utilization of Turkey for U.S. strategic purposes in the event of conflict with the USSR.”
175
 
 At the outset of the period in question, the US judged that “Turkey is the strongest anti-
Communist country on the periphery of the USSR and the only one in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and Middle East area capable of offering substantial resistance to Soviet aggression … Turkey’s 
military strength-in-being, and firm determination to maintain its political independence and 
territorial integrity continue to be effective deterrents to Soviet or satellite aggression directed 
against Turkey.”
176
  Although the Turkish Army had reduced its size after the end of WWII, its 
technological improvements had enabled it to retain its combat effectiveness.
177
  However, it 
struggled to adopt NATO doctrinal templates, such as a vibrant Non-Commissioned Officer 
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corps, and solicited US aid to correct these deficiencies.
178
  Thus, in terms of the components of 
capability as used in this theory, Turkey had an army of significant (high) size, moderate 
technology, low doctrine, and high geography.  It had no resources in the country proper, but 
contributed to American current and future war plans.  In the eyes of American planners, the 
Perceived Strategic Value (PSV) of Turkey was high. 
 As a result of its relatively high PSV, Turkey obtained extremely high levels of aid.  By 
1955, NSC documents recorded that “present plans for building up Turkey’s armed forces in 
accordance with U.S. interests will require continued substantial U.S. assistance over a period of 
years.  During FYs 1950-54 the U.S. allocated one billion dollars in those and following years on 
a program to build up the Turkish Army, Navy, and Air Force.”
179
  Nonetheless, despite the 
importance of Turkey to American plans for the defense of the Middle East from the mid-1950s 
onwards, Turkey’s moderate capability constrained US assistance.  Although the “qualitative 
improvement of the Turkish Army … would seem to be desirable from a strictly military point of 
view” it was hampered by the “questionable ability of the Turkish armed forces to convert to 
greater mechanization so rapidly … inadequate numbers of trained technical personnel and 
insufficient warehousing and maintenance facilities [technology], as well as the general low level 
of experience in logistics management [doctrine].”
180
 
 American reliance on Turkey continued to grow, and Turkey “granted extensive military 
facilities to the United States which have great strategic value.”
181
  Moreover, the “Turkish 
Government has committed Turkish ground and air forces to NATO wartime tactical command,  
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and its naval forces under national command are assigned to NATO missions in time of war.”
182
  
The purpose of these forces was to “resist direct Soviet attack as part of a concerted allied 
defense, to withstand an assault by satellite forces, to protect the vitally important Straits, to 
protect Turkey’s southern flank, and to maintain internal security.”
183
  However, despite the high 
levels of aid given to Turkey, in 1957 Turkish forces were believed to be unable to fully 
accomplish these missions, in large part because of the “low level of education and technical 
training” which “impede[d] the absorption of additional materiel, which [was] required if the 
Turkish forces [were] to attain the level of effectiveness currently envisaged.”
184
  Thus, through 
the mid-1950s, the Turkish role in American war plans expanded and their projected capabilities 
and purposes expanded as well (i.e., their relevance remained moderate, trending towards high).  
Moreover, as predicted by the theory, the American strategic concern for Turkey was directed at 
the Soviet threat and only secondarily towards regional politics.  Finally, Turkey’s capability 
continued to be constrained by technology and doctrine – although the US would have preferred 
to give more aid, it believed that it simply could not. 
 By the end of the 1950s, Turkey entered a “transitional phase” in the eyes of American 
planners that enabled US security assistance to move from “less sophisticated to more advanced 
weapons.”
185
  Turkey had made excellent progress in fielding infantry and armored conventional 
forces, and the shortfalls in their equipping (vice NATO goals) consisted of surface-to-surface 
missiles, destroyers, and fighters.
186
  Thus, Turkish capability continued its slow upward 
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movement, constrained by the technological capacity of the population, and despite significant 
US wartime goals for the Turkish forces, the aid that Turkey could absorb (especially in terms of 
advanced weapons and capabilities) was capped.  Thus, one can observe the conceptual utility of 
PSV; ceteris paribus, Turkey would be more valuable strategically if it had a greater 
technological capability.  This greater value would be reflected in American willingness to 
transfer security resources to Turkey at an even more substantial pace than was observed. 
Looking at the period as a whole, it appears that PSV is effective in predicting American 
security exchange behavior vis a vis Turkey from 1952-1961.  US war plans informed a 
component of the American willingness to pay significant costs to support Turkey’s military 
modernization.  However, the US also held beliefs about Turkey’s capability – while it did bring 
to the table considerable manpower and a critical geography, it was not nearly as strong in its 
technological and doctrinal abilities.  Combined with Turkey’s unwavering commitment to an 
Integration strategy with the West (discussed in Chapter 6), these factors formed Turkey’s PSV, 
which was set against American global commitments and economic limits to determine the 









                                                                                                                                                                                  
approxiamately $225 million) will consist of two LACROSSE, two SERGEANT, four LITTLE JOHN (or 
substitute) and one REDSTONE battalion; four patrol vessels, 14 minesweepers, four torpedo boats, two tactical 
fighter squadrons and a SAM substitute for a BOMARC squadron.  These shortfalls represent those portions of the 
prescribed force goals which cannot be effectively supported by the Turkish Armed Forces due to manpower, 
technical, and financial limitations.”  Ibid. 7. 




Summary Table: Turkey 1952-1961 
Year 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
TIV 358 555 498 360 195 606 673 848 605 329 
% of total in 
the region 
71 71 54 39 17 77 64 72 56 57 
PSV High High High High High High High High High High 
Capability High High High High High High High High High High 
Size High High High High High High High High High High 
Tech Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Doctrine Low Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Geog. High High High High High High High High High High 
Resources None None None None None None None None None None 
Relevance Med Med Med Med Med Med High High High High 
Near Low Low Low Low Med Med Med Med High High 
Long Med Med Med High High High High High High High 
- TIV is the Total Import Value of all arms transferred from the West in this year (see Ch 3. for a more extensive 
discussion of this variable.) 




 As noted earlier, the potential strategic value of Iran’s geography to the defense of 
Western interests in Turkey and the Gulf was not lost on Western planners after the Second 
World War.  The Elburz mountains form a natural defensive barrier along the Soviet Union’s 
southern border and would significantly impede the advance of a mechanized force.  In the map 
below, created by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in the early 1950s, restrictive terrain is marked in 
red and open terrain in white.  The red arrows represent passes through which armored vehicles 
can travel, and it is these passes that would canalize invading Soviet forces for nuclear attack, as 
well as provide local numerical superiority for prepared defenders.  In short, if the Iranian 




government could be induced to ally with the West and to produce the necessary forces, it would 





4 Terrain Analysis.  This map is an illustration of how the American defense establishment “saw” the Middle East.  
The very light areas are unrestricted terrain, which is ideal for mechanized warfare.  The dark red areas are so-called 
SLO-GO terrain, in which the passage of armored vehicles is inhibited.  The pink areas (such as those near the 
Caspian Sea) are NO-GO terrain, which is impassible to mounted forces.  The only way to get armored vehicles 




 Of course, the pliability and suitability of the Iranian state for these purposes was in grave 
doubt at the outset of the period discussed in this chapter.  Mohammed Mossadegh, whose 
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ascendance and subsequent overthrow will be discussed in Chapter 6, was not considered a 
potential ally by the US, who conspired along with the British to have him removed from power.  
They succeeded in this endeavor in August of 1953 and restored the Shah, who facilitated the 
abandonment of Iran’s “traditional policy of refusing to take sides in international rivalries” in 
favor of his own “profoundly anti-Communist” views.
189
  Buttressed by the fact that he was 
“determined to use authoritarian means if necessary to maintain stability and carry forward 
desirable economic and political programs,” the United States felt optimistic about the “progress 
… made toward the attainment of U.S. objectives with respect to Iran.”
190
 
 The American evaluation of Iran’s PSV in 1954 was fairly low.  While it had a 
potentially useful geography and an abundance of oil, it lacked significant manpower (when 
compared to Turkey, for example) and what forces did exist would require “intensive training … 
to make effective use of modern weapons.”
191
  Thus, in terms of capability, Iranian manpower 
was medium and geography was high, but both technology and doctrine were low.  In terms of 
relevance, it was understood that “Iranian armed forces [were] capable generally of maintaining 
internal security but [did] not possess a capability for significant defensive delaying action 
against Soviet aggression.”
192
  In the immediate future, American planners hoped to develop 
Iranian forces that had “defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution 
to Middle East defense.”
193
  Thus, near-term Iran’s relevance was low with the hope of reaching 
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 Ibid. 10. The decision not to utilize Iran’s geography reflects the importance of analytically differentiating 
geography capability and war plan relevance.  NSC 5402/1 declared that “It should be noted here that at the present 
time the U.S. has no commitment to employ U.S. forces in Iran.  If it is found necessary for the U.S. to provide 
military forces in this area, implementation will require either an augmentation of U.S. forces or a reduction of 
present military commitments elsewhere.  6.  The line which would have to be defended in order to protect Turkey 
and Pakistan against Soviet invasion through Iran, although mountainous, is much too extensive to permit any 




medium at some point in the future.  Given this rather modest PSV, it is unsurprising that 
American security transfers to Iran, while not negligible, were nowhere near what they would 
become. 
 In 1958, with the northward shift of the Western defensive line to the Elburz (driven 
largely by NATO’s expanding atomic capability) and the demise of the Iraqi regime, Iran took 
on greater relevance.  While its military continued to underwhelm American defense planners, 
who found it lacking in virtually all respects,
194
 “[o]n July 19, 1958, the United States indicated 
to the Shah its agreement that, in the light of developments in Iraq, Iranian armed forces should 
be brought up to agreed operational strength and to a high level of operational efficiency.”
195
  
The low technological and doctrinal capabilities of the Iranian forces required “additional 
training assistance” to support the increased security asset transfers and limited the amount of aid 
that could be given due to a lack of “adequately trained manpower.”
196
  A European Command 
(EUCOM) survey team found “serious problems exist[ed] in the fields of personnel, supply, and 
maintenance” that limited the “prospects for immediate improvement in the combat capability 
[of the] Iranian army.”
197
  Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, Iran shared the distinction with 
Turkey of being one of the two small states identified by Eisenhower for rapid improvement in 
support of the American defensive concept for the Middle East.  In fact, Iranian capability was 
believed to be trending upwards from its low levels of the mid-1950s, and in the 1958 policy 
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in this part of the Middle East make effective support of Iran extremely difficult.” 
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review discussed here, American planners projected a “gradual introduction of major items of 
force improvement (e.g., tanks, heavy weapons) in the FY 1961 and 1962 as the Iranian Army 
show[ed] itself capable of utilizing and maintaining them.”
198
 
Thus, in this period Iran has a medium PSV, which is a function of their large petroleum 
reserves (resources), their geographical importance and relatively large army (medium/high 
capability) and low doctrinal and technological capabilities (low capability), and their limited 
relevance to US war planning in the present but anticipated contributions in the future (low-
medium relevance).  This value then informed the level of cost the US was willing to pay in 
order to maintain its security arrangements with Iran.  As in Turkey, Iranian demands exceeded 
even the elevated level of resources the US was willing to dedicate in support of their strategic 
objectives in 1958: “Although pleased with this commitment, the Shah is basically dissatisfied 
with the U.S.-recommended levels for the Iranian armed forces and insists upon force levels that 
are clearly beyond Iran’s ability to support.”
199
    Again, ceteris paribus, the evidence seems to 
show that a higher PSV (e.g. in the form of increased capability) would have resulted in a greater 
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Summary Table: Iran 1952-1961 
Year 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
TIV 0 1 81 119 128 53 118 96 11 102 
% of total in 
the region 
0 0.1 9 13 11 6 11 8 1 18 
PSV Low Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Capability Low Low Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med 
Size Med Med Med Med Med High High High High High 
Tech Low Low Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med 
Doctrine Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Med Med Med 
Geog. High High High High High High High High High High 
Resources High High High High High High High High High High 
Relevance Low Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Near Low Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Long Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
- TIV is the Total Import Value of all arms transferred from the West in this year (see Ch 3. for a more extensive 
discussion of this variable.) 




 Saudi Arabia in the 1950s had a very limited and specific value for the United States.  It 
was, in strategic terms, an airfield and a sea of oil, but not much else.  That is to say, it had very 
high resources (which are discussed above), a wartime relevance that was limited to the runways 
at Dhahran, and no other capability worth mentioning.  This is expressed rather directly by the 
National Security Council: “The large-scale activities of American oil companies in the country 




and the position of the U.S. Air Force at Dhahran Field have been the important factors 
contributing to the development of this close relationship.”
200
 
A chief concern of American military planners in the 1950s was figuring out how to 
deliver atomic strikes into Soviet territory using long-range bombers.  To create an effective 
deterrent, these bombers and their weapons needed bases within range of their targets, and, for 
the Southern USSR, this required bases in the Middle East.
201
  As discussed earlier, it was with 
great alarm that the NSC noted in 1949 that there were no airfields in the area that could support 
American strategic requirements.
202
  Dhahran Airfield presented a solution to that problem, 
especially since the Saudi regime had aligned itself with the US and not the UK.
203
  The 
agreement that secured the base for the US was about as straightforward an illustration of 
Security Exchange Theory as one can imagine: 
Pursuant to a 1951 five-year agreement on U.S. base rights at Dhahran 
Airfield, a U.S. military training mission was established to provide training for 
the Saudi Arabian forces.  During negotiations in early 1957 for a 5-year 
extension of the Dhahran base rights, the U.S. agreed to provide $35 million in 
grant military assistance and to sell additional military equipment to Saudi Arabia.  
A three-year credit of $50 million dollars has been extended in connection with 
the sales.  
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By the end of FY 1960, it is estimated that the U.S. will have delivered 
55.5 million of assistance under these agreements.  Major items of equipment 
include F86F, T-33, C-123 and B-26 aircraft; M-41 and M-47 tanks, howitzers, 
and 3.5” rocket launchers; and, coast guard utility boats.  In addition, the U.S. has 
provided motor vehicles, spare parts, ammunition, and construction.  Training 
assistance is administered by a U.S. Military Training Mission, which has a 




Unlike security transfers to Turkey and Iran, however, this allocation of resources was 
not intended to contribute to a larger defensive concept for the region.  To believe that it was, 
one would have to assert that although Turkey and Iran were judged to lack the infrastructure to 
support large scale mechanized forces and thus US aid was limited, the Saudis were perfectly 
capable of fielding a modern force.  If this was the goal, then it was a failure, because after seven 
years the Saudi military had made no noticeable progress: “Some of the limitations of the Saudi 
Army are: an inadequately trained officer corps, very limited logistical support for the Army in 
the field, the existence of endemic diseases among the troops, and a low level of education.  The 
Saudi Army can maintain internal security but would be incapable of organized resistance 
against a modern army, except for desert harassing tactics.”
205
 
A more compelling argument, which is captured by PSV, is that the US wished to buy a 
very specific capability – in this case, the geography of Dhahran, and was willing to pay for it 
using security assets.  The overall pricing structure integrates the reality of Saudi resources 
(hence the importance of a notion of strategic value that is not simply a list of individual 
valuations tied to a form of capability, resources, or relevance,) but ultimately it is PSV that 
informs the extent of US willingness to pay costs to support its security arrangements with Saudi 
Arabia. 
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The other component of Saudi Arabia’s strategic value is its immense oil reserves.  Given 
their central importance to Europe’s economy and the American strategic rivalry with the Soviet 
Union, it seems rather odd that the Saudis were not recipients of a greater level of security 
resources.  However, I argue that the PSV of Saudi oil was so high that the US was unwilling to 
relinquish control over its defense and pay for a small state actor to provide an additional 
security capability. 
There is strong archival support for this argument.  First, the US planned to destroy the 
Saudi oil facilities rather than let them fall into Soviet hands and did not, from the discussion in 
the planning process, think it necessary to inform the Saudis about these intentions.
206
  Second, 
beginning in 1958, NSC documents began to include a paragraph to the effect that the flow of oil 
to the West would be maintained by force if necessary.
207
  This paragraph was repeated at 
various levels of redaction in all subsequent declassified NSC policy statements on the US 
objectives in the Middle East.  Third, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the subordinate 
commands in the region to develop plans to reverse a coup d’état in Saudi Arabia and 
“reestablish [the] authority of [a] friendly government.”
208
  Thus, in the 1950s the United States 
was unwilling to cede control of Saudi oil to foreign powers, a new Saudi regime, or even Saudi 
decisions to refuse to supply it.  The strategic value of Saudi reserves had become so high that it 
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falls outside the spectrum of Security Exchange Theory.  The “cost” of the alliance is hidden in 
the threats that underlie it – because defection is not an option, the transfer of resources puts a 
pleasant veneer on what is not really a completely voluntary exchange.  The ability and 
willingness of the U.S. to use force as needed to reverse adverse ally decisions requires 
resources, but these remain under the control of the US and within the global pool of coercive 
capabilities and thus are not implicated in the process of security exchanges. 
Setting aside the complicated issue of Saudi Arabia’s extremely high resource value, it is 
apparent that it is of limited PSV in terms of capabilities or relevance.  Saudi forces were deemed 
incapable of serious resistance, the battle to protect the Saudi oil fields was to take place further 
north (in the Zagros and then the Elburz mountains), and the sole useful military contribution 
that Saudi Arabia could make was to provide a suitable airbase.  The perceived value of this 
airbase can be observed directly, since negotiations between America and Saudi Arabia 
explicitly tied security exchanges to leasing rights.  Especially relative to Iran and Turkey, it is 














Summary Table: Saudi Arabia 1952-1961 
Year 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
TIV 7 1 1 9 10 51 36 8 11 12 
% of total in 
the region 
1 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.8 6 3 0.7 1 2 
PSV Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Capability Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Size Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Tech Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Doctrine Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Geog. Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Resources High High High High High High High High High High 
Relevance Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Near Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Long Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
- TIV is the Total Import Value of all arms transferred from the West in this year (see Ch 3. for a more extensive 
discussion of this variable.) 




 At the end of  World War II, Iraq was considered to be of central importance to Western 
security policy in the Middle East.  The British claimed that “the ability of Great Britain to 
contribute effectively to the maintenance of the Security of the Middle East depended to a large 
extent upon the holding of bases in that area” and “Iraq was regarded as possibly the key Middle 
Eastern country at the present time [1947].”
209
  For their part, the Americans did not disagree and 
only argued that Kuwait should continue to be developed as an alternative “in case developments 
should make it appear that effective use could not be made of the Iraqi bases.”
210
  In the period 
immediately before this project’s analysis begins, “The Regent and other responsible officials 
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were well disposed and the Iraqi Army appeared well satisfied with recent British efforts to meet 
its requests for the supply of military equipment.”
211
  However, in the intervening decade, Iraq’s 
portion of Western security transfers to the region became relatively small (and, as will be shown 
in Chapter 6, irritating to the Iraqi government); despite Iraqi participation in the Baghdad Pact, 
the monarchy collapsed, and Iraqi withdrawal from the US alliance framework for the region 
was met with mild disinterest.  The reasons for this massive shift are easily explained in the 
terms of PSV.  Iraq’s geography was of central relevance to controlling indigenous forces in the 
Middle East, but was of contingent usefulness in terms of a global conflict with the Soviet 
Union.  Likewise, Iraqi forces, aided by British aircraft, were more than sufficient to put down 
various tribal rebellions in the mid-Euphrates but had negligible abilities against a modern 
mechanized force.  Iraq’s resources, while important, were exploited in the broader context of 
Western oil ventures in the region and did not seem to be given a special independent weight. 
 A stark demonstration of the power of PSV over purely objective approaches to small 
state value is that just five years after agreeing on the centrality of Iraq to the defense of the 
Middle East, the NSC expressed the belief that “the armed forces of the Arab states [were] far 
inferior to those of the Western powers” and were “utterly inadequate to provide an effective 
counter to possible Soviet aggression.”
212
  Iraq was included in the list of countries whose 
military forces were “poorly trained and inadequately equipped.”
213
  At the same time, Iraq was 
also identified (along with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan) as a state that was “most keenly aware of 
the threat of Soviet Russia” and was “located geographically in the way of possible Soviet 
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  Thus, as the American concept for the defense of the Middle East moved from a 
defense of the Suez to a defense of the Zagros (based largely robustness of its nuclear 
capability), the relevance (and therefore the PSV) of Iraq increased and an aid program was 
established.  Nonetheless, Iraq was of relatively less importance than its neighbors to the north.  
In 1955, the same year that the US assistance program to Turkey was expanding and worth 
nearly a billion dollars, due to “worldwide requirements and limited funds available, the Iraq 




 In 1955, Iraq also became a founding member of the Baghdad Pact, which integrated it 
into the American concept for the defense of the Middle East.  As such, it “enjoy[ed] the highest 
priority in the delivery of MAP [Military Assistance Program] equipment along with Iran, 
Pakistan, and Turkey.”
216
  This aid appears to have some effect, and by 1957 the Iraqi army was 
considered “good by Near Eastern standards” and could support “one infantry division outside 
Iraq without loss of capability to maintain internal security.”
217
  Nonetheless, it was still assessed 
as capable of “no more than minor harassing action” against the invasion of a major power.
218
  It 
is precisely because it made such a limited contribution to the Western defense of the region 
against the Soviet Union that the 1958 coup that overthrew the monarchy was met with a less 
aggressive response than was planned for the equivalent event in Saudi Arabia. 
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 After the coup, the American evaluation of the Iraqi army’s capabilities remained stable.  
While it was “fairly well-trained and well-equipped by Middle East standards” it nonetheless 
suffered from “a shortage of well-trained and efficient officers [doctrine], the small size of the 
forces [size], the low level of general and technical education [technology], the lack of combat 
experience and of an adequate reserve of mobilization system, and a weak logistical system 
[doctrine/technology].”
219
  Iraq continued to sell oil to the West under the auspices of the Iraq 
Petroleum Company after the revolution.  Thus, in terms of PSV, Iraq was consistently a low 
capability state with high resources throughout the period 1952-1961.  However, its Perceived 
Strategic Value to the United States varied with its relevance in terms of war plans focused on 
the USSR.  While more relevant than states further south, it was less important than Turkey or 
Iran, especially after the planned line of defense moved north from the Iran/Iraq border to the 
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Summary Table:  Iraq 1952-1961 
Year 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
TIV 58 49 19 91 97 4 58 0 0 0 
% of total in 
the region 
12 6 2 10 9 0.5 6 0 0 0 
PSV Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Low Low Low 
Capability Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Size Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Tech Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Doctrine Low Low Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med 
Geog. Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Resources High High High High High High High High High High 
Relevance Med Med Med Med High Med Med Low Low Low 
Near Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Low Low Low 
Long High High High High High Med Med Low Low Low 
- TIV is the Total Import Value of all arms transferred from the West in this year (see Ch 3. for a more extensive 
discussion of this variable.) 




 In the early 1950s, the United States was concerned that the dispute between Israel and 
the surrounding Arab states would distract them from “the greater threat of international 
communism.”
220
  In order to encourage settlement of the dispute, the US pursued a “relatively 
balanced” approach to the two sides of the conflict and, according to Rashid Khalidi, “[i]t could 
certainly be said that until the mid-1960s the United States acted more as an honest broker in the 
conflict than as a dedicated ally of Israel.”
221
  Further, American willingness to pay 
disproportionate costs to ally with Israel was also very different in the 1950s – “the United States 
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did not sell Israel significant quantities or the most modern kinds of arms until the 1960s.”
222
  To 
properly analyze these shifts, which are still shrouded by classification, it is first necessary to 
establish Israel’s PSV. 
 The purpose of the limited assistance provided to Israel (and the Arab states) in the early 
1950s was 5-fold.  It was believed that: 
If military assistance were supplied to the several Arab States and Israel, these 
states would (a) tend to become more closely oriented towards the United States; 
(b) be better able to preserve the internal security; (c) contribute after a time to the 
defense of the area; (d) be able to conduct guerrilla warfare and harassing 
operations in the event the area or part of it is overrun; and (e) be more amenable 




This supports the defensive concept outlined at the beginning of the chapter, wherein the defense 
of the Middle East was to occur around the Suez after a series of atomic attacks on invading 
Soviet forces.  While the states in the region had a value that is identified by policy-makers, they 




 Nonetheless, it was clear to American policy-makers in the 1950s that Israel had a 
population that was “highly literate, industrious, and relatively free from the diseases which 
handicap other peoples of the area” and could, for its size, contribute “substantial and effective 
numbers to a fighting force.”
225
  That is to say, Israel had low size and geography, but high 
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technology and doctrine.  This opinion remained stable over time, as did the US position vis-a-
vis Israel during this period.
226
  Israel offered neither the overwhelming size nor the critical 
geography to be considered a high capability state worth investing in, and their contribution to 
the Western defense of the Middle East, its oil, and the critical sea lanes to Europe would be 
minimal in the event of a large-scale Soviet attack.  Thus, Israel capabilities, resources, and 
relevance were not particularly noteworthy during the 1950s. 
 There is, however, an odd spike in the data that bears further discussion.  In 1956, there is 
a rapid increase in arms transfers to Israel, which is recorded in US government documents 
thusly: “The U.S. continued its policy of not shipping major quantities of arms to Israel and 
neighboring Arab states … Prior to October 29 [1956], the U.S. offered no objection to the sale 
to Israel by France of 24 Mystere jet fighters and by Canada to Israel of 24 F-86s … France 
during this period [around the Suez Crisis] apparently supplied arms to Israel in substantial 
quantities without informing the U.S.”
227
  This reality presents a challenge to the usefulness of 
great power PSV similar to that of the British nuclear force discussed in the war plans section, in 
that PSV focuses itself on bipolar competition and does not model second-tier states particularly 
well.  In the data, it is apparent that the US supports purchases from other Western suppliers 
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financially, which seems to fit with the puzzle addressed by PSV (why would a bipole spend 
security resources on a small state?). 
The reason for the spike, of course, is that Britain, France, and Israel had independently 
developed a plan to seize the Suez Canal, which they then executed to the surprise and great 
annoyance of the United States.  This crisis and its politics are not tractable within the theory, 
given that they relate to regional security and post-colonial animosities.  Nonetheless, it still 
finds its way into the data, because  by treating “the West” as a bloc that is co-extensive with the 
United States, this research design inadvertently captures shifts in the dependent variable proxy 
that do not accurately reflect costs to the great power.  I do not believe this noise is fatal to the 
project as a whole, as it seems that, in general terms, the West shared similar security goals and 
the US supported the arms transfers that did occur between 1952 and 1979.  Nonetheless, it may 
















Summary Table: Israel 1952-1961 
Year 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
TIV 69 107 49 118 593 30 40 207 375 93 
% of total in 
the region 
14 14 5 13 52 4 4 18 35 16 
PSV Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Capability Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Size Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Tech High High High High High High High High High High 
Doctrine High High High High High High High High High High 
Geog. Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Resources Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Relevance Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Near Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Long Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
- TIV is the Total Import Value of all arms transferred from the West in this year (see Ch 3. for a more extensive 
discussion of this variable.) 




 This section demonstrates the explanatory power of the PSV approach.  Countries with 
lower PSV generally received lower total security transfers from all western sources (subject, of 
course, to the caveats discussed above.)  Moreover, the internal deliberations of the American 
government indicates that it understood capability, resources, and relevance in the manner in 
which the terms are used in the theory, that the causal relationship between PSV and security 
exchanges operates as predicted, and that alternate theories of alliance pay-offs (such as 
ideological, symbolic, and security/autonomy approaches) are not only less accurate but, in fact, 
are explicitly rejected by policy-makers as a basis for security transfers. 




 I have demonstrated that US strategic evaluations of potential alliances in the Middle 
East were a function of its beliefs about the region’s defensibility in a war with the USSR.  In the 
early 1950s, limited Western conventional forces, nuclear capabilities, and delivery platforms 
forced planners to adopt a defense of the region based around the Suez canal.  As American 
nuclear capabilities expanded, this line moved north, first to the Iran/Iraq border and then into 
northern Iran / Turkey.  Simultaneously, the region’s oil resources became increasingly critical, 
leading the US to prepare to use force to preserve access to Saudi oil. 
 PSV asserts that great powers base security payments not only on the geography, 
resources, and planning relevance of small states, but also on their capacity to absorb security 
transfers in such a way that the small state generates a useful force to be employed against a 
great power adversary.  The utility of this expanded notion of capability is evident in American 
deliberations concerning security transfers.  While the great power might, based purely on 
geography, resources, and relevance, prefer to transfer more resources, it is constrained by the 
size, doctrine, and technology limitations of its small state ally.  Conversely, a doctrinally and 
technologically advanced small state that is simply in the wrong place is also not of much value, 
as evidenced by American discussions of Israel’s potential contributions to regional war plans.  
The power of PSV is that it integrates these diverse considerations into a single variable, which 
both reflects policy-maker considerations and the reality that its particular sub-components are 
seldom considered in isolation. 
 This chapter has tested PSV against US alliance policy in the Middle East between 1952 
and 1961 and found it to be parsimonious and useful.  It is an effective predictor of both process 
and outcome, even in an era with significant political and ideological turmoil. 
 




PSV Summary Table: 1952-1961 
Year 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Turkey TIV 358 555 498 360 195 606 673 848 605 329 
% of total 71 71 54 39 17 77 64 72 56 57  
PSV High High High High High High High High High High 
Capability High High High High High High High High High High 
Resources None None None None None None None None None None 
Relevance Med Med Med Med Med Med High High High High 
           
Iran TIV 0 1 81 119 128 53 118 96 11 102 
% of total 0 0.1 9 13 11 6 11 8 1 18 
PSV Low Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Capability Low Low Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med 
Resources High High High High High High High High High High 
Relevance Low Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med Med 
           
Saudi TIV 7 1 1 9 10 51 36 8 11 12 
% of total 1 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.8  6 3 0.7 1 2 
PSV Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Capability Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Resources High High High High High High High High High High 
Relevance Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
           
Iraq TIV 58 49 19 91 97 4 58 0 0 0 
% of total 12 6 2 10 9 0.5 6 0 0 0 
PSV Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Low Low Low 
Capability Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Resources High High High High High High High High High High 
Relevance Med Med Med Med High Med Med Low Low Low 
           
Israel TIV 69 107 49 118 593 30 40 207 375 93 
% of total 14 14 5 13 52 4 4 18 35 16 
PSV Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Capability Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Resources Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Relevance Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
- see previous notes regarded TIV and % of total measures. 

















Soviet Security Exchanges in the Middle East, 1952-1961 
 
 In this chapter, I analyze the costly alliances made by the Soviet Union in the Middle 
East between 1952 and 1961.  Security Exchange Theory has been presented as a general theory 
of great power – small state security behavior in essential regions under bipolarity.  However, the 
bulk of the evidence presented has explored shifting American strategic considerations and the 
impact that these exogenous changes had on alliance behaviors in the Middle East.  An obvious 
and reasonable critique of this method is that it only demonstrates the efficacy of PSV as a 
theory of American foreign policy, but not as a component of a general theory of security 
exchanges.  Therefore, I now turn to Soviet policy, albeit in a more abbreviated fashion than the 
previous chapter.  Due to the differences in archival accessibility and robustness, to the extent I 
discuss the Soviet Union, I rely on memoirs, secondary sources, and a few critical documents.  
To be clear, the purpose here is not to make a structured and focused comparison between the US 
and the USSR, but rather to confirm that my theory is a general approach to great power alliance 
behavior. 
 I undertake that task in three parts.  First, I discuss Soviet strategic goals in the Middle 
East in a general way, recount their early and unsuccessful attempts to achieve those goals, and 
open my discussion of the alliance strategy that emerged in the mid-1950s.  Next, I analyze the 
relative PSV of the three recipients of Soviet aid during this period: Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.  
Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the utility of PSV in understanding the behavior of a 
great power that experiences limited success in the attainment of its strategic goals. 
 
Soviet Strategic Considerations 1952-1961 
 The Soviet Union suffered terribly during the Second World War, and began the period 
of this study in a precarious strategic position.  Western planners were deeply concerned about 




the vulnerability of their forces to Soviet attack, but ironically “[a]lthough, based on their 
capabilities or functions, the Western forces in early postwar Europe were not particularly suited 
to wage another war, the Soviet forces were even less so.”
228
  Many of the identified Soviet 
divisions were below strength or existed only on paper, and Soviet regular army formations 
relied on horse-drawn transport until the mid-1950s.
229
  The Soviet Union possessed no offensive 
naval capability.  Stalin’s goals for the Navy were “a credible deterrent against seaborne enemy 
attack; an adequate wartime defense of the USSR’s extensive maritime borders; and a prestigious 
position of readily apparent naval strength (tonnagewise), from which to conduct the political, 
economic, psychological, and paramilitary programs of the USSR’s long-term policy of 
‘peaceful coexistence.’”
230
  It had no ability to force its way into the Atlantic to gain control of 
NATO lines of communication (LOCs) and could not operate in the Mediterranean against the 
American Sixth Fleet due to a lack of organic air capabilities (ie carriers).  Finally, despite the 
development of a nuclear capability in 1949, the Soviet Union did not possess the long-range 
bombers to deliver those weapons to targets in the United States.  “It was not until 1956/7 that 
intercontinental bombers (the TU-20 Bear and the MYA-4 Bison) entered the Soviet 
inventory,”
231




 Between 1952 and 1961, Western nuclear strike capabilities relied on aircraft and 
intermediate range ballistic missiles, both of which required a ring of bases throughout the 
Middle East in order to range targets in the southern USSR.  I discuss these considerations 
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extensively in Chapter 4 and won’t recapitulate them here, except to highlight the strategic 
imperative this created for the Soviet Union to extend the buffer zone around its borders, which 
would have the salutary effect of both displacing existing missile sites (which would limit target 
selection and missile type) and creating more space for an air-defense in depth (which would 
increase the detection and subsequent attrition of incoming bombers).  In terms of defensive 
naval capabilities, the ability to intercept nuclear-armed naval aircraft would be enhanced by the 
ability to push the Sixth Fleet deeper into the Mediterranean, which, in turn, would be facilitated 
by control of the Turkish straits.  Thus, strictly from the perspective of limiting nuclear attacks 
against the USSR proper, the Soviets had strong incentives to attempt to gain either control or 
domination of neighboring states.  As will be discussed below, the Stalinist attempts to do so in 
Iran and Turkey failed catastrophically, and had the unfortunate effect of amplifying the very 
outcome they sought to avoid – that of Western-aligned states contributing capabilities to 
American war plans. 
 However, the Middle East also presented the Soviet Union with other Western 
vulnerabilities that could be exploited in a war with the United States.  Specifically, interdiction 
of the Suez Canal would cut an important sea line of communication (SLOC) between the 
Atlantic and Pacific, the ability to destroy shipping in the Persian Gulf and oil pipelines running 
across Syria would severely curtail Western petroleum supplies, and bases around the 
Mediterranean could play to Soviet naval strengths (littoral defense augmented by land-based 
aircraft) in the battle against the Sixth Fleet.  Thus, Soviet strategic objectives in the region were 
fourfold: gain and expand the control over buffer states (known to the West as the Northern Tier 
– Turkey and Iran); control SLOCs (the Suez and the Turkish Straits); interdict Gulf oil; and 
develop basing in the Mediterranean in support of operations against the Sixth Fleet. 




Misfire in the Opening Salvo 
 In his final speech to the CPSU in 1952, Stalin shared his thoughts on the relationship 
between the Soviet Union and its newly acquired client states.  In his view, the Soviet Union had 
been the “shock troops” that suffered enormously at the hands of czarist, fascist, and capitalist 
opponents, but in the aftermath of the Second World War that mantle had now been passed to the 
post-war People’s Republics across the world.  The Soviet Union would serve as an example, a 
guide, and a source of support and inspiration for revolutionary forces elsewhere, but, implicitly, 




 The need to buffer the Soviet Union proper against the aggression of capitalist states led 
to the creation of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe, which was easily accomplished through 
the presence of an occupying Soviet army.  A similar initiative was contemplated along the 
USSR’s southern border as well.  During WWII, the Soviet Union established a de facto state in 
northern Iran and continued to occupy its “zone” after the end of the conflict.  Similarly, the 
Soviets sought to gain a dominant position in Turkey both during and after the war.  Without 
getting into the diplomatic intricacies, it is sufficient to say that during the Second World War 
Turkey resisted Allied pressure to allow basing rights, in the belief that Allied bases would 
trigger a German offensive that they would be unable to counter on their own.  This incapacity 
would then merit the introduction of further Allied forces to shore up Turkish defenses (or retake 
Turkish territory) and, post-Stalingrad, those forces would in all likelihood be Soviet.  Having 
failed to do so during the war, the Soviet Union attempted to introduce bases into Turkey after 
the fact.  It is worth considering this Soviet attempt in a bit more detail, since its failure 
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transformed the Northern Tier into the fulcrum of American regional defense policy and became 
a considerable barrier to Soviet security ambitions for the remainder of the decade. 
Of the four Soviet strategic objectives in the Middle East listed above (geographical 
buffers, control of sea lanes, basing rights, and the interdiction of Gulf oil,) three would be met 
directly through domination of Turkey.  The Black Sea fleet could traverse the straits and operate 
in the Eastern Mediterranean with land-based air support, the West would be unable to operate in 
the Black Sea in wartime, and Western missiles and aircraft would be driven southward and 
away from the Soviet homeland.  Thus, Stalin sought a revision to the treaty apparatus that 
controlled the Turkish Straits. 
In addition to a 1921 treaty signed between Turkey and the Soviets, Turkish control of 
the straits connecting the Mediterranean and the Black Sea is governed by the 1936 Montreaux 
Convention which “ensures that no enemy fleet more powerful than the Soviet Black Sea fleet 
can threaten the coasts and shipping of the USSR in that region” but “limits the size and 
character of the warships which the USSR can pass through the Straits into the 
Mediterranean.”
234
  This external check on Soviet naval capabilities was challenged by Stalin in 
1946, when the Soviets transmitted a note to Turkey that “asserted that the Montreux Convention 
did not meet the security interests of the Black Sea Powers, and proposed a new regime at the 
Straits.”
235
  The revised plan “called for a joint Turco-Soviet system of defense for the Straits – a 
system which implicitly contained the idea of Soviet bases.”
236
  The idea of a permanent Soviet 
military presence was extraordinarily threatening to Turkey, and it was this diplomatic blunder 
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by the USSR that “pushed Turkey into the arms of the USA.”
237
  Or, put differently, the Soviet 
offer of a security exchange was rejected by the Turks in favor of the American alternative. 
 
The Soviet Entry into the Middle East 
 In 1953/4, the Soviet position in the Middle East was extremely precarious.  While 
American planners were concerned about the Soviet ability to generate forces within the USSR 
proper and attack south, the Soviets had to contend with Turkey’s alignment with the West, the 
restoration of the Shah in Iran, and American attempts to create the Middle East Defense 
Organization (MEDO).  The Soviet recognition of Israel had not persuaded the Israelis to 
abandon neutralism and a broad policy of support for local communist parties was yielding no 
worthwhile results.  In Egypt, “Stalin’s death in 1953 produced no real change.  The Russians 
opened a cultural centre in Cairo and there were some trade agreements, but communist parties 
everywhere maintained their hostility towards the Egyptian revolution.”
238
  Effectively locked 
out of the region, the Soviets were forced to wait for an opportunity to present itself. 
 In 1955, Egypt’s President Gamal Abdul Nasser delivered a speech at the Bandung 
conference in which he argued that the conflict between the great powers slowed the progress of 
all nations, not least because the pursuit of self-interest by large countries involved the 
manipulation of small countries in such a way as to divide and weaken them.
239
  Given that the 
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Baghdad Pact had been signed earlier in the year, it is not hard to read Egypt’s participation in 
the Non-Aligned Movement signaled a final rejection of American overtures to form an alliance 
and created a further schism between Nasser and the West.  Egyptian politics, security 
considerations, and its bargaining strategy in this period are fascinating and will be discussed in 
the following chapter; for now, it is sufficient to note that the US chose to exit the bidding for a 
security exchange with Egypt, thus opening the opportunity for the Soviet Union to do so. 
 Unlike the American case, I do not have archival evidence of that allows direct causal 
process observations of Soviet calculations of Egyptian Perceived Strategic Value (PSV).  
However, “if one considers that the primary and overriding objective of the Soviet Union during 
the period 1955-58 was the protection of Soviet security through the isolation and ideally the 
dissolution of the Baghdad Pact, then the Czech arms deal certainly contributed to the 
achievement of this objective.”
240
  Thus, the security exchange with Egypt was intended to 
indirectly facilitate Soviet security aims along its southern borders – namely, the creation of a 
buffer zone.  It could also directly achieve Soviet control of the Suez in the event of hostilities, 
assuming that the Egyptian government would be willing or able to close the canal to Western 
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ships.  Finally, Egypt could facilitate basing for Soviet forces intended to challenge the American 
Sixth Fleet, although this point merits further discussion. 
 It is certainly true that by the late 1960s Soviet basing rights in Egypt were used in 
support of Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean.
241
  Given the realities of the geography 
and the limitations of the Soviet arsenal, bases that supported naval operations with land-based 
aircraft near a natural chokepoint like the Suez were nearly ideal for Soviet strategic needs and 
one might conjecture that Soviet planners took this into consideration when evaluating Egypt’s 
PSV.  However, it seems just as likely that this is a case of the post hoc, propter hoc logical 
fallacy.  First, it imputes to Soviet planners an ability to predict 15-20 years into the future and 
then base policy on those predictions.  While military establishments in general are capable of 
trying to predict future trends, it is not apparent that these predictions are the basis for major 
foreign policy decisions (as opposed to say, research, doctrine, or procurement.)  To make this 
assertion would require facts that are currently not in evidence.  Second, at the time the Czech 
arms decision was made, Soviet naval doctrine had not evolved past a commitment to coastal 
defense and limited-duration naval strikes.  While there were changes afoot that would make 
themselves apparent in the next two decades, these were not yet doctrinal and likely had limited 
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impact on alliance strategy.
242
  Therefore, arguing that Egypt has a high PSV in the mid-1950s 
on the basis of its suitability for naval bases is difficult to support given the available evidence. 
 
PSV and Soviet Arms Transfers 1955-1961 
 Given the difficulties the Soviet Union faced finding willing participants in costly 
alliances in the Middle East and the relative inaccessibility of Soviet calculations, care must be 
taken in deriving theoretical predictions and assessing observable implications.  Nonetheless, 
PSV is an excellent predictor of the relative allocation of Soviet aid within the set of countries to 
which in transferred arms in the 1950s.  In this section, I leverage the four strategic imperatives 
identified above, the memoirs of participants, and contemporaneous assessments to derive 
measures of PSV for Iraq, Syria, and Egypt and then test the rougher evaluation of PSV against 
the observed value of the arms transferred to each country. 
 
Egypt 
 With the second largest army in the region (behind Turkey,) a critical geographic position 
athwart the intersection of Asia and Africa, access to both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, 
and the ability to address Soviet strategic imperatives as discussed above, it is unsurprising that 
Egypt would rank highest in PSV among the three states receiving Soviet aid.  In this section I 
discuss the constituent elements of the Soviet PSV for Egypt and conclude with a summary table. 
 While Egypt had a relatively large army, it had exceedingly limited equipment and 
capabilities.  In 1955, the USSR sent Dimitry Shepilov, an editor of Pravda and former chair of 
the Supreme Soviet’s Foreign Affair committee to Cairo, where he observed the anniversary 
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celebrations for the July Revolution.  Upon “leaving Cairo, Shepilov took with him numerous 
photographs of an Egyptian military parade, which featured a few outdated armored vehicles, 
and soldiers equipped with rifles that dated back to the First World War.”
243
  It is worth noting 
both that Shepilov is alleged to have passed along this information and that Primakov (himself a 
senior government official who, among other things, served as the head of the Russian Foreign 
Intelligence Service, Foreign Minister, and Prime Minister of Russia) saw fit to remember this 
detail and include it in his memoirs. 
 Thus, I conclude that in 1955 the Soviet Union was aware of the low level of technology 
in the Egyptian military, its relatively large size, and the strategic importance of its geographic 
position to the Soviet defensive concept for the region.  Sadly, I do not have data on the Soviet 
estimate of Egyptian doctrinal ability.  I also determine, based on the foregoing section, that 
Egypt had low war-time relevance in the near-term but could plausibly have been foreseen to 
contribute to Soviet plans in the future, which I assess as medium long-term relevance. 
 Whatever the Soviet beliefs about the doctrinal abilities of the Egyptian military, its 
deficiencies were laid bare in the 1956 Suez crisis.  “Egypt had taken delivery of Soviet arms 
only at the beginning of 1956l its army had very little time to master their use.  It was imperative, 
therefore, to have specialists who could quickly train Egyptian soldiers to use those arms – but it 
was only significantly later that Soviet military specialists were invited to Egypt.”
244
  Thus, 
beginning in 1956 and continuing through 1961, I determine that the Soviets believe the 
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Egyptian doctrinal ability to employ the weapons it had obtained was low.  Nonetheless, since 
the Soviet Union would certainly have been aware of the weapons it had transferred, which 
included the T-34/85, the BTR 40, and the MiG-17 (a tank, an armored personnel carrier, and a 
fighter respectively.)  These weapons systems were relatively advanced – the T-34/85 had a 
larger gun than its WWII-era variant and was only just being replaced by the T-54 in the Soviet 
forces, and the BTR40 and MiG-17 both represented the Soviet state-of-the-art platforms.  Thus, 
beginning in 1956, I assess the Soviet belief about Egyptian technological ability to be medium – 
not as advanced as the Soviet forces, but certainly more advanced than most other states in the 
region. 
 The relevance of Egypt to Soviet war plans, which is to say, the extent to which it could 
reasonably contribute to the four Soviet imperatives listed above is not entirely clear.  In terms of 
challenging the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, Soviet naval doctrine at the time eschewed 
foreign bases (and, in fact, they returned the bases they had access to in Finland and China) and 
did not envision large conventional surface engagements far from Soviet shores.
245
  While this 
would change in the coming decade, it did not appear to inform Soviet policy between 1956 and 
1961.  The Egyptian army might have presented a threat to the West in terms of its ability to 
interdict the Suez, although the Suez Crisis demonstrated the limits of Soviet abilities to project 
power and protect Egypt from aggression, and, thus, the low likelihood that Egypt could be 
expected to retain control of the Suez in the face of Western attack in the late 1950s.  However, it 
is possible that the production of a more powerful Egyptian military could, in fact, serve such a 
purpose, and thus I assess the near-term relevance as low and the long-term relevance as medium 
for the entire period. 
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Summary Table: Egypt 1952-1961 
Year 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
TIV 0 1 0 525 1011 488 478 322 134 208 
% of total in 
the region 
0 100 0 88 92 55 64 60 40 68 
PSV Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Capability Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Size High High High High High High High High High High 
Tech Low Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Doctrine UNK UNK UNK UNK Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Geog. High High High High High High High High High High 
Resources N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Relevance Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Near Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Long Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
- TIV is the Total Import Value of all arms transferred from the Warsaw Pact in this year (see Ch 3. for a more 
extensive discussion of this variable.) 
- % of total represents the small state’s share of the TIV for the entire region 
 
Iraq 
 Iraq’s favorable disposition towards the West during the Hashemite regime was discussed 
briefly in the previous chapter and will be explored in more depth subsequently, so I won’t go 
into great detail here.  Suffice to say, however much the Soviet Union may have preferred it, a 
security exchange with Iraq prior to the July 1958 revolution (which saw the (literal) demise of 
the monarchy and its replacement by Gen. Karim Qasim) was simply not in the offing.  Here 
again is a case where the underlying Soviet PSV for Iraq is hidden in the archives and its 
implications unobservable, due to the fact that the Soviets lost the initial bidding for involvement 
in the Middle East rather badly.  Happily, the 1958 revolution and its aftermath serve to reveal 




useful information about the Soviet perception of Iraq between 1958-61 and, in conjunction with 
the four strategic imperatives previously identified, to estimate Iraq’s PSV. 
The Soviet Union was quick to recognize the new Iraqi regime and to do what it could to 
check the Western and Western-aligned forces that began to gather almost immediately.  The 
Western reaction is significant, in that it demonstrates the extent to which the revolution was 
considered a security issue of global import.  In the event, thousands of American soldiers and 
marines landed in Lebanon and a British force was dispatched to Jordan.  For his part, the 
Jordanian king suggested that, as the sole remaining government in the AU, it was now 
incumbent upon him to take charge of the Iraqi state.
246
  Turkey and Iran also indicated their 
support for military action against the Qasim regime in the days that followed the coup.
247
  The 
British believed that the most appropriate response was an invasion of Iraq that would depose the 
Qasim regime and reinstate a conservative, Western-friendly monarchy.
248
  Unable to do so on 
their own, they requested support from the Eisenhower administration, hoping that the forces in 
Lebanon would form the American contribution to a joint force that would march on Baghdad.
249
  
Eisenhower refused, and the invasion plans came to naught. 
For their part, the Soviets “announced maneuvers by the Black Sea Fleet as well as in the 
Turkmen and Caucasus regions (which border Iran and the Caspian Sea).”
250
  Later, in 1963, 
Khrushchev reportedly said these maneuvers were intended to “deter Turkey, Pakistan and 
                                                        
246
 State Department, “Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State,” July 14, 1958, in Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1958-1960, Vol XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Edward C. 
Keefer, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1993): 312. 
247
 State Department, “Briefing Notes by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles,” July 14, 1958, in FRUS 1958-
1960, Vol XII: 311. 
248
 Stephen Blackwell, “A Desert Squall: Anglo-American Planning for Military Intervention in Iraq, July 1958-
August 1959” Middle Eastern Studies (Vol. 35, No. 3, 1999), 4. 
249
 State Department, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of 
State Dulles,” July 15, 1958, in FRUS 1958-1960, Vol XII: 317-318. 
250
 Primakov, Russia and the Arabs, 65. 






  The revolution survived and in time “the Soviet leadership started to think it ought to 
give precedence to General Qassem” over Nasser as a result of Qasim’s relatively greater 
tolerance for the Iraq Communist Party.
252
  Ultimately this policy was checked by Qasim’s 
increasing instability, Soviet rapprochement with Nasser, and, finally, Qasim’s overthrow at the 
hands of his former co-conspirator, Gen. Arif. 
From this brief narration, it is possible to determine that Iraq was a country of military 
significance to both the West and the Soviets, that both states employed military maneuvers in 
response to the revolution and its impact on the security situation in the region, and that Iraq was 
understood to be of military relevance to the defense of both Turkey and Iran.  I therefore posit, 
although I cannot prove directly, that Iraq had the potential to play an important part in Soviet 
war plans for the region.  Just as Turkey and Iran could invade Iraq from the north, so too could a 
strong and Soviet-aligned Iraqi army eventually invade the two countries from the south.  
Regardless of the eventual outcome, the mere threat of Iraqi invasion would force both Iran and 
Turkey to orient some portion of their forces southward and away from the Soviet Union in order 
to be prepared for the contingency.  In the near-term, the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad 
Pact and its commitment to “positive neutrality” favored the Soviets, in that it pushed the 
logistical support for the American defensive line in Turkey and Iran further north, making it 
more vulnerable to Soviet attack and rendering the Western position more brittle as a result.  
Thus, I assess that Iraq had medium near- and long-term relevance in the Soviet strategic vision 
of the Middle East. 
The capabilities of the Iraqi Army and the equipment that it had procured were public 
knowledge, and absent evidence to the contrary I make the assumption that the Soviet Union 
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would have been aware of the size, technology, and doctrinal status of the Iraqi military, which 
would have yielded an identical assessment to that of the US.  The geographic importance of Iraq 
to the USSR is that it undermines the threat posed by US allies against the Soviet southern 
border, which was a key concern for the Soviet leadership.  Thus, while not of high importance 
in its own right, it is able to directly influence an essential buffer area, which I evaluate as 
medium geographical value.  I therefore evaluate the overall value of Iraqi capabilities to the 
Soviet Union as medium between 1958 and 1961. 
 
Summary Table:  Iraq 1952-1961 
Year 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
TIV 0 0 0 0 0 0 126 167 164 114 
% of total in 
the region 
0 0 0 0 0 0 17 31 50 25 
PSV Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Med Med Med 
Capability Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Size Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Tech Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Doctrine Low Low Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med 
Geog. Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Resources N/A 
N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Relevance Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Med Med Med 
Near Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Med Med Med 
Long Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Med Med Med 
- TIV is the Total Import Value of all arms transferred from the Warsaw Pact in this year (see Ch 3. for a more 
extensive discussion of this variable.) 
- % of total represents the small state’s share of the TIV for the entire region 
  
Syria 
 Syria was a troubled place in the 1950s, beset by relatively powerful and meddlesome 
neighbors, unstable governments, passionate ideological parties, and negligible resources.  
Consequently, despite being the most overtly pro-Soviet state in the area beginning in the mid-




1950s (espousing a “positive neutralism” can be read as occupying the space between complete 
indifference to super-power conflict and explicitly alignment within a command structure)
253
 it 
did not receive the most security transfers from the Soviet bloc during the period.  This is a 
function of its extremely weak armed forces and its consequent indefensibility, which made it a 
partner of limited potential usefulness in a great power war. 
 In assessing Soviet perceptions of the size, doctrine, technology, and geography (i.e., its 
“capability” as the term is used here) I am unable to rely on Soviet accounts, because Syria 
simply was not important enough militarily to make it into the memoirs and accounts translated 
into English.  However, two key facts are sufficient to support a reasonable estimation.  First, 
when Syria offered a full military union with Egypt prior to the creation of the United Arab 
Republic, it was rejected because Syria contribution to the shared budget would have been 4.5% 
the size of Egypt’s.
254
  It is reasonable to assume that, had Syria been in possession of more 
modern technology and methods of employment, Egypt might have considered the trade 
worthwhile – as it was, it seems that Egypt would have assumed the burden of modernization for 
Syria, leading me to conclude that the Soviets, along with the Egyptians, would have assessed 
size, technology, and doctrine as “low” for Syria.  Second, in addition to its Byzantine internal 
power struggles, Syria was credibly threatened by its neighbors.  Upon signing a defense 
agreement with Egypt in 1955, Syria was promptly the victim of a large-scale Israeli attack in the 
Lake Tiberias area.
255
  Turkey, for its part, also used military exercises near the border as “a 
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standard method of putting pressure on Damascus.”
256
  Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that 
the Soviets were aware of Syria’s relative vulnerability and weakness. 
 That said, Syria was not in an altogether useless position.  Positioned in such a way as to 
potentially disrupt Western operations in Turkey, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean, it 
could serve an instrumental purpose geographically that, while less critical than Turkey or Egypt, 
was still non-negligible.  And, given time, Syria could be developed into an important 
contributor to the Soviet defensive concept for the area, which is likely why “Russian and 
Czechoslovak officers had reconnoitered the Syrian desert between Syria and Iraq, while access 
to large tracts of this area was denied to the public.”
257
  This, combined with Soviet port calls in 
Latakia, suggests the awareness of the potential base for Soviet power in the Middle East that 
Syria was to become.  Thus, I assess the geographic value of Syria to the Soviets as “medium” 











                                                        
256
 Ibid. 300. 
257
 Ibid. 268. 




Summary Table:  Syria 1952-1961 
Year 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
TIV 0 0 0 72 86 385 123 36 33 11 
% of total in 
the region 
0 0 0 12 8 43 16 7 10 2 
PSV Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Capability Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Size Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Tech Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Doctrine Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Geog. Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Resources N/A 
N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Relevance Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Near Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Long Low Low Low Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
- TIV is the Total Import Value of all arms transferred from the Warsaw Pact in this year (see Ch 3. for a more 
extensive discussion of this variable.) 
- % of total represents the small state’s share of the TIV for the entire region 
 
Conclusion 
 The application of PSV theory to the Soviet case demonstrates both its utility and its 
limitations.  The evidence indicates that the USSR placed an extremely high value on the 
strategic utility of both Turkey and Iran for the defense of their southern border.  However, due 
to serious diplomatic miscalculations during World War II and its aftermath, both states sought 
the assistance of the West in checking Soviet ambitions.  Therefore, no alliance was made and no 
security transfers took place; put differently, there is no movement on the dependent variable in 
Turkey and Iran due to a set of variables not considered by the theory.  In particular, there is 
nothing in the theory which would account for the situations in which a high-PSV small state 
fails to come to an agreement that results in the acquisition of arms from a great power that 
highly values it.  This defect is not fatal to the enterprise.  In this case, both great powers held 




similar views of the strategic importance of Turkey and Iran, so their relatively high PSV for 
both the US and the USSR resulted in substantial security transfers. 
However, it is important to avoid drawing the conclusion that this implies there is a 
symmetry in great power PSV that implies an underlying objective rule that is ultimately driving 
the process, which would make the “Perceived” element of strategic value completely 
superfluous.  Recall, for example, the within case variation in security transfers to Iran from the 
US discussed in the previous chapter.  The Soviet Union occupied northern Iran and was willing 
to run substantial risks to maintain their control, only to find themselves on the losing end of the 
proposition.  By contrast, the US had a low regard for the Iranian forces and its defensibility until 
late in the 1950s and only began transferring substantial amounts of arms once the Western 
strategic arsenal was sufficient to defend the Elburz rather than the Zagros mountains.  The 
Soviet Union could not know this with certainty, nor could the US know the precise nature of 
Soviet offensive or defensive designs.  This illustrates the more general point that there are often 
multiple reasonable methods for achieving one’s military objectives given a particular 
geography, and a great power is seldom able to ascertain another’s intentions with certainty.  
This asymmetry of information creates the space in which two different evaluations of strategic 
value can emerge, even given a bipolar competition in a region with limited strategic options.  
 Thus, it remains a theoretical possibility that a great power might highly value a small 
state that is deemed worthless by other great powers, be willing to engage in security transfers to 
that highly valued state, and then so botch the diplomacy that no transfer occurs.  The frequency 
of such an occurrence is an empirical question, and it doesn’t appear from the cases addressed in 
this project that it happens very often.  Nonetheless, even if this were to diminish PSV’s utility to 
a degree, it remains an excellent tool for explaining the distribution of security transfers 




conditional on some transfer taking place.  As illustrated in the table below, despite having a 
strategically relevant location and a vibrant communist party, Syria obtained the lowest level of 
security transfers.  Iraq, by contrast, got much higher levels, and even temporarily replaced 
Egypt as the leading recipient of Soviet aid in 1960 (when Nasser aggressively persecuted the 
local communist element in Egypt and Qasim had not yet proven his unreliability.)  However, in 
the end it was Egypt’s perceived capability and potential relevance that ultimately determined 
Soviet distributions.  While not the Soviet first choice (which, again, would have been Turkey or 
Iran), it was nonetheless the best of the remaining alternatives.   
Soviet PSV Summary Table: 1952-1961 
Year 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Egypt TIV 0 1 0 525 1011 488 478 322 134 208 
% of total 0 100 0 88 92 55 64 60 40 68 
PSV Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Capability Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med Med 
Resources N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Relevance Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
           
Iraq TIV 0 0 0 0 0 0 126 167 164 114 
% of total 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 31 50 25 
PSV Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Med Med Med 
Capability Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Resources N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Relevance Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Med Med Med 
           
Syria TIV 0 0 0 72 86 385 123 36 33 11 
% of total 0 0 0 12 8 43 16 7 10 2 
PSV Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Capability Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Resources N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Relevance Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
           
- TIV is the Total Import Value of all arms transferred from the Warsaw Pact in this year                                            
- % of total represents the small state’s share of the TIV for the entire region 
 










Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt, 1952-1961 
 So far, I have demonstrated that great powers consider the Perceived Strategic Value of a 
small state when contemplating the transfer of security goods.  The more capable, resource-rich, 
and relevant a small state is to the great power’s strategy for obtaining security against its great 
power rivals, the more security goods it can expect.  However, my theory claims that the purpose 
of these bilateral transfers is to contribute to a larger strategic outcome, which implies that the 
great power has an incentive not only to transfer the security goods but also to monitor the 
utilization of those goods to ensure that they comport with the great power’s understanding of 
both the global threat environment and the appropriate strategies to address it. 
 Unfortunately for the great power, small states have a diverse set of security concerns 
which can sometimes imply force postures that are not particularly useful to great power designs.  
As I’ve argued in Chapter 2, whereas great powers operate in a world of hierarchy domestically 
and anarchy internationally, the modest amount of relative power available to small states means 
that they operate in semi-anarchy both at home and abroad.  As a result, the primary threat facing 
a small state regime can be either internal or external.  Similarly, a small state is vulnerable to a 
variety of actors that are inconsequential to great powers.  Thus, in some cases it is threatened by 
a great power, which implicates it in the global security competition between great powers and 
presents a challenge that comports with great power understandings of the world; in other cases, 
it is threatened by a lesser, regional actor, which is of little concern to the great power from 
which it seeks a security transfer.  Therefore, the primary threat to a small state’s security can be 
identified according to its location along two binary dimensions: internal-external and regional-
global. 




 I argue that the type of threat a small state faces is exogenously given and causes a small 
state to choose one of four strategies: Integrated, Client, Distributed, or Independent.  If the small 
state faces an external threat from a great power, then it behooves that state to integrate itself into 
the war plans of the threat’s rivals, since the small state, by definition, has no hope of resisting 
the great power on its own.  Therefore, it will adopt an Integrated strategy.  If a small state faces 
internal threats sponsored by a great power, then it will seek the support of that power’s rival and 
will try to counter the threat using the language and tactics of great power conflict – it will adopt 
a Client strategy.  If the small state faces an internal threat not sponsored or ideologically 
supported by a great power, it will array its military so as to both control the society and prevent 
the takeover of the state by the security forces.  However, unlike the Client strategy, it will 
pursue a strategy of repression and payoff without paying more than lip-service to great power 
concerns.  I call this the Distributed strategy.  Finally, if a small state faces an external threat 
from a regional (i.e. non-great power) actor, it will be loathe to specialize its military capabilities 
in support of a great power’s global strategy – rather, it will seek to build a self-contained, self-
directed military optimized for the physical defense of the small state’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, not for maximal contribution to a multinational alliance in the context of a 
global war.  This is the Independent strategy. 
 Given that great powers transfer scarce security goods into essential regions in order to 
secure themselves against the depredations of their rivals, I assert that they believe those 
strategies that comport to their understanding of the world are superior to those that do not.  
Therefore, a great power would prefer that a small state facing an external threat integrate 
themselves into the great power’s overall strategic framework.  If the small state is facing an 
internal threat, the great power would prefer that the small state accept advice on how best to 




organize their forces and which elements within the society present the most danger.  In the 
terms of my theory, this means that, ceteris paribus, great powers prefer small states with 
Integrated strategies to those with Independent strategies and small states with Client strategies 
to those with Distributed strategies.  These preferences then inform the amount of security goods 
the small state is offered, both because the great power wishes to encourage Integrated and Client 
strategies and because it discounts the utility of security assistance that is repurposed for an 
Independent or Distributed strategy.  If a great power believes there is some residual usefulness 
to be gained by the  transferred security goods to a small state that employs either of the latter 
two strategies, then it will make the transfer based on that small state’s PSV.  If it does not, then 
no bargain will be struck.  Thus, Security Exchange Theory argues that security exchanges are 
determined by the interaction of great power and small state beliefs about how best to obtain 
security in a threatening world. 
 The fact that threat is exogenously given also limits the flexibility of the small state to 
mold its security behavior to maximize aid.  The type, training, and disposition of the forces 
implied by each of the four strategies identified varies significantly – troops in border forts will 
respond slowly to mass unrest in the cities and troops garrisoned near population centers and 
away from ammunition stockpiles are not well-situated to repel invaders.  Further, as I pointed 
out previously, security exchanges are costly for the recipient state – they require logistical 
adjustments, reduce flexibility in subsequent procurements, and carry the risk of future 
vulnerabilities to embargo of critical supplies.  Thus, small state preferences must be taken 
seriously in understanding the bargaining process that precedes any transfer of security goods. 
 In this chapter, I test my theory of small state security behavior and bargaining.  I select 
four cases: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt.  Collectively, these four countries received 76.7% of 




the security transfers from NATO and Warsaw Pact countries between 1952 and 1961.  They are 
also linguistically, geographically, and politically diverse states that have excellent within case 
and between case variation.  Each of the four underwent an involuntary change of leadership at 
some point during the decade, two of the four (Egypt and Iraq) switched their primary arms 
supplier, and one (Iran) changed its security strategy in response to changing threats.  They also 
represent all four of the potential small state strategies enumerated above. 
In order to test my theory, I engage in a series of causal process observations using archival data.  
Relying primarily on contemporaneous reports, and to a lesser extent memoirs and scholarly 
histories, I examine each state’s threat environment and assess whether my theory accurately 
predicts the strategy the small state chooses.  I then assess the great power response, which 
should be positive in the case of Integrated and Client strategies and negative in the case of 
Independent and Distributed strategies.  Finally, I discuss the bargaining dynamics in each great 
power – small state dyad, and assess the impact of both PSV and small state strategy on the 
shape of the final agreement.  In order to avoid over-reliance on the archives that supplied the 
data for Chapter 4 (and which were drawn primarily from the military bureaucracy and the 
American National Security Council), in this chapter I focus on the diplomatic record and the 
documents compiled by State Department historians in the Foreign Relations of the United 










Small State Threats, Cases, Predicted Posture, Predicted Great Power Response 
Threat Regional Global 
Internal Case: Iraq 1952-58, 1958-61; Iran 1957-61 
Predicted Posture: Distributed 
Predicted Response: Negative 
Bargain: Based on PSV 
Case: Iran 1953-1956 
Predicted Posture: Client 
Predicted Response: Positive 
Bargain: Above PSV 
External 
 
Case: Egypt 1952-55, 1955-61 
Predicted Posture: Independent 
Predicted Response: Negative 
Bargain: Based on PSV 
Case: Turkey 1952-1960, 1960-61 
Predicted Posture: Integrated 
Predicted Response: Positive 
Bargain: Above PSV 
 
Turkey: Integrated Strategy 
 In this section, I argue that Turkey perceived the Soviet Union as the most significant 
threat to its regime between 1952 and 1961, and therefore adopted an Integrated position vis a 
vis the United States.  My theory predicts that, given Turkey’s high PSV, the United States 
would reward and encourage Turkey’s efforts at integration and would read Turkey’s perception 
of their security environment as particularly praiseworthy and a relevant consideration in the 
disbursement of security transfers.  To test this prediction, the section is organized into three 
components.  First, I discuss the Turkish perception of the Soviet Union and argue that it is best 
characterized as an external-global threat in my conceptual framework.  Second, I test the 
prediction that Turkey would therefore have pursued an Integrative approach to their security, as 
my theory predicts.  Third, I assess the American response to the Turkish security posture, 
focusing in particular on the impact of that posture on American military support policies. 
 
The Soviet Threat  
 It must be remembered that there is no “natural” enmity between Turkey and Russia 
(Soviet or otherwise).  Czarist Russia sought to gain control over the Turkish Straits at various 




points, but after the consolidation of the Communist government, the Soviet forces disavowed 
any intentions of employing force against Turkey and signed a treaty of friendship in 1921.  By 
contrast, Turkey suspended diplomatic relations with the United States from 1917 to 1927, 
although the two countries were cordial upon their resumption.  Turkey developed some German 
leanings during the 1930s, but later reversed these inclinations and remained neutral throughout 
the Second World War.
258
  Thus, the decisive shift towards the US by Turkey during the period 
under discussion here is not a function of a natural hostility towards Russia, Kemalism, or an 
enduring predisposition to the West.  Instead, it is a direct response to Stalin’s diplomacy. 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, after failing to draw Turkey into the Second World 
War, which would have necessitated Allied support for her defense (which, in turn, would most 
likely have been provided by the Soviet Union), Stalin attempted to obtain the same outcome by 
different means.  Since the Soviet Union had not been able to emplace bases in Turkey during 
the war, the Soviets argued the need to do so after the fact and sent a note to Turkey expressing 
their desire for a jointly run defense of the Turkish Straits.  Unsurprisingly, having just expended 
a great deal of time and effort averting this eventuality, the Turks found Stalin’s undiminished 
enthusiasm for control of the straits extraordinarily threatening and sought ways to deter it.  In 
fact, Turkey expressed to the United States that it viewed the world in stark bipolar terms and 
was deeply concerned about “the Soviet threat.”
259
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 While there were considerable threats from abroad, Turkey’s domestic picture was much 
rosier.  Because “she was never occupied by a foreign army” Turkey  “was less susceptible to the 
kinds of pressures exerted by occupation on the states which bordered her.  Her sense of 
community, of nationhood, provided the moral fiber for her army and kept her from the internal 
divisions which, aggravated by occupation, were so disruptive in Iran and even more divisive in 
Greece.”
260
  While the formal government of the country was replaced in 1960 by a military 
coup, the consensus reading of the regime is that these coups reflected a stable underlying power 
structure (the military monitoring the civilian government’s adherence to Kemalist principles) 
and not an internal threat that the regime guarded itself against.  In fact, according to the new 
Turkish President the “biggest problem concerned his largest and toughest neighbor to the North.  
Turkey was not under direct attack but was subject to constant Soviet pressure.  This pressure no 
longer took forms of threats but constituted insistent offers and urgings to accept assistance.  The 
approach included Soviet effort to persuade Turkey to foresake [sic] NATO and join bloc not 
aligned against USSR.  Soviets insisted Turkey would be safer on this course.”
261
  Thus, the new 
regime continued to perceive external, great-power threats as predominant in their security 
decision-making.  Similarly, while Turkey certainly involved itself in the affairs of its neighbors 
and held opinions on Arab nationalism, the chief security concerns of the regime were not a 
function of regional threats.  Turkey sought American assistance because “American 
commitment offered the support immediately needed to counter pressure from another great 
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power source – the Soviet Union.”
262
  Thus, the evidence strongly supports Turkey’s inclusion in 
the External-Global threat category and its exclusion from the Internal or Regional categories. 
 
Integration: The Turkish strategic response 
 My theory predicts that because the most serious threat facing Turkey was the external 
intervention by a great power, Turkey would seek an opposing great power and actively integrate 
itself into that great power’s security strategies.  This is precisely what seems to have occurred in 
this case.  Throughout the period, Turkey aggressively integrated itself into US strategic 
concepts.  In 1951, the US perception was that “[t]he primary objective of Turkey’s foreign 
policy [was] to obtain a United States security commitment.”
 263
  Not only did it make a 
continuous effort to gain “full membership in NATO,” it also “indicated its willingness to 




 The Turkish government was very blunt about this aspiration.  Contrasting its own stance 
with Egypt’s objections to continued British occupation of the Suez Canal Zone in 1953, the 
Turkish Prime Minister stated: 
…attempts by Egypt to present the [Canal Zone] issue as a struggle for independence and 
freedom should be entirely secondary to the importance that the Canal Zone has to the entire free 
world as a point of strategy … The Turks, for example, possess airfields which they intend to use 
jointly with United States forces, and they do not feel that this involves in any way a question of 
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infringing Turkish sovereignty.  On the contrary, Turkey considers such arrangements to be 
elements of security for its very existence.
265
 
As discussed earlier, this strategy came to fruition and Turkey was able to obtain both US 
aid and integration into the NATO command and control apparatus.  They were so successful 
that only four years later, they were held up in the National Security Council as the sort of 
“effective forces” that could deter “local aggression” and exemplar of President Eisenhower’s 
global strategy wherein “our friends and allies supply the means for local defense on the ground 
and that the United States should come into the act with air and naval forces alone.”
266
 
By 1958, NATO operated under a document called MC-70, which determined force 
requirements for member states.  One of the key predictions of my theory is that a small state 
pursuing an integrative strategy will structure its forces in such a way that integration with the 
great power ally is prioritized over the maintenance over a fully autonomous defense capability.  
This seems to have occurred in the Turkish case.  As discussed in the previous chapters, Turkish 
units were “generally in accordance with NATO goals;” however, Turkey had also undertaken 
the “deactivation of certain pill-box battalions, frontier regiments, etc.” that were “maintained by 
the Turks over and above recognized force objectives.”
267
  It appears that documentary evidence 
from the period across multiple American sources and based on the direct testimony of Turkish 
leaders supports the assertion that Turkey pursued a strategy of Integration with the US. 
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A Friendly Bargain 
Thus far I have argued that Turkey believed it was threatened by a great power and 
pursued a strategy of integration with the rival great power throughout the 1950s.  This is an 
uncontroversial claim.  However, my theory makes two novel predictions: the small state will 
emphasize their integration with the great power in pursuit of larger amounts of aid and the great 
power will place a positive value on the small state’s shared perspective on global security and 
the appropriate response.  This is because the value of a small state to a great power is not simply 
a function of its objective capabilities (where it is, how big an army it has, etc.) but the extent to 
which those capabilities are perceived to be useful to the great power in their pursuit of security.  
Thus, where less sophisticated models place no particular value on the mechanics or extent of 
integration, Security Exchange Theory argues that the orientation of a small states security 
apparatus matters in the determination of security transfers.  Moreover, I assert that both the 
great power and the small state are aware of this fact and will use it in their bargaining behavior. 
In its discussions with the United States, the Turkish government consistently emphasized its 
value as a partner to the United States – not simply because of the capabilities it possessed, but 
because of the marginal utility of additional security transfers given to Turkey as opposed to 
some other state.  The Turks were absolutely explicit in this regard: 
The Prime Minister said he would like to stress one more fact pertinent to the 
establishment of the level of defense aid.  In addition to Turkey’s strategic 
position, her relentless determination to resist aggression, the social and political 
stability of the country, and her willingness to contribute forces to the common 
defense, it is clear that dollars spent in Turkey will buy more for defense than 




This sort of rhetoric characterized Turkish presentations throughout the period.  During a visit to 
Washington DC six years after the comment above was made to the American ambassador, “the 
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Prime Minister indicated gratitude for aid given in the past, which he felt had been effectively 
utilized by the Turks.”
269
  Shortly thereafter, during President Eisenhower’s visit to Turkey, the 
Turkish Foreign Minister argued that American aid policy ought to favor those small states 
which were “on the line” – that is, “they [were] committed to the West and [were] located in 
contact with the USSR” – because “they [were] in a better position than the uncommitted 
countries to receive and make use of aid.”
270
  In addition to lobbying for additional aid on the 
basis of their effectiveness, the Turkish government also readily adhered to American 
requirements for the placement of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, and “accepted, 
apparently without change, the draft proposed by the United States.”
271
 
 Lest it be thought that this language was purely a function of one regime’s strategy, it is 
worth noting that the regime which replaced it (and executed the officials cited above) used an 
identical approach.  After the coup in 1960, new Turkish President Gursel argued that Turkey 
would require additional military assistance because the previous government had been dishonest 
with NATO, that Turkish forces could not meet the MC-70 force goals, and that “he personally 
wishe[d] to explain [the] situation to Gen. Norstad.”
272
 The assistance that was eventually 
provided seemed to regard this as a negotiating tactic that mixed authentic concern with a bit of 
melodrama and was actually targeted at reforms to the Turkish military that would require 
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significant funds to pay for pensions for a large number of senior officers to be retired from the 
service.  Nonetheless, the language of security transfers between the US and Turkey was 
expressed in terms of MC-70 force requirements, which is to say, it was expressed in terms of 
integration. 
 The United States also understood its policy in terms of the economics of security 
exchanges.  In the words of Eisenhower, “it was much better and cheaper to assist the Turks to 
build up their own armed forces than to create additional U.S. divisions.”
273
  This was a belief he 
maintained throughout the period, and continued to express the power of the American alliance 
strategy in integrative terms.  During his 1959 visit to Turkey, he said (regarding the defense of 
the Free World): “All countries must work together in their own way.  The Turks, for example, 
contribute by maintaining large military forces.”
274
  Based on its perceptions of Turkey’s efforts 
to integrate its defense forces, the US determined that: “In view of Turkey’s special position as a 
staunch ally which has consistently withstood Soviet threats, the U.S. must consider carefully the 
effect of pressures and actions that would offend Turkish pride and adversely effect [sic] this 
basic U.S.-Turkish relationship.”
275
  This concern for the Turkish perspective went so far as to 
structure the nature of security assistance offered by the United States.  Despite the fact that 
President Eisenhower believed that “it was high time to convince the Turks that they must be 
content with a smaller military establishment,” he was nonetheless concerned that up until that 
point “we have been urging the Turks in the past to build up a considerable military 
establishment.  We are now changing our minds about the desirability of such a large Turkish 
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military establishment.  It is nevertheless going to be very hard to tell the Turks to stop.”
276
  
These statements place a value on commitment and continuity that, when combined with the 
economic logic above, powerfully express the logic of great power bargaining with an integrative 
small state.  Because the small state has integrated its forces with the great powers, it yields a 
greater marginal return than a distributed or independent type; because it has accepted some 
vulnerabilities and costs as a result of adhering to great power guidance, there is a reluctance by 
the great power to impose additional costs through policy volatility. 
Conclusion 
   The Turkish case is the most over-determined of the four presented in this chapter.  
Virtually any theory of alliance would predict Turkish alignment with the West against the 
material and ideological threat presented by the USSR.  Moreover, virtually any theory would 
predict that, based on its location, military capability, and overall size, Turkey would be a 
valuable ally sought by both the US and the USSR.  However, with a minimum of additional 
information, I am also able to make predictions about the scope, limitations, and logics of US-
Turkish security transfers. 
 Previously, I discussed how Turkish PSV limited the type of weapons that were 
transferred as a function of the Turkish incapacity to absorb and employ large numbers of high-
technology systems.  But while PSV established a sort of ceiling on aid, this section has 
demonstrated how Turkish commitment and bargaining was able to create a floor.  Turkey’s 
integration with the West through NATO and the Baghdad Pact inspired an American 
commitment to avoid rapid policy shifts, even when those shifts seemed indicated by a purely 
strategic logic.  Because the Turks has been “doing their part,” and hewed closely to the 
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American understanding of the global security environment, aid was consistently maintained, 
slight deviations in policy were overlooked, and policy continuity was maintained.  Moreover, 
the actors on both sides of the bargain understood this dynamic and appealed to it across both 
time and governments. 
 
Iran: Client and Distributed Strategies 
 Iran, like Turkey, faced credible threats of domination by the Soviet Union during the 
1950s.  However, unlike Turkey, the Iranian regime at the time had yet to consolidate its power 
to the extent that it could afford to focus primarily on external threats.  Instead, the Shah’s forces 
and their American advisors were primarily oriented towards internal threats, specifically those 
generated by Soviet-supported groups, during the late 1940s and early 1950s.  However, with the 
end of the Stalin era, the repression of Iran’s communist party, Tudeh, and the development of an 
increasingly powerful and sophisticated repressive apparatus, the Shah became less concerned 
about the threat of Soviet-sponsored movements destabilizing the governments.  Rather, Iran 
turned its attention to non-great power (or, in the terminology used here “regional”) internal 
challenges.  While both the U.S. and Iran perceived an external threat from the Soviet Union, I 
will demonstrate that the specter of a direct Soviet invasion was not foremost in the mind of the 
Shah, nor in the design of the Iranian security apparatus.  In this section, I will seek to 
demonstrate that the Shah understood the primary threat to his regime to be internal-global in the 
immediate aftermath of the Mossadegh coup, that Iran therefore adopted a Client strategy, and 
that Iran’s cooperativeness had a positive impact on the provision of American aid.  Following 
the successful elimination of the Communist threat, Iran then turned against other social 
elements that challenged the regime, and pursued a Distributed strategy.  By the end of the 




period, this shift was being met with disapproval and skepticism by the US, who would have 
preferred a more active integration into CENTO to support its war plans vis a vis the USSR, as 
Security Exchange Theory expects. 
 
Iran, Communism, and Clientalism 
 Iran’s regimes found themselves in a difficult position at the outset of this study.  The 
Pahlavi dynasty had spent its early years slowly consolidating power and bringing the various 
local, tribal, and religious elements within Iran under the control of the state.  This process was 
abruptly reversed by the Soviet and British occupation of Iran during the Second World War, 
during which “the centrifugal forces (political, administrative, religious, tribal, economic) which 
had militated against centralization under the shah again came to the fore.”
277
  As the Shah grew 
weaker, the Soviets simultaneously became bolder, and expressed their disinclination to 
withdraw from northern Iran at the conclusion of the war.  This triggered one of the earliest 




 Although the Mossadegh era only overlaps with the period examined in this study by a 
year or two, it is nonetheless worth discussing for what it reveals about the perils of pursuing 
neutralist strategies by a comparatively weak regime in the face of active great power 
interference.  The United States was aware that Mossadegh was interested in a policy of 
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neutralism, or what would become called non-alignment.
279
  This was a source of irritation, but 
early in the Mossadegh era (and to the great frustration of the British) the US held the view that 
Mossadegh, while not ideal, would stave off a potential Communist revolution.
280
  By 1953, both 
the American administration and its views had changed.  In the wake of Tudeh (the Iranian 
Communist Party) demonstrations in July, the US administration interpreted Mossadegh’s failure 
to crush the organization as an indication of dangerous predilections (or, at the very least, blind 
spots.)
281
  These concerns led the Secretary of State to declare publicly that “Recent 
developments in Iran, especially the growing activity of the illegal Communist party, which 
appears to be tolerated by the Iranian Government have caused us concern.”
282
  Less than a 
month later, Mossadegh was overthrown in a US-sponsored coup, the details of which continue 
to spawn an impressive array of primary sources and secondary literature.  Of particular interest 
to this study is the fact that Mossadegh seems to have badly misapprehended the threats he faced.  
Focusing primarily on the maintenance of civil order and the oil dispute with the British, 
Mossadegh pursued a Distributed security policy and kept loyal troops in their barracks during 




 In the aftermath of the coup, the Shah rejected neutralism and aligned himself with the 
West.  After reestablishing control over the government, the Shah visited the United States in 
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December 1954, and, in a meeting with President Eisenhower, suggested that Soviet ambitions 
meant that Iran was “compelled to keep constantly on guard to prevent or frustrate Communist 
infiltration,” which had been allowed to occur in both the Iranian armed forces and the body 
politic. 
284
 The Shah identified three forms the Communist threat might take: armed invasion, 
internal subversion, or the reduction of the Iranian people to a point of hopelessness.  The first of 
these I classify as an “external” threat, the latter two as “internal.”  In the Shah’s view,  
“one of the essential for preventing international communism from realizing its ambitions with 
regard to Iran is for us with the help of great free nations, particularly the US, to strengthen our 
Armed Forces to the extent that would render them capable of putting up an honorable defense if 
Iran is attacked.  If our forces could possess such a capability, morale would be much higher and 
they would be much less vulnerable to penetration.  The Iranian Government and the Iranian 
people would be sure to stand up more firmly in the face of pressures, threats and attempts at 
Communist infiltration if they had the feeling Iran could resist if attacked, and that the free world 
were interested in Iran being able to put up such resistance and were helping to that end.”
285
 
 What is particularly interesting about the Shah’s rationale is the relationship between the 
external and the internal threats.  Contrast this stance with Turkey’s – whereas Turkey is 
internally stable and has the intention of effectively resisting Soviet invasion, Iran has no such 
pretentions.  Quite to the contrary – Iran is sure that in the event of external attack it will lose.  
Thus, the purpose of the request for aid is not to effectively integrate Iran into a defensive 
concept that supports an externally-focused strategy; rather, the aid simultaneously addresses two 
internal threats to the regime.  First, it placates the armed forces, which the Shah has just 
                                                        
284
 State Department, “Tab A: Ambassador Henderson’s Summary of the Memorandum to be Handed to the 
President By the Shah at the Opening of Their Talk at the White House on December 13,”  in “Memorandum by the 
Acting Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State,” 
Dec 9, 1954, in FRUS 1952-54, Vol. X, 1069. 
285
 Ibid. 




identified as a target of Communist infiltration.  Second, it motivates society, which the Shah 
does not go so far as to accuse of disloyalty, but of apathy. 
 The Shah had good reason to concern himself with Communist infiltration, as only 
months before his meeting with President Eisenhower, the Iranian government had discovered a 
network of 600 Tudeh activists in the Iranian armed forces.  In conjunction with a broader 
campaign of imprisonment and execution of Tudeh leaders, the regime eliminated the network.  
Soon the Tudeh was a spent force: “[a]fter the mid-1950s the Tudeh party survived primarily 
through its organization outside Iran; within the country, the party barely managed to maintain a 
clandestine presence.”
286
  One of the key elements in the regime’s expanding repressive capacity 
was its rapidly professionalizing police and intelligence services.  The US contributed training 
teams for the National Police, and replaced a small military intelligence element with a 
permanent CIA detail that was to train a new intelligence unit.
287
  This unit became an 
independent organization in 1956 and began operating in 1957 under its new name: SAVAK. 
 In this strategy, the Shah followed in his father’s footsteps.  The elder Pahlavi had 
responded to Kurdish unrest in 1942 (in the Soviet controlled areas) by requesting an American 
advisor to take charge of the national gendarme.  This had the salutary effects of getting someone 
else to contribute to a necessary social function and drawing the United States into Iranian affairs 
on the side of the regime, rather than the Soviets or British.
288
  The parallels with the Shah’s 
strategy 15 years later abound.  In the 1950s, the relationship between SAVAK and the CIA 
expanded beyond trainers to include joint operations into the Soviet Union, intelligence sharing, 
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and the establishment of CIA-run listening posts in northern Iran.
289
  This both expanded the 
regime’s ability to suppress communist, nationalist, and religious critics and linked American 
security needs to the expertise and success of the Iranian intelligence service and the forbearance 
of the Shah.
290
  The regime also heavily invested in the military as an instrument of domestic 
oppression.  The Shah, who once said, “I am the Army,” personally hand-picked every officer 
above the rank of major, was deeply involved in military affairs, and, eventually, spent enormous 
sums on cutting-edge military hardware.
291
  And while SAVAK operated an intelligence-
gathering operation, a network of notorious prisons, and possessed some limited coercive 
capacity, the military was utilized repeatedly to augment police forces in quelling large-scale 
demonstrations through mass violence.  It also provided a third of the cabinet officials appointed 
by the Shah in the wake of Mossadegh’s departure. 
 Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the Mossadegh coup, it appears that Shah was deeply 
worried about Communism and, in the wake of late-1940s Stalinist policy, about the threat of 
destabilization supported by the USSR.  That is to say, the leading threat to the regime was of the 
Internal-Global type.  As the theory predicts, the Shah responded by requesting U.S. assistance, 
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reflecting U.S. policy concerns, and molding his forces based on the advice of American 
technical experts; that is to say, the Shah pursued a Client strategy. 
 In the Client strategy, the small state deploys its forces in support of the regime’s security 
from internal threats while attempting to induce security transfers from a great power on the 
basis of its fidelity to the great power’s view of the global situation.  In 1955, Iran did exactly 
that.  Even though the American defensive concept for the region was centered on the Zagros 
mountains (near the Iranian border with Iraq), Iranian security forces remained positioned near 
population centers (which were to be abandoned to the Soviets in the American-planned war).  
This was readily apparent to the American embassy in Tehran, which wrote that “[t]o make best 
use Iran defense capabilities in event Soviet invasion in force, it would be necessary for Iran 
forces to occupy different positions and have their supplies and equipment in different locations 
from present ones.”
292
  Nonetheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed happy with the progress of 
Iranian forces, and expressed their sentiment that “[t]he friendly and cooperative attitude of the 
present Iranian government should be encouraged.  Some recognition should be given to the 
receptiveness of the Iranian armed forces to guidance from the U.S. Mission and MAAG 
personnel and to the marked improvement over the past year in Iran’s ability to receive and 
utilize MDAP equipment.”
293
  The embassy shared the Joint Chiefs’ optimism, and while they 
expressed concern that the Iranian “Army is carrying a greater portion of the burden of the 
internal security effort than is compatible with concentration upon its regular duties or in the 
long term with the interests of the country” it nonetheless cheerfully noted that “[t]he Iranian 
Army with military aid already programmed can bring to bear adequate force to cope with 
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insurrection on any foreseeable scale if there is no coincident external military threat.”
294
  Thus, 
the evidence indicates that the US government was consistent in its evaluations across agencies.  
Although it found that the Iranian Army was not yet able to perform a useful role in contributing 
to regional defense, it was pleased with Iranian willingness to heed American advice and the 
Iranian ability to maintain internal stability with American assistance.  Despite the Shah’s 
“sensitive and mercurial” nature, the US felt it important in this period to encourage his policy 




Growing Internal Unrest, the Distributed Strategy, and the American Response 
 The US remained patient with the Shah during tough negotiations over Iran’s accession 
to the Baghdad Pact, an official visit by the Shah to Moscow, and various small agreements 
reached between Iran and the Soviet Union.  Nonetheless, by the middle of 1956, local embassy 
officials began to notice that the Shah’s needs extended beyond simply suppression of the Tudeh 
– the fact that he “oscillate[d] between military dictatorship, cynicism and cowardice” meant that 
“[p]olitical elements of all stripes” held the “fervent wish that the Shah would withdraw from 
active leadership.”
296
  The embassy presented a range of options, from a gradual reduction of 
support to the Shah in anticipation of the need to build “cooperation with other elements which 
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may take over political leadership” to “creating military forces which [could] maintain the Shah 
in power despite his political weakness.”
297
  This view percolated upwards, and in the 1957 
National Intelligence Estimate it was reported that “Iranian military and security forces, 
numbering some 168,000 officers and men, are presently organized, equipped, and deployed 
primarily for internal security duties.”
298
  These forces were necessary because the Shah “made 
little progress in coping with the fundamental causes of discontent that gave strength to the 
ultranationalists and Communists in the Mossadeq era” and, thus, was “unsuccessful in 
developing a solid basis of popular support and [had] in fact lost ground in this regard since the 
events of 1953.”
299
  The threats to the regime could no longer be ascribed to Soviet interference, 
since “criticism of the regime … exist[ed] in virtually all elements of the politically conscious 
public both in Tehran and in the provinces, including even those closely associated with the 
regime.”
300
  In the words of the embassy, even as the Shah became increasingly autocratic and 
grandiose, it was nonetheless the case that “[b]oth the Shah and his officers realize[d] that he 
relie[d] on the Army to keep him in power.”
301
 
 In terms of the present theory, 1957 was a key transition year.  The Iranian regime, 
having gained control of the state apparatus and eliminated the threat posed by Soviet-inspired 
dissidents, turned its attention to the threat posed by society.  In the same moment, there was a 
temporary thaw in Iran-Soviet relations, Iran joined the Baghdad Pact, and the US nuclear 
arsenal became robust enough to begin contemplating a defense of the Elburz, rather than the 
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Zagros, mountains.  Iran remained internally focused, albeit on a broader array of potential 
opponents; this necessitated the adoption of a Distributed rather than an Integrated or Client 
strategy.  This strategy is observed in the archival data presented – Iran had not created forces 
designed to oppose a Soviet invasion (as it would in an Integrated approach) nor was the Shah as 
amenable to US direction and advice (as in the Client approach.)  Ceteris paribus, the theory 
would then predict a reduction in aid.  However, in the same moment that Iran was becoming 
difficult it was also becoming more important and its forces were growing more capable.  This, 
then, exerted pressure on the US in the opposite direction – given Iran’s higher PSV, it should 
receive more aid, not less. 
 The key to assessing the effect of Iran’s strategic shift is to complement the Causal 
Process Observations regarding its PSV and aid policy discussed in chapter four with a further 
set of observations regarding the Shah’s requests for assistance.  Bearing in mind that when Iran 
was employing a Client strategy in 1954-6, the Shah was given aid over and above military 
requirements in order to reward his cooperativeness; therefore, any dramatic shifts in tone from 
1957-61 or a reluctance to reward the Shah’s behavior would seem to demonstrate the 
plausibility of Security Exchange Theory. 
 The Shah’s requests for US security transfers continued unabated, and as the American 
embassy in Iran “reported several times before the Shah’s primary interest [was] in military 
aid.”
302
  He even hinted darkly that, absent a dramatic increase in Iranian military capabilities 
analogous to Turkey’s, he might have to reconsider his participation in the Baghdad Pact.
303
  
Both of these strategies had been successful previously, but by the end of 1957 they were met 
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with the bureaucratic equivalent of a sigh.  Following the meeting with the Shah, the embassy 
wrote Washington that “Iranian military forces are of course necessary for internal control but 
Shah admits present level of forces are more than adequate for this purpose,” and that the 
“Shah’s interest in military forces is in part emotional rather than logical.”
304
  Given that the US 
would “not be able to increase military assistance Iran and since any level of increase military 
assistance would not completely satisfy the Shah’s appetite” the embassy advised seeking “other 
ways” to “persuade Shah of constancy of US support, while at same time disabuse[ing] him of 
notion that US has not lived up to its promises.”
305
  The same tone and content was echoed a 
month later by the Secretary of State in a letter to President Eisenhower about his visit to Tehran, 
in which he derisively notes that the “Shah, who considers himself a military genius,” is 
demanding a military that would “throw an increased economic burden upon the country and 
further unbalance and already unbalanced budget.”
306
 
 The trend of expressions of concern over the “inordinate demands for additional military 
assistance from the Shah of Iran” continued across all levels of the American defense and 
diplomatic establishment through mid-1958.
307
  Combined with this irritation was a frustration of 
the Shah’s “marked reluctance to accept U.S. advice” leading to an American perception of a 
“decline in the stability of the Shah’s regime and of his utility in the achievement of our 
objectives.”
308
  This general demeanor toward the Shah was abruptly reversed that summer by 
the confluence of two important events.  First, the Shah had a successful visit with President 
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Eisenhower, who called the Secretary of State immediately afterwards and informed him that he 
found the Shah “fairly convincing” and appreciated “his clear comprehension of the relationship 
between economy and military strength and that military strength must be gauged by 
economy.”
309
  The Shah had wisely taken the opportunity to emphasize both the conventional 
threat posed by a Soviet land invasion of Iran and the renewed efforts at Communist subversion, 
thereby reflecting the American worldview.
310
  As my theory predicts, this had the effect of 
building the confidence of the great power in the small state’s strategic acuity.  Second, less than 
three weeks after the Shah’s visit to Washington, the pro-Western government of Iraq was 
overthrown in a bloody coup that caused grave concerns amongst American policy-makers about 
the possible spread of Communism in the Middle East.
311
  President Eisenhower felt sufficiently 
moved by the events to instruct the American embassy to deliver a verbatim message from him 
to the Shah in which he observed that the Shah “indicated [his] belief that there should at this 
time be additional strengthening of the Iranian armed forces beyond that already contemplated” 
and goes on to inform the Shah that he has “already directed that the delivery of a wide range of 
equipment for your present forces be further accelerated and [he was] prepared to provide your 
armed forces with additional training assistance on a selected but intensified basis.”
312
 
 Within a month, however, the basic critique of the Shah’s regime that was interrupted by 
the events of June and July began to resurface.  A Special National Intelligence Estimate charged 
                                                        
309
 State Department, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of 
State Dulles,” Jun. 30, 1958, in FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XII, 569. 
310
 State Department, “Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower,” Jun. 30, 1958, in FRUS 1958-
1960, Vol. XII, 566. 
311
 This concern was not particularly warranted, for reasons I will discuss below.  Nonetheless, it drove American 
policy in the Middle East for the next two years. 
312
 State Department, “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran,” Jul. 19, 1958, in FRUS 
1958-1960, Vol XII Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Edward C. Keefer, ed. (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1993), 575-6.  This build-up had the effect of expanding Iran’s armed forces by about 
37,000 men, along with associated equipment, and accelerating the delivery of various advance aircraft and other 
weapons.  see State Department, “Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination 
(Barnes) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon),” Jul. 24, 1958, in FRUS 1958-1960, 
Vol XII, 579.   




with examining the Shah’s stability found “basic and widespread dissatisfaction with his regime” 
and “his character and situation are such that he is unlikely” to undertake major reforms; thus, 
while the American intelligence community believed “a coup unlikely in the immediate future, 
because … the army does not now desire it,” in the absence of significant reforms “the 
overthrow of the monarchy is likely.”
313
  Nonetheless, American policy-makers were sufficiently 
shaken by the prospect of revolution that they gave up on the idea of actively seeking alternatives 
to the Shah and chose a policy of constructive engagement.
314
  The Shah, for his part, became 
more amenable to American advice and continued raising the specter of Tudeh and other forms 
of communist infiltration.  That said, even in light of the increased American commitment the 
Shah remained “basically dissatisfied with the U.S.-recommended levels for the Iranian armed 
forces” and continued to confront the U.S. with “a major problem in attempting both to dissuade 
the Shah from embarking upon excessive military programs and, at the same time, to encourage 
Iran’s participation in the Baghdad Pact through assistance to the Iranian armed forces.”
315
 
 By 1959, the fundamental tensions that had been briefly masked by the events of the 
previous summer had re-emerged.  The Shah’s demands for additional security transfers from the 
US led him to threaten to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union.  This was deeply irritating 
the US, which felt that it had moved to its maximal offer with the aid promised by President 
Eisenhower’s note, which was subsequently delivered.
316
  Iran eventually rejected the Soviet 
Treaty of Friendship and signed a bilateral agreement with the US.  President Eisenhower made a 
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visit to Tehran, and again the Shah imprecated him for more aid, this time in the form of airfields 
and aircraft.
317
  While the President continued to hold a relatively positive view of the Shah, 
U.S.-Iranian relations entered a pattern of begrudging acceptance.  The Shah continued to make 
demands on the US for security transfers, but the US, recognizing the Shah’s limited exit 
options, the path-dependency of US support up to that point, and the limits of the Iranian military 
to absorb additional aid, simply continued to execute the planned levels of expenditure.  
Concurrently, the CIA training mission for SAVAK begins to wind down, and was removed in 




Security Transfers to Iran and the Impact of Client Strategies 
 As predicted, when Iran focused its efforts on suppressing Communism and seemed to be 
willing to follow the advice of American advisors, the US was willing to consider additional 
support to the Shah beyond that dictated by a strict security calculation to be a worthwhile 
expense in support of a valued ally.  Even though Iranian forces were not ideally deployed to 
support American plans for defense of the region, the fact that they listened, or, in terms of the 
theory, adopted a Client strategy, generated additional security transfers.  By contrast, as the 
Shah shifted to a Distributed approach, the US national security apparatus became disillusioned, 
and limited the rate of security transfers to that dictated by Iran’s capacity to absorb the 
additional capabilities.  The historical evidence supports the hypothesis that great powers prefer 
small states to view their threat environments in global rather than regional terms.  While the 
extent of the effect of this great power preference cannot be quantified precisely, observing the 
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causal process posited by my theory in both the Iran and Turkish case indicates that policy-
makers explicitly consider the extent to which small states share their understanding of the threat 
environment and act on     the advice and strategic intentions of the great power.  Thus, it is 
reasonable to conclude that, ceteris paribus, Client and Integrated strategies by small states will 
induce larger security transfers from great powers. 
 
Iran: An epilogue 
 While it lies outside the scope of the cases under scrutiny in this chapter, given the scale 
of the security transfers Iran eventually received from the United States, the spectacular nature of 
the regime’s collapse, and the on-going drama of American-Iranian relations, it seems important 
to discuss the rest of the story.  The negative trends in the American assessments of the Shah 
discussed above continued into the Kennedy administration, abated in the Johnson 
administration, and then sharply reversed themselves under Nixon.  Gaining a rough 
understanding of why this is the case is important not simply for historical interest, but for what 
it illuminates about the strengths and weaknesses of my theory. 
 At the beginning of the Kennedy administration, it was quite clear to American planners 
that major structural reforms were required to ensure the longevity of the Shah’s regime.  
Concerned with loss of allied regimes to revolutions from within, Kennedy embarked on a global 
initiative to induce friendly illiberal regimes to begin top-down reforms of the security sectors, 
economy, and political practices.  In Latin America, this was known as the Alliance for Peace, 
and a similar program was suggested for Iran.  Under pressure from the US, the Shah 
begrudgingly accepted the necessity for some sort of policy shift and reluctantly appointed a 
reformist Prime Minister named Amini; however, Amini’s favor with the Kennedy 




administration worked against him, and the Shah successfully engineered his removal from 
power.  Still needing to placate the US, the Shah began a process of land reform and education 
known as the White Revolution.
319
 
 This resulted in a series of social dislocations and challenges to the regime, which 
culminated in a series of protests in 1963 and 1964 that the Shah brutally repressed.  However, at 
this point Kennedy had been assassinated and Johnson was proving to be far more tolerant of the 
Shah’s exercise of force and reduced the pressure to reform throughout the 1960s even as 
American security transfers expanded.  The reasons for this are varied, but one of them is 
certainly the fact that American involvement in Vietnam was deepening and the need for stable 
clients seemed more pressing.
320
  Another is that an expanding oil sector was supporting arms 
purchases by the Shah, reducing the cost of such transfers to the United States (who suffered the 
opportunity costs of losing control of the equipment, but not an additional monetary cost.)
321
 
 While the flow of American security transfers to Iran may have increased in the 1960s, in 
1972 Nixon and Kissinger completely opened the floodgates.  Against the advice of the 
American national security establishment, Iran was allowed unlimited access to the American 
inventory, subject only to the discretion of the Shah.
322
  The purpose of this change in policy was 
to support the Two Pillars strategy for ensuring the security of the Persian Gulf, in which Iran 
would provide a military bulwark against Soviet aggression without the need for direct 
involvement of American forces.  Security transfers then commenced on a truly massive scale, 
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with a more than sevenfold increase in Iranian military expenditures from 1972 to 1979.
323
  “By 
1975, the shah had the largest Navy in the Persian Gulf, the largest air force in Western Asia, and 
the fifth largest army in the whole world.”
324
  The alteration to the security relationship between 
Iran and the United States was so fundamental as a result of this unprecedented decision that it 
persisted beyond the Nixon/Kissenger era and until the eventual demise of the regime.
325
 
 This sequence of events highlights both the strengths and weaknesses of my theory.  On 
the one hand, it is clear that changing security postures vis a vis their rival’s structure great 
power decision-making as regards security transfers.  Kennedy and Johnson, who were 
concerned about internal threats, supported policies of reform and repression, respectively.  
Nixon and Kissinger, in alignment with a general policy of “Vietnamization” which leveraged 
the capabilities of local proxies in conventional wars, decided to expand Iran’s high-technology 
military capacity.  Both of these calculations were made in terms of the stability of the client, the 
security needs of America in the Persian Gulf, and the availability (politically or militarily) of 
American forces to intervene and reverse adverse outcomes.  On the other hand, it is clear that 
my theory suffers from the same limitations incurred by all general theorizations that depend on 
structural considerations and orderly, rational decision-making.  Namely, the bounded rationality 
of individual decision-makers creates noise in the data that may overwhelm the variation 
accounted for by the theory.  The secondary literature is unanimous that Nixon and Kissinger 
acted against the professional advice of both the defense and diplomatic bureaucracies, and then 
subsequently thwarted attempts by the bureaucracy to undertake policy reviews after the fact.  
While not clairvoyant in every respect, the American national security apparatus consistently 
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generated the prediction that, given the ability purchase unlimited arms, the Shah would wreck 
his economy and trigger unrest and revolution.  In previous administrations, this was sufficient to 
deter such a policy; in the Nixon administration, it was not.  There is no obvious theoretical 
solution to this problem – rather, it merely highlights the fact that my theory works better for 
states with defense bureaucracies that achieve more comprehensive rationality and undertake 
orderly and consistent policy-making and is less effective for autocratic, erratic, or vainglorious 
leaders. 
   
Iraq: Distributed Strategies 
 Unlike Turkey and Iran, Iraq was never occupied or directly threatened by the Soviet 
Union during World War II and the early Cold War.  Further, unlike the Turks and Persians to 
the north, the politics of Iraq during the 1950s were structured by, and responded to, the 
examples and interferences of other regional actors.  The vulnerability of the regime to threats 
from within and the lack of obvious great power interference led Iraq under both the Hashemite 
monarchy and Qasim’s revolutionary regime to pursue Distributed strategies.  That is to say, 
Iraq’s security apparatus was not optimized to address threats from abroad, nor did it integrate 
itself into a single great power command structure, nor did it hew closely to the dictates of great 
power advice.  Of course, like the Shah, Iraqi leaders occasionally sought to portray themselves 
as worthy clients that aspired to an integrated defense posture; however, just as with Iran, 
American and Soviet policy-makers were able to determine the motivations of their erstwhile 
ally and adjust their security transfers accordingly. 
 
 





The Enemy Within: Threats to the Hashemite Monarchy 1952-58 
 From its birth in 1921, the Hashemite monarchy struggled to gain control over Iraq and 
its territory.  In the words of King Faisal I, “In Iraq, there is still – and I say this with a heart full 
of sorrow – no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic 
idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to 
evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever.”
326
  
Gaining mastery over this fractious and unruly (but well-armed) bunch required the creation of 
an army powerful enough to crush the tribal uprisings that erupted throughout the 1920s and 30s.  
This was accomplished through a rapid expansion of the state, the support of the British, and the 
ruthlessness of the new Iraqi generals.  However, in addressing the threat posed by the society, 
the regime constituted a new threat posed by the state.  The officer corps became increasingly 
emboldened in carrying out coups against Prime Ministers, until in April 1941 they overthrew 
the monarchy itself.
327
  Unfortunately for the new rulers, they chose to contest the British right to 
use Iraq to support their war effort, were invaded and quickly overcome by the United Kingdom, 
and were ushered out of power only two months after they seized it.
328
 
 The return of the monarchy under the protection of the British also signaled the return of 
their powerful courtier, Nuri al-Said, who served variously as cabinet minister, Prime Minister, 
kingmaker, and power behind the throne for most of the next two decades.  A cunning politician 
with a strong authoritarian streak, Nuri sought to modernize Iraqi society, bring the army to heel, 
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and propel Iraq to a position of dominance in the Arab world.  At the outset of this study, in 
1952, his project was well underway.  He had developed a philosophy of a single party state, had 
begun to introduce military reforms as Minister of Defense, and was on his way to obtaining 
more favorable terms from the British on both oil concessions and treaty obligations.
329
 
 The regime’s relationship with Iraqi society was complicated.  While it had spent the 
1920s and 30s quelling tribal uprisings and trying to dismantle tribal power, in the aftermath of 
the coups during the 1940s and the development of “the intensely leftist or intensely nationalist 
intelligentsia allied with the urban masses” the regime and tribal organizations made common 
cause.
330
  The leftists were able to find a home in the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), which was 
suppressed in the 1940s but reemerged in the 1950s and gave special attention to mobilizing in 
Shi’a areas.
331
  In the fall of 1952, when this case study begins, the ICP coordinated protests in 
Baghdad so extensive that the Army was called out to subdue them.  While the ICP began 
fragmenting by the mid-1950s, it nonetheless aroused Nuri’s ire sufficiently to find itself banned 
and the object of special scrutiny.  Also emergent in the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution was 
an intense nationalism which found expression in Ba’athism and the Arabization of the ICP.
332
 In 
reaction to the Suez Crisis of 1956 the ICP was again able to mobilize large protests, this time in 
Najaf, which overwhelmed the police and again required the intervention of the army.
333
  In 
1957, the ICP combined with Ba’ath and other leftist / nationalist organizations to form the 
National United Front, which “marked a qualitative change in the political situation.  It at least 
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 Given the political involvement of the military in the previous decades and the example 
of the Egyptian revolution, it is hardly surprising that the “idea of a blow by the army was in the 
early fifties in the air, so to say.”
335
  While the ICP had long been active in the army “they 
progressed, principally, among the common soldiers and noncommissioned officers.”
336
  Thus, in 
1952 a Major named Rif’at al-Hajj Sirri formed the Free Officers, a clandestine organization 
motivated by Arab nationalism and inspired by the Egyptian organization of the same name that 
had just seized power from King Farouq.
337
  Sirri was investigated and punitively transferred in 
1956, but the organization was not effectively suppressed.  In part, as will be discussed in more 
detail below, this stemmed from Nuri’s belief that he had the military under his control after his 
tenure as Minister of Defense.  Yet while he “succeeded among the most senior officers … the 
reaction amongst a number of the junior and middling officers was quite different.”
338
  In 1958, 
these Free Officers, led by Brigadier General Karim Qasim, overthrew the monarchy established 
a new regime. 
 From 1952 to 1958, the monarchy faced serious threats from society and the state.  Nuri 
managed these political challenges in a variety of ways – allowing free elections, banning all 
parties, creating independent agencies, shuffling allies, resigning in protest, suppressing dissent, 
etc.  While he had regional ambitions relative to external powers, he did not seem especially 
concerned about the physical invasion.  However, after the Egyptian revolution, he was very 
concerned about the impact of Arab nationalism on the internal threats to his regime.  The 
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challenge for Nuri was that he simultaneously harbored ambitions for a leadership role in the 
Middle East, needed to maintain domestic support for reform projects, and held a belief that the 
“there was nothing odd about the notion of cooperation with the West,” which was “a natural, if 
not inevitable requisite.”
339
  Since the British had oil concessions and defense interests in Iraq, a 
sudden breach would likely have had deleterious effects on Iraqi access to Western support 
necessary to complete a wide variety of development projects; however, continued cooperation 
with the West in an era of Arab nationalism created an opportunity for the Egyptian mobilization 
of domestic opposition to the Iraqi regime. 
 Egypt seized this opportunity with gusto.  After Iraq signed a treaty with Turkey in 1954 
that seemed to move Iraq away from the cause of Arab neutralism and Egyptian leadership and 
towards the west, Cairo launched a blistering radio attack on the anniversary of famous riots that 
had scuttled an earlier treaty with Britain in 1948.  “Implicit in the vilification [sic] of Nuri in 
that broadcast was a thinly veiled incitement to the Iraqi public to repeat the Portsmouth riots and 
cause the rejection of the proposed Turkish-Iraqi Agreement and the downfall of Nuri.”
340
  These 
attacks continued throughout the process in which the Baghdad Pact (discussed in Chapter 4) 
was negotiated and signed.  While Nuri was publicly confident, he also urgently requested “as 
quickly as possible, from the United States, radio equipment powerful enough to match radio 
Cairo.”
341
  Therefore, in terms of the theory, the threat facing the Iraqi regime was internal and 
regional. 
 
                                                        
339
 Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact.  (New York: E.J. 
Brill, 1995), 30. see also Waldemar Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1954-
1958, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), 29. 
340
 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, 38.  see also Lord Birdword, Nuri As-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership, 
(London: Cassell, 1959), 232. 
341
 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, 49. 






Balancing the Threats: Iraq’s Distributed Strategy 
 My theory predicts that, faced with internal threats that are not strongly supported by a 
great power, small states will adopt a Distributed strategy.  Unlike an Integrated or an 
Independent strategy, the military apparatus of the state is not optimized to preserve its territorial 
integrity from external threats.  Unlike the Client strategy, the small state employs its coercive 
capacity against a breadth of opponents and outside the ideological language of great power 
rivalry.  In the case of Iraq between 1952-58, this took two forms.  First, Nuri undertook purges 
and payoffs to gain control of the military.  Second, the newly loyal military was held in reserve 
away from the major cities and used to quell disturbances that overwhelmed the police. 
 As Minister of Defense, and later as Prime Minister, Nuri attempted to regain mastery of 
the officer corps through “promotions, fat salaries, grants of land, and other privileges.”
342
  Nuri 
had been a soldier himself and took an active interest in equipping the forces of public order in 
both the army and the police.
343
  He also used the procurement of arms to political effect in the 
society at large, noting in a radio address before the 1957 annual military parade that spectators 
“could expect to see weapons on parade such as were possessed exclusively by the modern 
armies of the United States and Britain.  Many more of this sort were on their way or awaiting 
shipment.”
344
  While Lord Birdwood, his biographer, rather patronizingly noted that “[t]he 
delight of a child may have been discernable in his enthusiasm” it was nevertheless the case that 
Nuri’s “firm direction which had produced such a display could look for its reward in a general 
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sense of confidence restored at home and abroad.”
345
  That said, the modern armaments that the 
regime obtained from the West were not arrayed according to a strictly military logic.  In fact, 
“Nuri … made sure to keep the powerful units out of Baghdad and without ammunition for their 
weapons,”
346
 which is an inadvisable strategy if facing a foreign adversary and eminently 
sensible if living under the threat of coup.  Beyond controlling ammunition stockpiles, “the 
government had up its sleeve a contingency plan envisaging the systematic destruction of defiles, 
bridges, bottlenecks, and so on, to forestall a coup d’état and ‘freeze’ the army in its barracks.”
347
  
Again, even as Nuri paid off army leaders and used to the army to deal with threats from society, 
he also tolerated substantial costs to military efficiency to protect the regime against threats from 
the state.  Put differently, Iraq pursued a Distributed strategy in response to an internal-regional 
threat, just as my theory predicts. 
 
Skepticism and Limitation: the American Response 
 The American ambassador to Iraq in the mid-1950s, Waldemar Gallman, identifies three 
possible goals for American military aid in his memoir:   
One was to concentrate on equipping an Iraqi force capable of taking part in a general war.  A 
second was to disregard this, but aim at building up a force intended primarily to do no more 
than maintain internal order during a general conflict.  The third possible course might have been 
to disregard these objectives and frankly concentrate on building a force for purely political ends, 
showy enough in types of equipment to have bolstered Nuri with his own people and to have 
impressed his neighbors at the same time.
348
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While Gallman may have preferred the third alternative, both my theoretical expectation and the 
empirical data indicate that great powers transfer security goods on the basis of their utility in 
what Gallman calls “a general conflict.”  Indeed, it was precisely the fact that American planners 
discerned that military aid to Iraq would be allocated according to a domestic political logic that 
they limited such transfers to the minimum necessary to achieve the desired military effect. 
 In 1952, the US began moving away from the paradigm in which the UK was given 
specific responsibility for the West’s policy in Iraq, referring to such arrangements as “galling in 
the extreme to the Iraqis” and “anachronistic in light [of the Middle East Command, a precursor 
to the Baghdad Pact] concept.”
349
  Given the American ambition to create an integrated defense 
structure for the defense of the Middle East, the decision was made to utilize aid as a “bargaining 
lever to bring Iraq into the MEC.”
350
  The Iraqi government correctly discerned US priorities, 
and expressed their concern about “how very vulnerable their country was to a Soviet attack 
coming through Persia.”
351
  Thwarting such an attack would require the development of Iraqi 
forces, which would in turn require American funding, and “Nuri emphasized the precedent of 
arms and funds given to Turkey and that such aid had been given prior to Turkey’s participation 




To a limited degree, these arguments succeeded, and Iraq was considered, alongside 
Syria, for an aid package designed to protect it from Communist attack in the form of “a limited 
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amount of military aid to strengthen the internal security of friendly regimes.”
353
  Nonetheless, 
even though the aid would be distributed bilaterally, the US remained committed to regional 
security arrangements, in this case among the Northern Tier states.
354
  When such a commitment 
appeared to waver in the face of blistering attacks from Cairo, which led the Iraqi government to 
temporarily disavow any potential agreements with the West, Turkey, or Pakistan, Secretary 
Dulles informed the embassy in Baghdad that the “whole policy regarding military assistance to 
the Middle East [was] based on concept of collective security” and that even though the US was 
“willing to consider military aid to Iraq without insisting upon adherence to any regional defense 
pact” it was nonetheless “counting upon at least a clear-cut public recognition by Iraq of her 
interest in regional defense against outside aggression and her willingness to cooperate with 
other states who also see the danger.”
355
  The negotiations for military aid to Iraq were then 
suspended until the Iraqi government assuaged concerns about the limits of its anti-Communism. 
The issue facing Iraq was that Nuri was famously “adept” at “tailoring his argument to fit [the] 
listener on hand.”
356
  Thus, despite its slow acceptance of regional defense, the US remained 
somewhat skeptical of Iraqi intentions.  As became the case in Iran in the late 1950s, the Iraqi 
government tended to request higher-profile items than the “vehicles, signaling equipment, etc.” 
that were programmed, while the US maintained that the creation of an effective Iraqi army 
required “the supply of a number of items which had little ‘glamour’ attached to them but were 
nevertheless indispensible.”
357
  Put in terms of my theory, while the language Iraq used signaled 
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a Client strategy with aspirations to Integration, its actions were read by the US as neither.  
Rather, the Iraq regime was understood to have adopted a Distributed approach, and thus was not 
given the benefit of the doubt in terms of either the type or the timing of security assistance that 
it received. 
This skepticism is expressed most clearly in the internal American assessment of Iraq 
motivations for signing the defense agreement with Turkey that had been such a priority for Sec. 
Dulles and US regional policy: 
Iraqi cooperation in the regional defense sphere will continue to be influenced by 
a number of motives other than that of developing an effective defense 
arrangement.  Although Iraq’s signature of a defense agreement with Turkey 
reflected some appreciation of the Soviet military threat, it was largely motivated 
by such collateral factors as: (a) the desire to replace the old Anglo-Iraqi Treaty 
with an arrangement more acceptable to nationalist sentiment; (b) the wish to 
promote Syro-Iraqi union; (c) the recognition that some positive step toward area 
defense was necessary to obtain further US military aid; (d) the wish to increase 





Despite taking the actions required by the US, the Iraqi government received little forbearance.  
For example, in the aftermath of the transfer of Soviet aircraft to Syria, Iraq requested Western 
fighters.
359
  But other than the training of Iraqi pilots, the US demurred on the transfer of aircraft; 
in fact, President Eisenhower determined that one helpful course of action would be to improve 
the quality of allied regional air coverage by “re-equpping a Turkish squadron with the latest 
type interceptors.”
360
  The stated Iraqi force procurement goals were, in the short term included 
“3 squadrons of jet fighter aircraft, 100 M-24 tanks … [and] equipment for a third division, in 
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addition to the equipment for two divisions currently being supplied under MDAP [a US aid 
program]” with the long-term objective of creating “six Army divisions and a nine squadron (one 
group) Air Force.”
361
  The American response in 1957 was to allocate “24 M-24 tanks and 
various combat vehicles,” provide “5 additional pilot training spaces,” and accept the possibility 
of forming additional Iraqi units, which the Iraqis would be expected to pay for, given the 
American inability to “provide equipment these forces on grant basis.”
362
  To the irritation of 
both the Iraqi government and the American ambassador in Baghdad, the US remained steadfast 
in its commitment to resist aid requests that exceed its assessment of Iraqi needs.
363
 
 The archival evidence indicates that Iraq was treated more like Iran during its Distributed 
strategy period than Turkey.  The US did transfer security resources to Iraq, but in accordance to 
a strictly military strategic logic that remained focused on the threat from the Soviet Union at the 
expense of other regional and domestic political considerations.  This notion was clearly 
illustrated in the American response to Iraqi requests for aircraft – while the threat from the north 
could be adequately addressed by Turkish squadrons, this was hardly an acceptable solution in 
terms of the Iraqi regime’s needs.  The national security apparatus was informed of this fact by 
both Iraqi and State Department sources, so it wasn’t ignorant of these concerns; it was simply 
indifferent to them.  This reinforces the findings from the Iranian case; the US extends its 
forbearance and extra resources to states that either integrate themselves completely into 
American strategic concepts or accept tutelage in security affairs and it does not do so vis a vis 
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states that refuse to do either.  This is not to say that such states do not receive any security 
exchanges, only that offers to them are driven by the logic of Perceived Strategic Value. 
 
The Enemy Within: Threats to the Qasim Regime and the Soviet Response 1958-61 
On 14 July 1958, the young King of Iraq, the Crown Prince, the ladies of the 
Palace, the Prime Minister and his son, and several foreigners were killed.  The 
British Embassy was burned and looted.  The Hashemite monarchy, established 
by the British nearly forty years before on the ruins of the Turkish Empire and 
bound by allegiance to Britain was overthrown.  The romance of early Anglo-
Arabism, the special relationship born of archaeology and the coincidence of war-
time interests, pictured in Allenby’s capture of Jerusalem and the contrived entry 
of Feisal I into Damascus, incarnate in those more than life-size figures of the 
romantic period, Lawrence, Gertrude Bell, Percy Cox, was finally shattered in the 
ruins of the British Embassy in Baghdad. 
-Baron Humphrey Trevelyan, British Ambassador to Iraq 1958-1961
364
 
 This rather vivid description of the day that brought Gen. Karim Qasim to the head of a 
new Iraqi regime in 1958 captures the many of the internationally significant elements of the 
coup: the old monarchy and its courtiers were utterly destroyed, the old relationship with the UK 
was severed, and Iraqi withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, which transferred its headquarters to 
Ankara and renamed itself CENTO.  As discussed previously, this inspired a deep antipathy from 
the British towards Qasim, and they proposed a joint invasion to Eisenhower in the immediate 
aftermath of the coup. 
365
  The US, while it declined to participate in armed regime change in 
1958, was nonetheless concerned about the fact that Qasim allowed known Communist 
sympathizers into his initial revolutionary government.
366
  However, it promptly recognized the 
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new government and went about the creation of a new strategy to deal with the radically altered 
situation. 
 As my theory expects, great powers see the world in terms of their security imperatives, 
and in the next year, both the Soviet Union and the United States assessed the Qasim regime in 
the language of the Cold War.  The United States came to understand that Qasim himself was not 
a Communist, and reflected this fact in communications from the embassy
367
 and within 
Washington.
368
  Nonetheless, Qasim’s tolerance of the Iraqi Communist Party moved CIA 
Director Allen Dulles characterized Qasim as “in the hands of the Communist mob” at a meeting 
of the National Security Council.
369
  As events continued to unfold, the US despondently forecast 
that 1959 would be the “year of the bear in Iraq.”
370
 
 By contrast, the Soviets were initially quite excited by Qasim.  In the two weeks after the 
revolution, and encouraged by Nasser, Khrushchev directed the creation of a plan to “outfit two 
Iraqi infantry divisions with Soviet equipment … on a crash schedule with everything in Iraqi 
hands in a month’s time.”
371
  Over Nasser’s objections, this agreement was concluded on a 
bilateral basis and the equipment was shipped through the Syria port of Latakia.  Within a month 
of the revolution, Khrushchev expressed the feeling that, while no one could predict Iraq’s 
trajectory with certainty, he was happy with Iraq’s willingness to “followed Moscow’s 
recommendation” and “take Soviet advice.”
372
  However, both the Soviets and Americans were 
soon to discover that Qasim’s strategic logic was structured by regional and domestic threats, not 
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grand narratives of superpower conflict.  Like the US and Iran, the quick burst of Soviet 
enthusiasm quickly gave way to a sober assessment of Iraq’s commitment to global security 
objectives. 
 Karim Qasim rode into Baghdad on an armored brigade and a wave of revolutionary 
enthusiasm; the coup was to usher in a new pluralist era in which Iraqis would work together to 
propel the nation to the vanguard of the Arab world. 
373
  Qasim expressed a vision for unified, 
powerful, and modernizing Iraq, but led by a single leader (himself) who embodied the very 
essence of the nation, pithily expressed in Arabic as “Maku zaim, illa Karim” – there is no leader 
other than Karim.
374
  Being the Sole Leader necessitated the removal of rival centers of power, 
beginning with allies that vied for popular affection and extending to political parties, tribal 
organizations, and other social formations.  While internationally Qasim disputed with Iran and 
rather futility rattled his saber at Kuwait, the role of the military in his policy-making was 
limited.  However, domestically the Iraqi armed forces found themselves pressed into service 
against a Kurdish uprising, a coup attempt, and several incidents of mass violence.  Qasim 
himself was nearly assassinated by Ba’ath plotters and spent the majority of his tenure gaining 
control of both the Iraqi state and Iraqi society. 
 Although Iraq remained the fractious and unruly society lamented by King Faisal 30 
years earlier, Qasim’s difficulties were compounded by the active involvement of an emerging 
regional adversary in the form of Egypt’s Nasser.  While Nasser originally supported Qasim and 
helped smooth his introduction to the Soviet Union,
375
 he became disillusioned with Qasim’s 
Iraqi nationalism and refusal to recognize Egyptian leadership.  He then embarked on a 
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campaign of subversion which was tracked closely by the American government.  President 
Eisenhower was informed of coup plots in Iraq backed by Egypt,
 376
 the State Department 
communicated their support of Nasser’s efforts to Egypt,
 377
 and the National Security Council 
contemplated ways to “discreetly lend Nasser encouragement and assistance recognizing that the 
United States is severely handicapped … and that the problem should be approached through 
indigenous forces.”
378
  Thus, in the estimation of contemporaneous American documents, the US 
did not interfere in Iraqi politics directly, although Egypt certainly did.  Therefore, the chief 
threat to Qasim’s regime was of the internal-regional type, just as was the case for his 
predecessor. 
 The Soviet leadership initially interpreted Qasim’s cautious neutrality, commitment to the 
stability of the global oil markets, and tolerance of (as opposed to alignment with) the 
Communist Party as evidence that their prudent advice had been heeded.
379
  Mikoyan, who went 
on to become the Soviet deputy premier in 1960, went so far as to praise Qasim for Iraq’s 
neutrality and tolerance and suggest that the policy might “serve as an example to other 
countries” in the Middle East.
380
  As discussed previously, the Soviet regime considered giving 
primacy to its perceived client in Iraq over the obstreperous Nasser.
381
  However, a series of 
incidents in Iraq demonstrated Qasim’s regional (vice global) orientation and his associated 
Distributed strategy. 
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 The first major challenge to Qasim’s regime occurred in March 1959, when pro-Qasim 
communist marchers in Mosul became involved in a dispute with nationalists that escalated into 
general mayhem.  Plotters within the state decided it was time to strike, and called for the 
military to rise up and depose Qasim.  This came to naught, and the abortive coup was utterly 
crushed by the regime, which then conducted a series of purges against nationalist officers.  
However, by eliminating its nationalist enemies within the state, the regime also removed the 
largest check on the power of the Iraq Communist Party.  Having seen the power of the ICP, 
which mobilized its members in large numbers in defense of the regime, when another round of 
violence in northern Iraq burst forth in July, Qasim took the opportunity to suppress and disarm 
the Communist Party.  He disbanded the Communist militia, closed various ICP vocational 
organizations, and demobilized “no fewer than 1,700 reservists, including the entire Communist-
influenced Thirteenth Reserve Officer Class.”
382
  The third, and most important, incident of 1959 
came in October, when a Ba’athist assassin named Saddam Hussein, along with his co-
conspirators, attacked the Presidential motorcade and wounded Qasim.  Fearing another 
nationalist coup attempt, Communist cadres took over barracks and key government facilities; in 
the event, Qasim lived and became even more wary of his Communist allies.  Convinced by the 
amateurishness of the attack that the nationalists were a spent force, Qasim increased his 
repression of the Iraq Communist Party until, eventually, he refused to arm its militias and call 
for its assistance in the days of fighting that led to his death in 1963.
383
 
 Thus, at the close of the period under scrutiny in this study, Qasim was increasing his 
repression of the Communists in defiance of Soviet appeals for tolerance at the moment when 
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Nasser was seeking to heal the rift that had opened between Egypt and the USSR.  While Iraq 
enjoyed a brief moment in the sun, it became clear that it had neither the PSV of Egypt nor a 
Client strategy that might have warranted elevated levels of support.  Thus, in the end, the Soviet 
Union remained committed to Cairo and the Nasser regime, which I discuss in detail below. 
 
Conclusion 
 Both Nuri and Qasim, for a set of exogenously given reasons, were more threatened by 
internal actors and regional politics than they were by the menace of invasion or great power 
interference.  As predicted, both regimes adopt a Distributed strategy, which uses the armed 
forces to check society while simultaneously limiting the threat the armed forces pose to the 
regime.  My theory predicts both that great powers view the world in terms of threats posed by 
other great powers and that they prefer their small state clients to view the world in similar terms.  
They reward compliance, as seen in Turkey, Iran, and the early Qasim regime, and frown on 
deviations, as seen with the Shah, with Nuri, and with Qasim after 1960. 
 Both between case and within case variation support my hypothesis that Client and 
Integrated strategies have a positive effect on great power security transfers to small states.  
Contrast, for example, the forbearance shown to Turkey throughout the period and Iran in 1954 
with the impatience and focus on the Soviet threat voiced by the US vis a vis Iraq and, later in 
the period, Iran.  When Turkey needed money to pension off a bloated officer corps, the US was 
ready to find ways to support the policy.  When Iraq needed aircraft for an equally political 
purpose, the US was willing to provide them – to Turkey, in order to counter the Soviet menace.  
Likewise, when Qasim seemed like a client, the Soviets were quite patient; when he deviated 




from their desires, they turned back towards Egypt.  Iraq is an especially vivid and useful test in 
this respect, and the results are consonant with the theoretical expectation. 
 
Egypt: Independent Strategy 
 This study begins in 1952, the year the Free Officers overthrew the monarchy in Egypt, 
inspiring a generation of Arab nationalists and inaugurating over a half century of military-
dominated Egyptian governments.  While an internecine struggle brought Gamal Abdul Nasser 
to power over his adversaries in 1954, the chief concern of the revolution was not threats from 
other Egyptian political actors.  Workers who seized their factory in 1952 were promptly 
hung,
384
 the communist party was relatively small and disorganized,
385
 and the Muslim 
Brotherhood was initially aligned with the Free Officers before being brought to “ruin” in 1954 
by Nasser after a failed assassination attempt.
386
  This is not to say that there was not a capacity 
for mass violence – Cairo had been burned and “in 1951 alone a total of forty-nine workers’ 
strikes and several bloody peasant uprisings took place.”
387
  Rather, that these violent impulses 
lacked political organization and focus – Nasser had the control of a regime-sponsored mass 
party and the coercive instruments of the state and, “with the military as the bedrock of his 
support” became “the master of Egypt.”
388
 
 The threats facing the Egyptian regime were threefold.  First, its army was of a low 
quality – in the words of the former commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Army, General Aziz el-
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Masri, “Of course the Egyptian army is worthless.  It was the British who organized it, and they 
had their reasons for making a poor thing of it.”
389
  Second, the British government was 
inhospitable towards the revolution, yet had a garrison with tens of thousands of soldiers at the 
Suez that could menace the regime’s survival and its interests.  Third, despite Nasser’s 
disinclination to provoke Israel, cross-border raids continued to escalate throughout the early 
1950s, culminating in “a devastating retaliatory raid on Gaza in February 1955 [which] sharply 
escalated the level of violence.  The attacking Israelis lost eight men, with thirteen more 
wounded; they left behind thirty-eight dead Egyptians – thirty-seven men and a seven-year old 
boy.”
390
  Combined, these three facts not only limited the Egyptian capacity to create security for 
itself, but also undermined the regime’s raison d’être through cross-border raids and occupation.  
Thus, the chief security concerns of the regime were external. 
 They were also regional – Egypt did not perceive Britain as a member of the “West” in 
the sense that there was an exact congruence between American and British foreign policy aims 
and central direction from Washington.  Nor was Israel understood to be an American client 
(and, as discussed earlier, America was quite deliberate in avoiding partiality in the Arab-Israeli 
dispute during the 1950s.)  Less than a month after the revolution, the new heads of Egypt dined 
with the American ambassador and “emphasized their desire to be particularly friendly with the 
US.”
391
  The US was generally amenable, to the great annoyance of the British, who were prone 
to “muttering of the threat of mil[itary] intervention being [the] best deterrent on Egypt Govt.”
392
  
Secretary of State Acheson directed the embassy in Cairo to inform the Egyptian government 
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that the US wanted to help settle the dispute between Egypt and the UK in order to reach some 
accommodation that would leave the Canal Zone free for regional defense while recognizing 
legitimate Egyptian political concerns.
393
  And, of course, even at the same time that he was 
enlisting the help of the US in various regional matters, Nasser was keen to avoid involvement in 
superpower competition.  Even before his speech in Bandung, Nasser pursued a policy of non-
alignment, which is to say, in the terms of Security Exchange Theory, he was uninterested in 
global threats.  As he told Dulles in 1955, “The Soviet Union never occupied our country; it has 
no imperial past in the Middle East.  I don’t see why I should turn my country into a base to 
threaten the Soviet Union with nuclear warheads when they have never threatened us.”
394
 
 My theory predicts that in the face of regional external threats small states will adopt an 
Independent security strategy.  That is to say, they will avoid stationing the forces of other actors 
on their territory, will build self-sufficient militaries capable of waging regional campaigns, and 
will steadfastly resist the demands of great powers to adjust their military’s logistical bases, 
command and control structures, or force composition.  As with the Distributed strategy, great 
powers may have a burst of initial enthusiasm, but will update quickly regarding the small state’s 
pliability and feel free to give voice to their irritation.  However, like the Integrated strategy, the 
great power security establishment will understand the essentially military, rather than purely 
political, purpose of the small state’s arms procurement strategy and transfer requests. 
 
Egypt and the Middle East Defense Organization: 1952-1955 
 As discussed earlier, the garrison at the Suez canal was to provide the line of defense that 
would halt a Soviet advance in the Middle East and eventually set the conditions for a 
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counteroffensive to retake the region.  Nuclear attacks by aircraft launched from airfields across 
the region were to attrit Soviet forces substantially, but without the Western forces stationed at 
the Suez there was no way to prevent the Soviet seizure of this vital Sea Line of Communication 
(SLOC).  Hence, the story of America’s relationship with Nasser is the tale of a drive for 
integration that encountered an Independent strategy – as expected by Security Exchange Theory 
the US, after a period of hope, was frustrated in its goals, and ultimately abandoned its efforts 
and focused further north. 
 Initially, though, the US was quick to offer military equipment on a reimbursable basis 
just as soon as a needs assessment could be completed.
395
  Egypt demurred, stating that it was 
“glad to enter into discussions with the Govt of the US to determine the nature and the scope of 
such coop[eration] immed[iately] upon … the withdrawal of Brit armed forces from Egypt 
territory.”
396
  However, Egypt held out the possibility of future integration, saying that upon the 
conclusion of a final agreement regarding the withdrawal of the British, Egypt would “be 
prepared to give assurances that one of the ultimate objectives of its policy [was] participation 
with the US, UK and other free-world powers in planning for the common defense of the area 
within the framework of the charter of the UN.”
397
  The US, while disappointed that the Egyptian 
response was “not as forthcoming as might be wished” found that “it nevertheless provide[d] the 
basis for a limited program of assistance at this time with the object of supporting and 
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strengthening the present regime.”
398
  This aid was to take the form of repurposing supplies 
originally intended to equip three police divisions and a promise of further transfers to come.
399
  
The US government was very explicit in its internal and external communication that security 
transfers were based on the promise of integration – the willingness to pay up-front costs was a 
function of the value placed on the importance of Egyptian cooperation in the future.  Egypt was 
well aware of this fact, and the head of the regime at the time, Naguib, told the American 
ambassador that “I may be dreaming but if you could find a way to let us have 100 tanks various 
doors would be opened including one leading to Middle Eastern Defense.”
400
 
 The aid requested by Egypt was supported by the American national security apparatus, 
in the form of an interim program that facilitated the purchase of $11 million in US arms.
401
  
This transfer was to be made as a result of “overriding political considerations;” namely, the fact 
that that the US became “convinced that Egypt is the key to the establishment of a Middle East 
Defense Organization and to a new relationship between the West and the Arab states.”
402
  
However, the British government vehemently opposed the transfer of American arms to Egypt 
prior to a final settlement regarding the Canal Zone.  Interestingly, the British objection to the 
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US transfer of arms to Egypt went beyond the purely mercantile (the UK having been, up to that 
point, the sole supplier of Egyptian arms); in fact, the British were concerned about the 
development of an capable and independent Egyptian force, noting that the “supply of armoured 
cars and tanks … would greatly increase potential of Egyptian force which could be used against 
Her Majesty’s forces in Suez Canal Zone.”
403
  Furthermore, the British couched their desire to 
remain in the Canal Zone in the language of integration when requesting the assistance of the 
United States during negotiations.
404
 
 British resistance to the sale of arms to Egypt was initially met with skepticism and 
irritation by the US, since indications had been made to the Egyptian regime that the deal was 
made.  President Eisenhower himself transmitted his displeasure to Prime Minister Churchill in 
which he claimed to “most deeply deplore having gotten into a position where we can be made to 
feel like we are breaking faith with another government.”
405
  However, after a personal visit to 
Cairo, in which he found that “MEDO [the formal Middle East Defense Organization] [was] 
completely unacceptable to Egyptians,” Dulles determined that the US would not move forward 
with their arms deal with Egypt “at this time.”
406
  This was not because the US supported the 
British policy in the regionally generally, but because “the 70,000 British troops in the Suez base 
and zone represented the only effective fighting force for the free world in the Middle East.  
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Accordingly, we [the US] [had] to play along with the British for the time being, and take the 
beating that would inevitably result through our association with an ally whom the Egyptians and 
other Arab states hated as imperialists.”
407
  The overriding American concern was the “need to 
assure functioning and availability of [the] base in [the] sense that we understand those terms,” 
which is to say that the American security exchange strategy was rooted in its global security 
imperatives vis a vis the Soviet Union.
408
 
 As power shifted within the Egyptian government, Nasser began negotiating directly with 
the West and resumed the Egyptian strategy of tying security exchanges to an effort to “build 
pro-American sentiment in army in preparation for future cooperation.”
409
  Nonetheless, the US 
remained true to its commitment to the UK and, even as negotiations wore on throughout the rest 
of 1953, held back the allocated military equipment.  Interesting, the chief obstacles in the 
process were uniforms for British personnel and the criteria for British reoccupation of the base.  
The former was a function of the symbolic importance of the Suez base for both countries – the 
Egyptians wanted no visible remnant of the British colonial occupation (and, hence, wanted no 
uniforms) and the British national pride demanded otherwise.
410
  The latter got directly to the 
core concerns of the both the US and the UK, in that access to the Suez base was still of key 
importance to the Western concept for the defense of the region; whereas Egypt wanted 
restrictive conditions under which the base could be reoccupied, the UK asked for a greater 
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degree of latitude in the matter, based on the discretion of the British government.  While issues 
of national pride and symbolism lie outside the scope of my theory, the nature of the discussions 
regarding the strategic significance of the Canal Zone support my evaluation of American 
Perceived Strategic Value of the region, and also indicate the security transfers were artificially 
depressed by omitted variables (namely, the intransigence of an alliance partner with a historical 
tie). 
 The negotiations over the canal dragged on throughout the first half of 1954, until an 
agreement was finally reached in July.  Freed from the restraints of British diplomatic strategy, 
the US began the process of providing security transfers on the basis of Egypt’s strategic value, 
through both training and grants for equipment.
411
  Again, the record is explicit about the 
connection between the plans for “the defense of the Near East” which “require[d] Egypt to take 
an important part therein” and the military assistance offered.
412
  Surprisingly to the US, Nasser 
did not immediately leap at the opportunity for a security transfer, in large part “because of the 
anticipated adverse public reaction to the type of agreement required by the [Military Security 
Assistance] legislation.”
413
  Moreover, even if the agreement was kept secret (and so would not 
inspire public outcry), Nasser was opposed to the American survey teams or military advisors 
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  While he was not of the opinion that the Egyptian military could deter a 
Soviet attack on the Suez in the event of a general war, he had no interest in joining a MEDO 
that left a “vacuum” between the oil fields of the Arabian peninsula (the first Soviet target) and 
the canal (the second).
415
  In short, America’s expectations of a rapid integration of Egypt into 
their strategic concept vis a vis the Soviet Union were thwarted by Egyptian indifference to 
global external threats.  Egypt was committed to rebuilding its military for its own purposes; 
thus, it pursued an Independent strategy. 
 The tension between Nasser’s refusal to accept American guidance regarding both his 
military and regional politics continued into 1955.  As an inducement to begin a peace process 
with Israel, the US considered offering Egypt $20 million in grant military aid not subject to 
signing a formal MDAP agreement, with the possibility of more aid under the auspices of MDAP 
later on.
416
  However, paralleling the bureaucratic fate of the potential offer of military assistance 
contemplated in 1952, this security transfer quickly became bogged down in the diplomatic 
morass of the Anglo-American peace initiative in the Middle East (Operation Alpha) and the 
American shift to the Northern Tier defensive concept embodied in the Baghdad Pact.
417
  While 
the grant aid did not materialize, after several months the US agreed to sell Nasser $28 million in 
military equipment, with an initial delivery worth about $11 million based on a list delivered by 
the Egyptian government at the behest of the American ambassador in Cairo.
418
  Unfortunately 
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for Nasser, Egypt was suffering from a lack of foreign currency and held “a balance of $28 




 This request created “severe difficulties” for the US,
420
 both because of the bureaucratic 
complications associated with accepting foreign currency and the simple fact that generating the 
demand for pounds would require offsets in the effectiveness of US economic assistance 
programs.
421
  The American ambassador to Egypt was apoplectic at the “unwillingness to 
manipulate a few million dollars” that was “permitting [the] situation to deteriorate” to the point 
that Egypt was driven into the arms of the Soviet camp.
422
  While the ambassador’s predictions 
were shown to be accurate, they fell on deaf ears precisely because Egypt no longer has a 
sufficiently high PSV to demand American aid on favorable terms to support its security 
requirements against regional rivals.  While it may have been somewhat important, it was not 
“essential” to the security of the Middle East any longer.
423
  Whereas the Suez Base had been the 
bedrock of the Western defense of the region, the US now sought “tightly-knit military 
cooperation by states along northern tier” and “association by Egypt with Turkey and Pakistan in 
a looser form of association appropriate to remoter area.”
424
  In the terms used by this theory, 
Egypt’s declining PSV meant that the US would only accept security transfers on its own terms – 
complete with an MDAP agreement, military advisors, and the like.  These conditions were 
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unacceptable to Nasser, who was pursuing an Independent strategy and he was unable to compel 
the US to change them; ultimately years of bargaining came to nothing. 
 
Egypt and the Soviet Union: 1955-1961 
 Despite his commitment to an Independent strategy, Nasser still had a substantial 
requirement for foreign arms.  On Feb. 28, 1955, Israeli forces attacked Egyptian positions in 
Gaza, killing over three dozen people.
425
  This raid was a substantial escalation in the level of 
violence along the border, and afterwards a series of guerrilla attacks in Israel, mine warfare 
targeting Israeli forces, and conventional artillery and small unit attacks against Egypt 
commenced in earnest.  The simple fact facing Nasser was that his Israeli opponents were better 
equipped and trained, and that he lacked the indigenous ability to produce the arms necessary to 
adequately protect Egypt from the threat of Israeli attack. 
 Up until 1955, “Nasser believed America to be capable of playing a useful and 
constructive role in the Middle East, for alone among the major powers she seem potentially able 
to influence events in the right direction.”
426
  But at the Bandung conference, Nasser approached 
Chou Enlai, who reportedly told the Soviet Union that “Nasser asked me if the Soviet Union 
would agree to sell him the arms which he was unable to get from the United States and which 
he badly needs if he is to break out from the monopoly over arms supplies which dominates his 
part of the world, and if he is able to meet the armed raids over Egypt’s frontier to which he is 
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  The security transfer from the USSR was forthcoming and, as discussed 
previously, it supplied Egypt with cutting edge equipment on extremely favorable terms.
428
 
 It is important to note that Nasser was not favorably disposed towards Egypt’s 
communists, who, as discussed above, sided with Naguib, his rival, in their internal struggle for 
power.  The regime quickly suppressed any hints of communist agitation in the immediate 
aftermath of the revolution and continued to do so throughout the whole of the period examined 
in this study.  Soviet policy-makers were aware of this fact, which Nasser reportedly made 
explicit to them during the negotiation of the 1955 arms deal.  In response, he was told that “the 
Soviet Union had nothing to do with local communists; what Nasser did with his communists 
was a purely domestic Egyptian affair.”
429
  In combination with his speeches at Bandung, it 
seems clear that Nasser was not interested in integrating himself into the global revolution and 
that he made his commitment to an independent Egyptian security policy explicit through both 
his words and deeds.  Unfortunately for the Soviets, they had so badly mismanaged their 
diplomacy with Turkey and Iran that supporting the Independent policy of the Egyptian regime 
was the only option they had. 
 Egypt’s determination to forge an independent path (and its vulnerability to regional 
external threats) came into sharp relief during 1956 during the Suez Crisis.  Up until the crisis, 
Nasser had attempted to maintain cordial relations with both superpowers – while he took Soviet 
arms, he had immediately relayed to the US that this was “in the nature of a commercial 
arrangement and he would take every precaution [to] minimize its political implication.”
430
  He 
also continued to negotiate with the West to finance the building of the Aswan High Dam, since 
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Soviet aid would have required visits from foreign technicians, which, as seen above in the 
discussion of American military advisors, he strongly wished to avoid.
431
  During the 
negotiations with the US, he decided to put pressure on the Americans by recognizing the 
People’s Republic of China, which backfired and resulted in the termination of the negotiations 
and the cessation of American support for the project.  Since Nasser still needed currency and the 
Egyptian government was still sharing Suez revenue under the terms of a lease signed by the 
King, he decided to nationalize the canal. 
 Nasser was aware that there might be a military response by the British and French to the 
nationalization of the canal, but believed that if he could buy enough time he could find a 
diplomatic solution.
432
  Of key importance to the theory at hand, “[t]he Egyptian government was 
careful not to ask the Russians what they proposed to do if Egypt was attacked, fearing that their 
answer might well be to propose joint military planning, the preparation of bases for their forces 
on Egyptian territories, the recruitment of volunteers and so on.”
433
  The Egyptian government 
remained committed to its belief that its optimal strategy was Independent, and it resisted even 
the possibility of moving towards Integration.  In this case, though, the military strength of Egypt 
was no match for the combined forces of Britain, France, and Israel, who seized the Sinai and the 
Canal Zone by force in an operation that began on October 29
th
.  This invasion prompted saber-
rattling by the Soviet Union and outrage within American policy-making circles; 11 days later 
the combined pressure of the two superpowers forced a withdrawal by the occupying forces and 
the return of the Suez Canal to Egyptian control. 
 This moment was the “high point of the Egyptian-Russian honeymoon,” when the 
politico-military benefits seemed clear to both parties and discordant aims implied by an 
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Independent strategy had not yet become clear.
434
  So close was the relationship that “Nasser was 
told all the arms lost at Suez would be replaced – the aeroplanes free of charge and the rest at 
half their cost price.”
435
  As discussed previously, simply having a Middle Eastern client capable 
of disrupting Western strategic imperatives in the region was worth the cost of the security 
transfers to the Soviets, and the ready supply of weapons necessary to resist regional adversaries 
was of critical importance to the Egyptian regime; thus, unlike the bargaining process between 
the US and Egypt, there was space to achieve a mutually satisfactory agreement, which is what 
occurred. 
 Nonetheless, Security Exchange Theory predicts that great powers have an enduring 
preference for small state clients that conform to the great power’s understanding of the world.  
Eventually, small states with Independent strategies will be pressured to conform their forces to 
the dictates of an Integrated approach; likewise, Distributed strategies will elicit pressure to 
accept advisors and direction and thus become a Client strategy.  If the small state continues to 
believe that the primary source of threat to their regime is from regional, not global, actors, then 
this pressure creates friction between it and the great power.  Divergent conceptions of the 
security environment bring the honeymoon to an end. 
 This dynamic began to emerge in Soviet-Egyptian relations in 1957-8.  Eager not to 
alienate the West, Egypt abstained from a resolution condemning the Soviet occupation of 
Hungary.  Egypt also disbanded the volunteer forces that had resisted the occupation of the Suez; 
since these forces were openly supported by the Egyptian Communist Party, Khrushchev felt 
moved to object.
436
  In the words of an Egyptian participant in the relationship: “They were very 
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generous with their advice on all matters.”
437
  Compounding the friction created by this 
propensity to advise, the merger of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic (UAR) was 
opposed by the Syrian communists, who found their party banned.  This was an unexpected 
development for the Soviet Union, which had until that point “been regarding with 
understandable satisfaction the growing importance of the communist party in Syria, and now the 
party was dissolved, its leader in virtual exile, and Nasser installed in Damascus instead.”
438
  
This pattern of suppression continued to expand.  As discussed above, Iraq-Egyptian competition 
led Nasser to renew his efforts against the Qasim regime and the communists within the UAR.
439
  
Tensions flared and Khrushchev gave a speech referring to Nasser as a “hot-headed young man 
who has taken on more than he can manage;” Nasser replied in a speech in Damascus that, while 
it might have been the case that he was hot-headed, it was his willingness to courageously face 
steep odds that had brought Egypt out of colonial domination and “[w]ith that same hot-
headedness we shall face the new danger, just as we faced dangers in the past.  We shall achieve 
victory against the new agents of communism.”
440
 
 Eventually, as discussed above, Qasim’s autocratic tendencies and unstable narcissism 
led the Soviet Union to turn back towards Egypt and to cool the heated words being exchanged 
publicly.  Nasser developed a system for understanding Soviet foreign policy, in which he 
articulated five stages that culminated in a country being placed in one of three categories.
441
  
Category A was a most-favored status, which was enjoyed by Egypt in the early 1960s and was 
reminiscent of the “honeymoon” stage of the mid-1950s; Category B was more stand-offish, but 
still obtains “reasonable aid;” Category C was an entirely marginal state; and, if a small state is a 
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source of deep irritation it can find itself, as Egypt did in 1959, in Category D, subject to “cold 
formality and scarcely concealed hostility.”
442
 
 Security Exchange Theory presents a systematic and falsifiable explanation for Nasser’s 
classification scheme.  The Soviet Union began its engagement with Egypt well enough, because 
it was happy to have a small state ally in the region and was willing to tolerate Egypt’s 
Independent security strategy.  Egypt maintained this strategy throughout the period, due to the 
significant and on-going threat of attack by regional powers, as my theory expects.  However, 
also in keeping with the theory, the Soviet Union became irritated by Egypt’s unwillingness to 
take its advice and was less than sanguine about Egyptian persecution of local communists.  
When an exit option seemed to present itself, the Soviets became more aggressive in their 
demands that Egypt comport itself in accordance with the Soviet understanding of the world; 
when that option faded, the Soviet Union became less vociferous in its objections and the space 
to bargain over security transfers expanded. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Egyptian case conforms to the expectations of my theory.  The Egyptian regime 
consolidated quickly after the revolution, and the primary threat it faced was posed first by the 
British garrison in Suez and later by the qualitatively-superior, better-equipped Israeli military.  
Thus, the central preoccupation of Egyptian security strategy was the development and 
deployment of a capability to meet these threats, which they sought from the Americans and then 
the Soviets.  Both great powers, at various points, believed that Egypt would contribute to a 
global security strategy of some type and that, in some way, Egyptian concerns were aligned 
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with great power strategies.  Both great powers were subsequently disappointed, as Egypt 
remained consistent in their evaluation of the regional threat and their strategy to meet it. 
 Security Exchange Theory also expects that the impact of small state strategy interacts 
with that state’s Perceived Strategic Value to a great power.  When Egypt was the cornerstone of 
America’s defensive strategy in the Middle East, American policy-makers would have preferred 
to give aid on favorable terms and rushed to do so upon the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Suez agreement.  However, as Egypt became less important strategically, the US became less 
flexible in its willingness to circumvent bureaucratic procedure in order to make a security 
transfer.  Similarly, when Egypt was the Soviet Union’s primary partner in the region, the USSR 
had a much higher tolerance for the persecution of local communists than it did when it seemed 
that Iraq presented a viable alternative for Soviet security aims in the region. 
 
Conclusions 
 Security Exchange Theory is a powerful predictor of small state security behavior, the 
great power response to the strategies of its allies, and the interaction between great power and 
small state security logics in the determination of security transfers.  The theory performed well 
not only in over-determined cases like Turkey, but also in stronger tests: unlike security-
autonomy, simple capability aggregation, or even other structural approaches (like Balance of 
Threat) my theory provides useful predictions that explain why the US became less patient with 
Egypt between 1952 and 1955, why the American opinion of the Shah shifted dramatically in 
1957, and why the US failed to reward Iraq’s adherence to the Baghdad Pact between 1955 and 
1958.  It is effective in explaining both within case and between case variation – that is, it 




provides a plausible logical sequence that explains why countries are treated differently from one 
another and why the same country is treated differently over time. 
 Importantly, the historical cases discussed in this chapter address important questions in 
the omnibalancing and the bargaining literatures.  First, it seems clear that small states assess 
both internal and external threats when arraying their forces and seeking security assistance 
abroad.  While the omnibalancing literature often emphasizes the cumulative effect of alliances 
on small state power, it is apparent from the analysis above that omnibalancing can sometimes 
reduce security transfers from great powers.  This is because, while great powers acknowledge 
the necessity to balance against internal threats, they nonetheless prefer their clients to see the 
world the same way they do.  This congruence of perception is a novel contribution to the 
omnibalancing literature, and, as the foregoing has demonstrated, can have a significant impact. 
Second, there is a considerable emphasis in the security-autonomy, rational choice, and 
bargaining literatures on the challenges associated with accepting costs in the present for payoffs 
in the future.  The possibility of defection looms large, and the management thereof has 
stimulated substantial scholarly and policy-maker attention.  In the case of security exchanges, 
though, these concerns are less significant.  In fact, the data presented in this chapter show that 
although great powers are often overly optimistic in their initial assessment of small state 
commitment to global strategies, they adjust their views quickly and their policies accordingly.  
This is because the practicalities of security exchanges are such that the great power often has 
performed an independent assessment of the small state’s needs, has officers in the small state 
able to observe the utilization of any security transfers, and has an intelligence apparatus that 
seems to update quickly in response to shifts in small state strategy.  A transfer of security goods 
typically takes place over a period of years, enabling both parties to update continuously 




throughout the process.  In most cases and at most times, the great power has a clear 
understanding of the strategy small state and is able to make adjustments to the security 
exchange package as the situation evolves.  Thus, while the threat of defection might be 
enormously important in many alliance and security structures, it is less so in regards to the 
transfer of security goods. 
 That said, the empirical record examined in this chapter also highlights some interesting 
dynamics not predicted by the theory.  The strength of the theory is in its usefulness for 
understanding the broad trends in great power and small state security bargaining, which is 
driven by a rational actor assumption that informs the optimization processes of both parties.  
However, as was vividly illustrated by the Iranian case, idiosyncratic decisions taken by senior 
leaders can create very surprising results.  This can also be the case with the leaders of small 
states that unilaterally take precipitous action that has enormous impact on the security 
environment, such as was the case with Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez and the Arab-Israeli 
wars.  The Soviets were not consulted prior to either of these events, and the losses to the Arab 
armies that they were then asked to replace were significant. 
 Individual leaders and regimes also have a great deal of latitude within the four ideal 
types of strategies I’ve identified for small states, and, as evidenced above, sometimes either 
select the wrong strategy or implement the correct strategy badly.  There is only one case in 
which a regime fully misapprehended the threat against it – the Mossadegh regime in Iran.  
While he acted as though he faced internal threats from regional actors (and, for a while, he did), 
once the Eisenhower administration took office, Iran faced a rapidly emerging and quite serious 
great power threat.  Security Exchange Theory expects that they should have sought the overt 
assistance of the Soviet Union, and they did not do so.  This suggests that perhaps small states 




have a lag in their updating process that parallels, in some ways, the great power updating 
process regarding small states’ strategies.  More common in the cases examined than a small 
state leader choosing an altogether inappropriate strategy is that the appropriate strategy 
nevertheless fails.  The Hashemite regime in Iraq tried to employ a Distributed strategy, and yet 
was destroyed by the state security apparatus.  The Independent forces of Egypt were defeated by 
regional allies on multiple occasions.  The Turkish civilian government, while focused on the 
threat from the Soviets, was replaced in a coup.  The fact that regimes are occasionally defeated 
by that which most threatens them ought not be read as an indictment of the theory.  It is entirely 
believable that a regime’s best strategic alternative might simply not be good enough to handle 
the magnitude of the threat it faces.  Similarly, the fact that a lesser threat becomes fatal does not 
indicate that the regime was wrong to focus on the greater threat; it simply means that in a 
complex, semi-anarchic environment, regimes face a dizzying array of threats and are always, in 
some way, playing the odds. 
 Finally, my theory also takes the West and the Warsaw Pact as homogenous blocks for 
the purpose of analytic efficiency.  But, of course, the foregoing history indicates that there were 
substantial disagreements between members of the West over regional strategy generally and 
security transfers in particular.  For example, the actions of the UK, France, and Israel in the 
Suez crisis were inimical to American interests, the British successfully dissuaded the US from 
selling arms to Nasser in 1952, and British arms exports to Iraq were notoriously slow and 
underwhelming. 
While both the idiosyncratic actions of individual leaders and the reality of intra-bloc conflict 
create noise in the data, it is not clear that there is an easy or prudent theoretical fix.  Happily, the 
impact of leaders seems to operate strongly only when a confluence of factors are present; in all 




the cases mentioned above, more than one idiosyncratic leader needed to choose to override their 
national security bureaucracy.  For example, had the Shah been reasonably conservative 
regarding the economic impact of septupling his defense budget, the Nixon/Kissinger disregard 
for the bureaucracy’s security recommendations would have been less significant.  Trying to 
determine ex ante which leaders are more likely to keep their own counsel and when their 
interactions will result in significant deviations from predicted behavior seems likely to induce 
ad hoc theorization and proliferating complexity for a marginal improvement in results.  While 
this problem is less acute with intra-bloc disagreements, moving from a bilateral theory to a 
multilateral theory will still exponentially increase the interactions that must be modeled.  Again, 
while this would certainly increase the accuracy of predicted result, the Security Exchange 
Theory in its bilateral formulation is already an extremely effective tool for understanding the 
logic of security transfers from great powers to small states. 





 Security Exchange Theory is a parsimonious explanation of the transfer of scarce security 
resources from great powers to small states.  Perceived Strategic Value, or the utility of a small 
state in terms of a great power’s wartime needs vis a vis a rival, explains why great powers 
would choose to relinquish control over some portion of their national power to a state that, by 
conventional measures, has no ability to significantly influence the international security 
environment.  Based on an assessment of their global security needs and resources, great powers 
evaluate small states on the basis of their capabilities, resources, and relevance.  Small states 
with a higher PSV are offered more security goods than those with a lower PSV. 
 Unlike great powers, small states face a variety of internal and external threats.  As actors 
interested in their own survival, small state regimes orient their security apparatus towards the 
source of the greatest threat.  Depending on whether the most serious threat is internal or external 
and regional or global, a small state selects one of four Small State Strategies: Integrated, Client, 
Independent, or Distributed.  Each of these strategies entails a different configuration and 
composition for small state security forces and a different relationship to potential great power 
patronage.  Great powers prefer Integrated and Client strategies, which both allocate security 
goods in accordance with the great power’s understanding of the world.  Great powers tend to 
frown upon Independent and Distributed strategies, which focus small state energies on regional 
threats and not on their contribution to the global security environment. 
 As the logic of Perceived Strategic Value and the logic of Small State Strategy interact, a 
bargaining dynamic emerges wherein great powers offer security goods to potential allies in the 
hopes that key small states will participate in their war plans against their rivals.  Small states, if 
threatened by the rival great power, eagerly accept the goods and the advice that comes along 




with them; great powers seek to reward compliant behavior and are willing to offer additional 
goods in order to ensure its continuation.  However, when small states are threatened by regional 
rivals, great power security goods are repurposed and put in service of a strategy that may not 
optimally contribute to the great power’s desired strategic outcome.  Great powers then tend to 
lower security transfers to the minimum levels dictated by PSV and to shop for alternative small 
states.  Where no alternative exists, the security exchange continues; however, if the great power 
can achieve their desired aim by other means or if the small state is unwilling to accept the costs 
incurred by accepting great power security goods then no exchange takes place. 
 The historical evidence provided great power security exchanges in the Middle East 
between 1952 and 1961 supports the hypotheses generated by Security Exchange Theory.  Small 
states with higher PSVs received more security exchanges than those with low PSV.  Both the 
US and the USSR rewarded compliance with their strategic worldviews and became unhappy 
with small states that deviated from great power advice and pursued Distributed or Independent 
strategies.  Moreover, causal process observations indicate that the hypothesized covariation 
occurred for the reasons captured by Security Exchange Theory.  The US and USSR thought 
about their security environment and the role of security exchanges in terms of the components 
of PSV (capability, resources, and relevance) and were able to accurately assess small state 
strategies and adjust their security transfers accordingly.  Small states adopted the strategies the 
theory expected them to adopt and responded to great power imprecations in the way the theory 
expected them to respond. 
 I selected the mid-twentieth century Middle East for both the abundance of available 
archival records and because it meets the scope conditions I articulated in Chapter 2.  The 
international system was bipolar, the region was essential to both great powers for the 




maintenance of their security and filled with small states, and neither great power could simply 
dominate reluctant small states and induce widespread bandwagoning (although Stalin certainly 
tried.)  While certainly useful from a theoretical and empirical perspective as a test of Security 
Exchange Theory, one could argue that the selected cases are of limited relevance to the 
contemporary, unipolar world.  According to this critique, Security Exchange Theory is mostly 
relevant to a world that no longer exists.  In this chapter, I show the applicability of Security 
Exchange Theory to great power – small state interactions today.  Specifically, I discuss the 
myopia of national-security bureaucracies, the relationship between observed security exchanges 
and inferences about great power security priorities, and the role of Security Exchange Theory in 
regions with bipolar characteristics, such as East Asia.  I will conclude with Security Exchange 
Theory’s implications for the discipline of International Relations and future research agendas.  
 
You see what you look for: Myopia and Policy-making 
 One of the surprising phenomena that emerge from Security Exchange Theory is the 
great power disdain for Distributed strategies.  Presumably, if a great power thought a small state 
was important, it would be happy to support its efforts to achieve internal stability.  A regime 
that collapses from within will be of no help in a larger global conflict.  Yet both in theory and in 
practice, great powers reduce aid to small states that do not hew to their advice regarding internal 
security. 
 This counter-intuitive behavior is, ironically enough, the result of a great power’s deep 
concern for the stability of valuable small states.  The national security apparatus of a great 
power is compelled to develop a theory of power and security that provides a framework for its 
resources allocations.  This framework can be implicit or explicit, but it explains to the great 




power where national power comes from, the relationship between power and security outcomes, 
and how to allocate scarce resources to maximum effect.  During the Cold War, Soviet security 
behavior was structured, in part, by its beliefs about historical materialism and the role of 
communist states in the advancement of its national interests.  American security behavior was 
informed by a belief in the insidious nature of Communism and the tendency of communist 
states to ally with one another.  Thus, the Soviet Union became angry at Nasser over his 
persecution of Egypt’s communists; for its part, the US became equally concerned about Qasim 
over the early inclusion of communists in minor positions in the Iraqi government.  The US also 
became irritated with the Shah of Iran’s deviations from its advice over how to develop Iranian 
stability and national power.  In all these cases, the great power believed that it had a clear 
understanding of the threats faced by small states and the optimal strategy by which to address 
them.  To the extent that a small state did not share this understanding, the great power believed 
it was allocating resources suboptimally and unnecessarily increasing the risks to itself and to the 
great power. 
 American beliefs about the nature of communism and the security policies required to 
oppose it remained fairly consistent through the end of the Cold War, with obvious exceptions.  
However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US was left without an adversary around 
which to concentrate its theory of national security.  This all changed on September 11
th
, 2001, 
after a particularly successful terrorist attack which begat the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  
The GWOT included invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also heralded expanded military 
operations against Islamic terror organizations in the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, the 
tribal areas of Pakistan, and the Sahara desert.  The focus on the security threat posed by Islamic 
terrorism structured American actions in Iraq, including the attempted arrest of Moqtada al-Sadr 




and the headlines and jubilation that greeted the death of the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi.  Similarly, exhaustive reports on the attack on the US embassy in Benghazi 
indicates the team there was more focused on the danger from transnational terrorism than it was 
on the more significant threat posed by local actors responding to local security imperatives.  The 
fact that national security discussions find themselves couched in the language of “the post-9/11 
era” is a strong indication that America’s national security bureaucracy has remained largely 
focused on a single class of threat in the 13 years since the 9/11 attack. 
 This behavior adheres to the expectations of Security Exchange Theory.  Great powers 
allocate scarce resources according to a logic that identifies both threats and optimal strategies 
for obtaining security from those threats.  As it positions resources around the world to facilitate 
the execution of its chosen plans, a great power expects valuable small states to adhere to its 
theory of security and to adjust their forces accordingly.  In the contemporary era, an example of 
this behavior is American demand that Malian forces, which are given training and equipment as 
part of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), be pushed away from 
populated areas and into smuggling networks in the desert utilized by Islamic radicals.  
Transnational terror networks are not Mali’s most pressing security concern, and one could 
easily make the case that Western counterterror operations in the Sahara will be better served by 
a stable Malian government than by the combat power generated by forward-deployed Malian 
soldiers.  However, just as Security Exchange Theory expects, the United States prefers its 
clients to share its worldview and to act accordingly.
443
 
 The great power tendency toward strategic myopia in their interactions with small states 
has important implications for security studies as a discipline.  In order to make sense of great 
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power behavior towards small states, one must have some sense of the great power’s beliefs 
about the nature of threats in the world (in bipolarity, this is fairly obvious, but in other 
circumstances it is less so) and how best to meet those threats with its available resources.  This 
is more than just a simple problem of physics, wherein any observer could determine the optimal 
allocation of assets based solely on their capability – it is a problem of perception.  This creates 
interesting bargains with small states regarding security exchanges; it also creates asymmetrical 
strategic behavior between great power rivals, who do not necessarily share the same perception 
of what constitutes a “valuable” place.  Happily, the tendency towards myopia also makes the 
evaluation of perception more feasible for researchers, as it appears to be stable over time and 
across geographies.  Thus, a great deal of insight into great power politics can be gained at 
relatively low informational cost by discovering and incorporating the great power’s beliefs 
about security. 
 
Determining great power strategies 
 As I discussed in Chapter 3, determining great power war plans using a stable, objective 
measure is extraordinarily difficult.  Great powers have an incentive to deceive their opponents 
about the precise nature of their plans, and one would have to presume that any objective 
measure that could be manipulated by a great power to its strategic advantage would be.  
However, Security Exchange Theory, and particularly PSV, might enable both policy-makers 
and scholars to infer a great power’s security strategy from objective measures that are not easily 
manipulated, such as security exchanges, resource consumption, and available military force. 
 The logic is as follows: if a great power is observed transferring scarce security goods to 
a small state without an obvious payment in return, it is likely doing so on the basis of its belief 




in that small state’s strategic utility.  Major arms transfers are tracked by multiple international 
organizations, the general size and composition of great power militaries is also public 
information, and wartime resource consumption can be estimated using the basic analytical tools 
of security analysis.  The technological and doctrinal status of the small state, its general security 
posture, and the size of its military are also not difficult to discover.  Thus, it is possible to 
observe the dependent variable (security exchanges), the small state strategy, and two of the 
three independent variables of PSV (capabilities and resources).  Armed with this information 
and with an assessment of the great power’s general beliefs about security, it is possible to 
estimate the geographical significance of the small state to the great power and its relevance to 
great power war plans. 
 Given the scale of the commitment required to significantly alter a small state’s 
capabilities, this method of deriving great power’s private security strategies is more difficult to 
manipulate strategically than are other forms of great power signaling, such as formal alliances, 
public declarations, or short-term deployments of power.  Applying this logic to the cases 
discussed in Chapter 4, it is possible to determine American plans for the defense of the Middle 
East by backwards inducing the war plans from the security transfers.  When the Middle East 
was to be abandoned, transfers to the Arab states were very low; when the line of defense was to 
be anchored in Iraq, the US-Iraqi security exchanges increased and when the line moved north, 
they decreased.  The plans that were discussed in secret documents circulated at the top of the 
national security establishment that I cite in the chapter could have been derived from observing 
US-small state security exchanges. 
 The reason that security exchanges are particularly difficult to manipulate in support of a 
strategic deception plan is that doing so creates risk by allocating scarce resources sub-optimally 




and that effective security exchanges require a substantial investment.  The archival data that 
I’ve presented in this project show that, in the American case, there was a finite pool of money 
available to support security exchanges in the Middle East, that allocations within the pool were 
understood to be zero-sum, and that deliberations regarding the optimal employment of security 
exchanges extended to the highest level of government.  Watching carefully what great powers 
invest in seems to be an excellent method for determining how they intend to create security for 
themselves. 
 
 Relaxing the Bipolar Assumption 
 In the scope conditions listed in Chapter 2, I restricted Security Exchange Theory to 
bipolar systems.  This has several desirable theoretical effects – it simplifies the alternatives 
available to small states, reduces the complexity of great power decision-making, and provides a 
structural imperative for great powers to engage in a bit of myopia without relying on less 
tractable theories of bureaucratic behavior.  When tested in an essential region where small states 
could balance (the Middle East) during the early Cold War, Security Exchange Theory 
performed quite well.  One might, however, question its utility in the post-Cold War world.  
Thus, in this section I relax the assumption of global bipolarity and argue that even in a unipolar 
world, some regions may take on characteristics of bipolarity and be amenable to analysis by 
Security Exchange Theory. 
 Removing the assumption of bipolarity is not without cost.  Great powers are likely to 
continue to be strategically myopic, but this is a function of bureaucratic culture and capacity, 
not a simple response to the logic of security.  In a world with only one existential threat, that 
threat structures the security apparatus of a state interested in its survival.  In a world with many 




threats, none of which are existential, it seems plausible that great powers might split their 
attention, even if they seldom seem to do so as an empirical matter.  However, to the extent that a 
great power neglects one threat in favor of another, this would lower the PSV of the states more 
suited to plans to combat less important threats.  The tricky part is when a state could contribute 
to multiple security strategies designed to combat multiple threats – it is not clear, theoretically-
speaking, whether the strategic valuation of the state should aggregate all those strategies 
together or not. 
 For example, consider American policy in East Asia.  Since I have argued that power 
declines over distance, my theory can accommodate the idea that American and Chinese power 
start to equalize the closer one gets to China and the further one gets from America.  Thus, it is 
imaginable and, in fact, seems reasonable to argue that the region takes on some bipolar 
characteristics, even if China is not able to threaten the United States on a global scale.  One 
American concern about potential conflicts with China is the challenge of overcoming Chinese 
anti-ship defenses (called Anti-Access / Area Denial, or A2AD in military parlance) to move 
forces into the region.  There are a variety of solutions to this problem, which could rely on 
naval, air, and cyber attack, could utilize intermediate staging areas, or could preposition 
supplies in the region in order to rapidly introduce forces faster than they could be interdicted.  
All of these sorts of strategies are facilitated by the Philippines, and the US has recently taken 
steps to rehabilitate the base at Subic Bay for contingency operations.
444
  However, as discussed 
above, the Philippines are also a participant in the American campaign against global terror – in 
fact, the same agreement that facilitated the use of Subic Bay was also used to introduce 
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American special forces to fight the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 2002.
445
  It seems that the 
Philippines are important, although the absence of bipolarity makes it more difficult to determine 
exactly why. 
 In any event, it would seem that the Philippines is important to the US because it 
provides a capability the US cannot manufacture on its own – a base near the South China Sea.  
The Philippines face a fading threat from internal actors and a growing threat from China.  Since 
the US shares its perspective on these threats, and because of the Philippines position, Security 
Exchange Theory would expect there to be security exchanges between the two states.  And, in 
fact, the Philippine military has been modernizing and “[t]he U.S. is aiding in this effort by 
selling the Philippines more advanced arms like U.S. Coast Guard cutters.”  Similar security 
exchanges exist with other powerful states in the region that are threatened by growing Chinese 
assertiveness. 
 The purpose of this discussion is not to make final claims about American strategy in 
Asia, but, rather, to demonstrate the applicability of Security Exchange Theory to the 
contemporary world.  While relaxing the assumption of bipolarity complicates the theory by 
making capability and relevance much slipperier concepts, it does not render the theory 
analytically useless.  In fact, in areas of the world that take on characteristics of bipolarity 
relevant to the theory (i.e., a great power can be credibly militarily challenged in some way that 
reduces its security, even though the challenge doesn’t threaten its survival), Security Exchange 
Theory will continue to perform well at both a predictive and an analytical tools for the 
evaluation of great power – small state security exchanges. 
 
Scholarly implications and future research 
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 Security Exchange Theory provides a new approach the analysis of security cooperation 
between great powers and small states.  It extends the capability aggregation literature by 
providing a broader and more nuanced definition of “capability” that more accurately models 
real-world security decision-making, adds significant predictive power at minimal informational 
cost, and solves a puzzle that defies explanation using standard approaches in the field.  It also 
challenges some of the common heuristics employed by the field to understand military aid and 
security cooperation.  Specifically, this project illustrates the limited fungibility of military goods 
and the difficulty in defecting from security exchanges.  This, in turn speaks directly to an 
important difference between raw capability and relative power which is often elided in the 
literature but that is illuminated by Security Exchange Theory.  It also highlights the need to test 
alternative security exchange measures in the era of commercial arms transfers. 
 Military equipment is frequently treated in the aggregate by international relations theory, 
for very good reasons.  In calculating rough estimates of national power, the particulars of 
military hardware are less important that the aggregate number of people and systems the state 
has.  To determine the relative power of two states or the overall distribution of power in a 
structure, this level of imprecision may be appropriate.  However, in the analysis of security 
exchanges, the precise attributes of the security resources being transferred is important.  In the 
cases I examine in this project, the small states lacked an ability to indigenously produce the 
tools of mechanized warfare.  Thus, both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes expressed frustration with 
the US for its refusal to increase the rate at which it transferred armored vehicles, artillery, and 
other higher technology systems.  It was simply impossible for either regime to reallocate funds 
from the indigenous production of logistical support systems the Americans were willing to 
provide to the indigenous production of tanks that they weren’t.  However, just because military 




assistance may have limited fungibility does not mean that it is never fungible – for example, 
when Turkey needed to finance a retirement plan for senior officers (which was forbidden under 
American law), American officials intentionally contributed extra aid elsewhere in the Turkish 
budget to free up the money to facilitate their personnel reforms.  Thus, the obvious rejoinder to 
Security Exchange Theory that small states will simply accept aid and reduce spending in one 
area only to increase spending in another, thus slipping the leash of great power control is 
theoretically appealing but practically difficult. 
 Connected to the idea that the practicalities of military equipment might obviate some of 
the common concerns in security studies is that fact that defection from the security exchange or 
repurposing of the security transfer is quite difficult for small states.  As discussed in Chapter 6, 
one of the chief contributors to the breakdown in US-Egyptian negotiations in the 1950s was the 
American requirement that security exchanges include military assessment teams to aid in 
fielding the new technology and, implicitly, to monitor its use and report back to the American 
national security apparatus.  The disposition of large numbers of conventional forces is not an 
easy thing to keep secret, and the archival evidence in this project has shown that the US was 
aware of the location and purpose of the military elements in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt.  
Thus, the theoretical concern that small states might secretly defect from a security exchange 
would seem to be unfounded. 
 Equally unfounded is the concern that a small state could defect in a very short timeframe 
after receiving a large quantity of aid.  There are a number of obstacles in this regard.  First, the 
delivery of security goods is not an instantaneous thing, and is constrained by equipment 
availability, logistic capacity, and throughput limitations at all the various ports along the 
delivery chain.  Second, as discussed theoretically in Chapter 2 and then demonstrated in Chapter 




6, transforming military equipment into national power requires training, a supply of spare parts, 
and a logistical infrastructure.  If a small state were to defect, the value of the transferred arsenal 
would degrade quickly; this encourages caution on the part of small states, as exemplified by the 
lengthy and careful process undertaken by the Egyptians in the 1970s during their move from the 
Soviet to the American camp.  It is far more likely that great powers will determine that a small 
state is no longer particularly valuable (or, in terms of Security Exchange Theory, its PSV drops) 
and will rapidly decrease security exchanges.  This was the case for Egypt in the early 1950s and 
Iraq in the late 1950s.  As the American nuclear arsenal expanded, the feasible line of defense 
moved north and formerly critical states became luxuries, not necessities. 
 The upshot of these practical limitations on the fungibility of aid and the possibility of 
rapid defection is that extant theories of alliances are unsuitable for security exchange behavior.  
While defection and buck-passing may be viable strategies in alliances between states of equal 
power or states that both have the domestic capacity to produce the security goods their 
militaries require, such is not the case in alliances between great powers and small states.  
Because of the very particular asymmetries that exist between these types of powers and the 
nature of the capabilities to be aggregated, Security Exchange Theory represents an important 
addition to the on-going research on variations in alliance patterns. 
 Security Exchange Theory is also rooted in a deeper debate about the nature of power in 
international relations.  The theory itself is rooted solely in the austere logic of material, relative 
power – great powers and small states are differentiated on the basis of relative power, face 
different threats due to their power disparities, and seek to grow their power to increase the 
capacity of their states/regimes to overcome threats to their survival.  They engage in security 




exchanges because each party believes doing so will increase the power it has relative to its most 
pressing threat. 
 In physics, force is the product of mass and acceleration while power is the product of 
force and displacement.  For a given force to become powerful internationally it must exert itself 
across space; thus, national capability includes not only the people and machines at a state’s 
disposal, but where they are and where they can be put.  This is well-known to military thinkers.  
In fact, the difference between the two concepts is captured in the language used to describe 
combat formations – from the very beginning of their military educations, American officers are 
taught to think in terms of “composition” (what the formation has) and “disposition” (where it is 
and how it is arrayed), because both attributes are of critical importance in shaping the 
formation’s capabilities at a given time.  In international relations theory, there is a tendency to 
elide the latter at the expense of the former.  As a matter of intellectual history, this makes sense.  
Much of the foundational thinking about polarity and power was done during the Cold War.  In 
that era, the disposition of nuclear forces can be changed rapidly by adjusting alert levels or, in 
terms of conventional forces in Europe, disposition remained relatively fixed while composition 
changed over time. 
 Nonetheless, as President Eisenhower explained to the Treasury Secretary in the meeting 
recounted at the beginning of this project, improving the disposition of existing forces can do 
more to increase a state’s coercive capacity relative to its rivals than simply increasing the total 
pool of forces available.  Since relative power, in the sense that it is used here and in the realist 
canon, refers to the material capability to induce desirable behavior in others and protect oneself 
from their depredations, it necessary includes the sorts of compositional things that are very 
commonly measured – the size of a state’s army, economy, population, level of mechanization, 




etc. – and dispositional elements of power that are not.  Security Exchange Theory provides one 
avenue by which dispositional considerations can be reintroduced into the larger concept of 
relative power through the inclusion of geography and war plan relevance in great power security 
considerations and the differentiation in the disposition of forces captured by the four distinct 
strategies adopted by small states.  However, there is more work to be done to determine 
methods for the consistent and valid inclusion of dispositional variables into general theories of 
international security behavior. 
 Future research will also be needed to address the complexity of applying Security 
Exchange Theory in the contemporary world.  Total Import Value (TIV) worked well as an 
operationalization of security exchanges in the cases study because the countries lacked an 
ability to produce weapons on their own and the Cold War blocs were still allocating scarce 
resources in a world where demands outstripped supply.  For some types of arms, this has 
changed.  For example, the US tried to manage the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1950s by limited 
the export of arms to the combatants and maintaining parity between the parties when 
superpower security calculations demanded the introduction of capabilities to an ally.  It could 
pursue this policy because neither the Israelis nor the Arabs could simply produce advanced 
weaponry on their own.  Today, however, Israeli has a robust and highly advanced weapons 
industry, and is capable of producing its own tanks, guns, and other tools of warfare.  Moreover, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, in the 1990s the US Commerce Department took over responsibility 
for foreign military sales from the State and Defense Departments.  Countries with money to 
spend have a variety of potential arms suppliers, and the export of arms is considered good 
business and fiscally prudent for the powers capable of producing them.  Thus, TIV would now 




be a poor operationalization of security exchange behavior because it includes both mercantile 
logics and the logic of security competition. 
 A possible alternative measure would be to consider only high-technology systems that 
countries are reluctant to export, either for security considerations or supply constraints.  An 
example of such a system would be the American PAC-III variant of the Patriot Ballistic Missile 
Defense system, which is both sensitive and scarce.  With the proliferation of ballistic missile 
technology, American allies in both the Middle East and Asia are interested in optimizing their 
defensive capabilities.  Thus, a good measure of the relative strategic importance the US places 
on a small state ally might be the transfer of PAC-III systems.  Whether this works as a measure 
is an empirical question; it is, however, illustrative of the sorts of approaches that will be 
necessary to apply and test Security Exchange Theory in the messy and complicated 
contemporary world. 
 That is not to say that it should not be attempted.  Great power beliefs about the relative 
power, the measures they take to array their forces in the world, and struggle of small states to 
obtain security while buffeted from without and within are central issues in the study of 
international relations.  As states transfer tens of thousands of soldiers and billions of dollars of 
military hardware around the world, both scholars and practitioners ought to pause and consider 
what these behaviors reveal about relative power and how they relate to the pursuit of security.  
Security Exchange Theory is a theoretically-powerful and empirically-tested tool to help them in 
that process. 






 This project relies heavily on primary sources, including archival documents, edited 
readers, speech transcripts, and memoirs.  For ease of reference, these sources have been grouped 
together.  Within the “Primary Sources” section, the works are subdivided based on their type 
and origins.  Speeches and memoirs are presented in standard Chicago-style bibliographic 
formatting that readers are likely to be familiar with.  However, the organization of the archival 
documents and edited volumes merits further comment. 
 The US government documents produced by the national security apparatus in the 1950s 
and 1960s are primarily held in the National Archives in College Park, MD.  There, documents 
can be requested by Record Group (RG), File, and Box number.  The Record Groups are quite 
large, and encompass entire agencies or departments.  Here, I draw from RG 218, the records of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and RG 273, the records of the National Security Council.  Within the 
Records Group, agencies have considerable latitude in the creation of a filing system.  Thus, files 
can be organized by any sort of logic – in the present case, RG 218 uses a geographic filing 
system for documents pertaining to a particular area and a topical filing system (called the 
Central Decimal system) for general topics; RG 273, by contrast, uses a bureaucratic system that 
differentiates between specifically enunciated policies and more general “think piece” documents 
circulated by the National Security Council staff.  Within the files, documents are sorted into 
boxes, which may contain loose paper, sub-folders, or numbered documents. 
In order to facilitate the rapid location of the records I have used in this project, I have 
adopted the National Archives’ organizational schema for my bibliography.  Thus, within the 
National Archives section, there are sub-headings for Records Group, File, and Box.  Further 




information about the precise sub-file location, if available, is contained in each document’s 
citation. 
In addition to the documents at the National Archives, I also employ the documents 
collected by the State Department and presented in the Foreign Relations of the United States, or 
FRUS.  The FRUS volumes are organized by date and topic, and within each volume documents 
are presented chronologically, with occasional topical division.  I use the same organization for 
the documents presented in the bibliography.  The titles of the documents are generally anodyne 
for the period that I study, but the supplied date should enable the reader to quickly locate the 
documents I reference.  Doing so will be made considerably easier thanks to the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, which has digitized the FRUS volumes into searchable .pdf files.  The 
FRUS can be accessed online at http://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/FRUS .  
 
  






National Archives at College Park 
 
RG 218 Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
 
Geographic File 1948-50, 381 Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East Area (11-9-47) Sec. 1 to 
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